Home Entertaining astrology Aquinas considered it the best form of government. Thomas Aquinas and his views on the state. Proofs of the existence of God

Entertaining astrology

Aquinas considered it the best form of government. Thomas Aquinas and his views on the state. Proofs of the existence of God

Thomas Aquinas (1226–1274) - a representative of medieval Catholic theology and scholasticism, a native of Sicily (the town of Aquino), belonged to a noble feudal family. He received his education at a Dominican monastery, then at the University of Naples. He taught philosophy and theology in Paris, Rome, Naples, Cologne and other cities. During his lifetime he was called doctor universalis for his extensive knowledge and doctor angelicus for his loyalty to the Catholic Church. In 1323, Thomas Aquinas was canonized, in 1567 he was recognized as the fifth great teacher of the church, and in 1879 his teaching was declared the “only true” philosophy of Catholicism. His political and legal views are set out in the treatises “Summa Theologica”, “On the Government of Sovereigns”, as well as in commentaries on Aristotle’s “Politics” and “Ethics”.

In the political teachings of Thomas Aquinas, one can trace the influence of Aristotle, Cicero and the Stoics, combined with the influence of the tradition of political theology of Augustine, Albertus Magnus, and other ideologists of Christianity.

The state, according to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, is a certain part of the universal order, the creator and ruler of which is God. Moreover, the state, as a form of pre-established human community and cooperation, arises from the needs of “nature” and “reason”. The laws of the state can only be specific regulations that meet the requirements of the divine order. The power that puts these laws into operation is a force whose source also lies in the deity. This unifying power is natural and necessary; it meets the pre-established need of human nature to be a moral, rational, religious, social and political being. In order to live and work together, a high authority is needed to guide each member of society to achieve the common good. The purpose and justification of the state is to provide man with a satisfactory means of subsistence, to provide a basis for moral and mental development, which, in turn, should assist the state in the spiritual education of the Christian.

Following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas argues that man, unlike animals, is guided not by instinct, but by reason, and this gives him the opportunity to organize social life. But Thomas Aquinas traces this relationship between reason and social organization to divine arrangements. And among them is the divinely established necessity of human existence as a “political being” or “social being”

A political community, according to Thomas Aquinas, is formed from artisans, farmers, soldiers, politicians and other categories of workers. The state can function normally only when nature produces such a mass of people, among whom some are physically strong, others are courageous, and others are mentally astute. In this division, Thomas Aquinas also follows Aristotle and argues that these different categories of workers are necessary for the state due to its “nature,” which in his theological interpretation turns out to be ultimately the implementation of the laws of Providence.

In the classification of forms of government, Thomas Aquinas is also noticeably influenced by Aristotle. He identifies three pure forms: monarchy, aristocracy, polity - and three deviant forms - tyranny, oligarchy, demagoguery (democracy).

Just government should be distinguished in the same way. So, if control is carried out by any set, this is called “polity”, for example, when a set consisting of warriors dominates a city-state or province. If management is carried out by a few people who have excellent qualities, government of this kind is called “aristocracy,” that is, the best power, or the power of the best, those who are therefore called optimates. If a just rule is carried out by one, he is correctly called a king [S. 234].

In this case, the criterion for differentiation is the moral nature of government: fair (correct, reasonable, proper) and unfair - from the point of view of the common good as the goal of society. On the same basis, he divides power: political (correct, fair) and despotic (wrong, unjust).

Some of those who are heading towards a goal manage to achieve it in a direct way, and others in an indirect way. Therefore) in a direction there is a multitude of just and unjust. Any government is direct when it leads to an appropriate goal, but indirect when it leads to an inappropriate goal. The many free men and the many slaves have different purposes. For he is free who is his own cause, and a slave is he who is what he is because of another. So, if a multitude of free people is directed by a ruler for the common good of this multitude, this rule is direct and fair, as befits free people. If the rule is directed not towards the common good of the multitude, but towards the personal good of the ruler, this rule is unjust and perverse [P.234].

Just as the rule of a king is the best, so the rule of a tyrant is the worst. Democracy is contrasted with polity; in fact, as is clear from what has been said, both of these governments are carried out by many; an aristocracy is an oligarchy, for in both cases a few rule; and monarchies are tyranny, because both governments are administered by one. It was previously shown that the best government is a monarchy. Therefore, if the best is opposed to the worst, tyranny is inevitably the worst kind of government.

So, the more unified the government under a just government, the more benefits it brings; thus, a monarchy is better than an aristocracy, and an aristocracy is better than a polity. For unjust government the opposite is true - so, obviously, the more united the government is, the more destructive it is. So, tyranny is more destructive than oligarchy, and oligarchy than democracy.

In his treatise “On the Government of Sovereigns,” Thomas Aquinas raises another very important topic: the relationship between church and secular authorities. In this formulation of the problem, the answer is given to the question of what goal a just ruler should lead society to. According to Thomas Aquinas, the highest goal of human society is eternal bliss, but the efforts of the ruler are not enough to achieve it. The care of this highest goal is entrusted to the priests, and especially to the vicar of Christ on earth - the pope, to whom all earthly rulers must obey, as to Christ himself.

<...>So, people unite in order to live well together, which no one can achieve by living alone; but a good life follows virtue, for a virtuous life is the goal of human unity<...>. But to live following virtue is not the ultimate goal of the united multitude, the goal is to achieve heavenly bliss through a virtuous life<...>To lead to this goal is the purpose not of earthly, but of divine power. This kind of power belongs to someone who is not only human, but also. God, namely our Lord Jesus Christ<...>

So, the service of his kingdom, since the spiritual is separated from the earthly, is entrusted not to earthly rulers, but to priests, and especially to the highest priest, the heir of Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Pope, to whom all kings of the Christian world must obey, as to the Lord Jesus Christ himself. For those who care about the preceding ends must obey the one who cares about the final goal, and recognize his authority

In solving the problem of the relationship between church and secular authorities, Thomas Aquinas departs from the concept of direct theocracy, subordinating secular power to church power, but distinguishing their spheres of influence and granting secular power significant autonomy.

So, the state, according to Aquinas, arose as a result of natural necessity, since man is by nature a social and political being, since he is a rational being (perception of Aristotle’s reception). But the State, like nature and all things, originates from God. But the nature created by God has some autonomy and creative properties, and the state created by nature has the same properties (the concept of Thomas Aquinas himself). This distinguishes his doctrine of the state from the tradition of Augustine and his followers, according to which the origin of the state is traced back to the Fall, and every phenomenon of nature and society is considered as the result of the direct intervention of divine Providence.

DE REGIMINE PRINCIPUM AD REGEM CYPRI

Book I

Chapter 1

ABOUT WHAT IT IS NEEDED FOR SOMEONE TO RULE PEOPLE LIVING TOGETHER

And our work should begin in such a way that it is clear what needs to be understood by the word king. After all, everyone who is heading towards any goal, everyone who falls to the lot in one way or another to move towards it, needs some kind of guiding principle with the help of which he will directly reach the necessary goal. After all, the ship, which falls to the lot of moving in one direction or the other, under the pressure of different winds, would not have reached its intended goal if it had not been guided to the harbor by the efforts of the helmsman; and man also has some goal towards which his whole life and activity is directed, since he acts with the help of reason, the task of which is obviously to serve the achievement of the goal. On the other hand, it falls to the lot of people to move towards the intended goal in different ways, which in itself reveals the difference in human inclinations and actions. So, a person needs something to guide him towards his goal. There is, after all, a light of reason naturally inherent in each person, thanks to which he is directed towards the goal in his actions. And if only it were fitting for man to live alone, as many animals live, he would not need anything else to guide him to his goal, but everyone would be his own king under the authority of God, the highest king, since man himself would direct his actions himself given to him by the will of God by the light of reason. For man, however, since he is a social and political being, 1 it is natural that he lives in multitudes; 2 even more than all other creatures, for this is required by natural necessity. 3 After all, all other creatures are naturally provided with food, a covering of wool, protection, for example, fangs, horns, claws, or at least agility in running. Man, on the contrary, was created in such a way that nature did not endow him with any of these qualities, but instead of all this he was given reason, thanks to which he could provide himself with all this with the help of his hands. One person, however, cannot cope with all that must be provided. Truly, one person alone could not survive. So, it is natural for a person to live in the company of many. Moreover: other creatures have a natural instinct for everything that is useful or harmful to them, for example, a sheep by nature identifies an enemy in a wolf. Some animals, with the help of natural ability, recognize any medicinal herbs and other things they need for life. A person has an innate knowledge of what he needs for his life, only in general, as if he were able to reach with the help of reason from the knowledge of general principles to the individual ones necessary for his life. It is impossible, however, for one person to comprehend all things of this kind with his mind. Therefore, man should live in multitudes, so that one helps another and different people use their minds for what needs to be learned in different fields, for example, one in medicine, another in this, a third in that. This is even more clearly revealed in what is inherent in man - in the use of speech, thanks to which one person can fully express his thoughts to others. It is true that other creatures mainly express their feelings to each other; Just as a dog communicates anger by barking, so other creatures express their feelings in various ways. So, people are more closely related to their own kind than any other creature that is considered gregarious, for example, a crane, an ant or a bee. 4 Considering this, Solomon in Ecclesiastes (IV, 9) says: “Two are better than one; because they have a good reward for their labor.” So, if it is natural for a person to live in a society of many, then people need people to have what governs society.<...>

Some of those who are heading towards a goal manage to achieve it in a direct way, and others in an indirect way. Therefore, in the rule of multitudes, just and unjust occur. Any government is direct when it leads to an appropriate goal, but indirect when it leads to an inappropriate goal. 5 To many freemen and many slaves 6 different purposes are appropriate. For he is free who is his own cause, and a slave is he who is what he is because of another. So, if a multitude of free people is directed by a ruler for the common good of this multitude, this rule is direct and fair, as befits free people. If the rule is not directed towards the common good of the multitude, but towards the personal good of the ruler, this rule is unjust and perverse. Therefore, the Lord threatened such rulers through Ezekiel (XXXIV, 2), saying: “Woe to the shepherds of Israel, who fed themselves! (as if looking for his own benefits). Shouldn’t shepherds feed the flock?” Since shepherds must care about the welfare of the flock, then any rulers must care about the welfare of the multitude under their control. So, if unjust rule is carried out by only one, 7 who seeks to extract his own interest from the rule, and not at all the benefit for the multitude subject to him, such a ruler is called a tyrant (which name is derived from “power” 8 ), because, as you know, he oppresses with power, and does not rule with justice, which is why the ancients called powerful people tyrants. If unjust rule is carried out not by one person, but by a large number of people - if not by many - it is called an oligarchy, that is, it is the supremacy of a few, when, as is known, the few suppress the plebs for the sake of enrichment, differing from the tyrant only in quantity. If unjust rule is carried out by many, it is called democracy, which means the dominance of the people, when people from the common people suppress the rich. Thus, the entire people acts as one tyrant. Just government should be distinguished in the same way. So, if control is carried out by any set, this is called a polity, for example, when a set consisting of warriors dominates a city-state 9 or provinces. If management is carried out by a few people who have excellent qualities, government of this kind is called aristocracy, that is, the best power, or the power of the best, those who are therefore called optimates. If a just rule is carried out by one, he is correctly called a king. Therefore, the Lord, through the mouth of Ezekiel (chapter XXXVII, 24), says: “And my servant David will be king over them, and one will be the shepherd of them all.” From here, obviously, it is clear that the king should be considered the one who rules alone, and this is a shepherd who cares about the common good of the many, and not about his own benefit.

Since a person has to live in a multitude, since he cannot provide himself with the necessities of life, if he remains alone, then the society of many will be all the more perfect, the more he can provide himself with the necessities of life. 10 After all, in one family living in one house, there are some things necessary for life, namely as much as is needed for natural processes - nutrition, procreation and other things in this sense; on the same street 11 - as much as needed for one craft; in a city-state, which is a perfect community, as much as is needed for all vital needs, but even more in one province 12 due to the need for struggle and mutual assistance against enemies. Therefore, he who reigns in a perfect community (such as a city-state or province) is antonomastically 13 called king; the one who reigns in the house is called not a king, but the father of a family. He, however, bears some resemblance to the king, which is why kings are sometimes called fathers of nations.

From what has been said, it follows that the king is the one who rules the multitude of one city-state or province, and rules for the common good. Therefore Solomon in Ecclesiastes (V, 8) says: “The king of all the earth commands those who serve him.”

Chapter II

ABOUT WHAT IS MORE USEFUL FOR MANY PEOPLE LIVING TOGETHER TO BE RULED BY ONE THAN MANY

After what has been said previously, the question must be asked whether it is more suitable for a province or a city-state to be governed by one or by many.

So one rules better than many, because they are just approaching becoming one. Moreover, what exists by nature is arranged in the best way, because nature acts in the best way in each individual case, and the general government of nature is carried out by one. Indeed, among the many parts of the body, there is one that moves everything, namely the heart, and among the parts of the soul, one power predominates, namely the mind. After all, bees have one king, and in the entire universe there is one God, the creator of everything and the ruler. And that's reasonable. Truly, every multitude comes from one. Therefore, if what comes from art imitates what comes from nature, and the creation of art is better the more it approaches what exists in nature, then it inevitably follows that the human multitude is best governed which is controlled by one.

This is confirmed by experience. For provinces or city-states, which are governed by more than one, are overcome by discord and are in unrest, not knowing peace, which, obviously, must be supplemented by what the Lord, lamenting, spoke through the mouth of the Prophet (Jeremiah, xii, 10): “Many shepherds They ruined my vineyard." By contrast, provinces and city-states that are governed by a single sovereign enjoy peace, are renowned for justice and enjoy prosperity.

Chapter III

ABOUT HOW MUCH THE DOMINION OF ONE IS BEST, WHEN IT IS JUST, SO OPPOSITE TO IT IS THE WORST; PROVED USING MANY CONSIDERATIONS AND ARGUMENTS

Just as the rule of a king is the best, so the rule of a tyrant is the worst. Democracy is contrasted with polity; in fact, 5 as is clear from what has been said, both of these governments are carried out by many; an aristocracy is an oligarchy, for in both cases a few rule; and monarchies are tyranny, because both governments are administered by one. It was previously shown that the best government is a monarchy. Therefore, if the best is opposed to the worst, tyranny is inevitably the worst kind of government.

In addition, a unified force is more effective in carrying out its intended purpose than a scattered or divided one. After all, many, united together, pull what they cannot pull individually if the load is divided among everyone. Therefore, just as it is more beneficial when the force for good is more united, since it is directed towards the accomplishment of good, so much more harmful is it when the force for evil is united and not divided. The power of the wicked ruler is directed towards the evil of the multitude, since he will turn the common good of the multitude only into his own good. So, the more unified the government under a just government, the more benefits it brings; thus, a monarchy is better than an aristocracy, and an aristocracy is better than a polity. For unjust government the opposite is true - so, obviously, the government is so much more united, so much more pernicious. So, tyranny is more destructive than oligarchy, and oligarchy than democracy.

Moreover, the rule becomes unjust due to the fact that, trampling on the common good of the many, it seeks the good only for the ruler. Consequently, the more the common good is rejected, the more unjust the government; and they reject the common good more under oligarchy, when they seek the good of the few, than under democracy, when they seek the good for many, and they deviate even more from the common good under tyranny, when they seek the good of only one; for the whole totality is closer to many than to few, and to few than to just one. Therefore, the rule of a tyrant is most unjust.<...>

So, it is better for a just government to be the rule of only one, also because it is stronger. If the government turns into unjust, it is better that it be the rule of many, since it is weaker and the rulers interfere with each other. Therefore, of unjust governments, democracy is the most tolerable, and tyranny the worst.

This becomes even more obvious when we consider the misfortunes that come from tyranny. After all, when a tyrant, trampling on the common good, seeks his own, he will inevitably torture his subjects in various ways, since, overwhelmed by the desire to possess any benefits, he will fall under the influence of various passions. (. . .) He oppresses his subjects not only in regard to earthly goods, but even in regard to spiritual goods, for those who strive more to be first than to be useful interfere with any success of their subjects, fearing that their superior qualities the latter were not harmed by their own unjust domination. After all, a tyrant fears decent people more than bad ones, and he is always afraid of other people’s virtues. 14 For the said tyrants try to hinder those of their subjects who, moved by virtue and greatness of spirit, may come to the intention of no longer tolerating their unjust domination. They strive to prevent the union of friendship from being strengthened between their subjects, so that they, on the contrary, do not rejoice in the blessings of the world, since they cannot plot anything against its domination until one trusts the other.<…>

Chapter IV

ABOUT HOW DIVERSE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ROMANS WAS AND HOW SOMETIMES THEIR STATE WAS EXTREMELY STRENGTHENED UNDER THE RULE OF MANY

So, since both the best and the worst principles lie in the monarchy, that is, in the power of one, the virtues of royal power seem hateful to many because of the treachery of tyrants; if, on the contrary, they desire the rule of a king, they fall under the ferocious reign of tyrants - after all, a considerable number of rulers have become tyrants , hiding behind the title of king. An obvious example of such cases is the Roman Republic. After the kings were expelled by the Roman people, who could no longer endure royal, or, better said, tyrannical, autocracy, they established consuls and other positions for leadership and administration, wanting to replace the monarchy with an aristocracy, and, as Sallust reports: “ Soon after the Roman state gained its freedom, it strengthened itself in a striking manner within a short time.” For it often happens that people living under the power of a king are less concerned about the common good, believing that what they sacrifice for the sake of the common good will benefit not themselves, but another, under whose power, as they see, they are common good. When they see that the common good is not in the power of one, then they will not treat the common good as if it belonged to another, but everyone will treat it as their own: after all, from experience it is clear that one city a state governed by annually changing rulers is sometimes capable of more than any king, if he rules three or four city-states; and small duties imposed by kings are much more difficult to endure than large burdens if they are imposed by a community of citizens: this helped the rise of the Roman state. After all, the plebs enlisted in military service, and those serving in the army were paid a salary, and when there was not enough money in the public treasury to pay it, for public needs they turned to private fortunes to such an extent that the senators had no gold left except one ring and one bulls 16 - a sign of senatorial dignity. But when they were exhausted by long strife, which developed into civil wars, because of which the freedom to which they had devoted so much energy was stolen from their hands, they found themselves under the rule of emperors; these rulers did not want to be called kings for the reason that the word “king” was hated by the Romans. Some of them, as befits kings, faithfully observed the interests of the common good, and through their efforts the Roman state was exalted and unharmed. However, many of them were tyrants for their subjects, and in the face of enemies they turned out to be inactive and weak and reduced the property of the Roman state to nothing.<...>

So, the danger is twofold, because if you are afraid of the tyrant, then the opportunity to find the best rule is lost - the rule of the king, but if you want to gain such rule, royal power turns into the misfortune of tyranny.

Chapter V

ABOUT WHAT FROM THE BOARD OF MANY OCCUR MORE FREQUENTLY T TYRANNIC RULE THAN FROM THE RULE OF ONE; AND THEREFORE THE RULE OF ONE IS BETTER

If you have to choose one of two dangers, you should choose the one from which the lesser evil will follow. From the monarchy, however, if it turns into tyranny, less evil will follow than from the rule of many optimates, if this rule is perverted.<...>

If the government which is best seems most undesirable from the danger of tyranny, and tyranny, on the contrary, no less, but more often arises from the government of many than of one, it remains only to admit that it is more useful to live under one king than under the rule of many.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION THAT THE RULE OF ONE WHOLE IS BEST. IT SHOWS HOW THE MANY SHOULD BEHAVIOR TOWARDS THEM TO ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF TYRANNY, BUT EVEN IF TYRANNY ARISES, IT MUST BE TOLERATED TO AVOID GREATER EVIL

So, indeed, one should prefer the rule of one, since it is the best, but it happens that it turns into tyranny, that is, the worst, so from what has been said it follows: it is necessary to try with zeal and zeal so that it is foreseen in advance among the many that, as it were, the king did not become a tyrant. First of all, it is necessary that from among those who are subject to this duty, a person of such character should be nominated as king for whom it would be impossible to incline towards tyranny. Samuel, by the power of divine providence, discussing the establishment of a king, says: “The Lord will find Him a man after His own heart” (I Book of Kings, ch. 13, 14). Then the administration of the kingdom should be arranged in such a way that the king would no longer have the opportunity to establish tyranny. At the same time, his power must be so moderate that he cannot easily resort to tyranny. How this should be done will be discussed further. 17 If a king strives for tyranny, all you need to watch out for is how to avoid it.

And if tyranny cannot be avoided, it is more useful to endure until the tyranny ends, than, by acting against the tyrant, to be exposed to many dangers that will be worse than the tyranny itself. After all, it may happen that those who act against the tyrant will not be able to win, and thus the wounded tyrant will rampage even more. If someone who can win rises up against the tyrant, this alone causes the most severe strife among the people: either when the multitude rises up against the tyrant, or when, after the overthrow of the tyrant, it is divided into parts, arguing over the order of government. It even sometimes happens that when, with the help of someone, the multitude expels a tyrant, another, having received power, establishes tyranny, and, fearing to suffer from another what he himself did to his predecessor, suppresses his subjects with even more severe oppression. After all, this usually happens with tyranny that the next one is more difficult than the previous one, because it does not abolish the previous burdens, but, based on its character, invents a new evil. So, once in Syracuse, while everyone wanted Dionysius dead, a certain old woman prayed for a long time that he would be unharmed and would survive her. Having learned about this, the tyrant asked her why she did this. Then she said: “When I was a girl, and we had a terrible tyrant, I wished for his death. He was killed and succeeded by another tyrant, even more severe; and when his power ended, I believed that he was much more severe. You are the third, and now we understand that you are a much harsher ruler. So, if you are destroyed, an even worse one will take your place.”

And if the burden of tyranny is unbearable, it seems to some that to kill the tyrant and expose one's life to the liberation of the multitude would be a valiant deed for a brave man: an example of this is even found in the Old Testament. For when a certain Ehud killed Eglon, the king of Moab, who held the people of the Lord in severe captivity, with a blow of a dagger in the thigh, the people made him a judge. But this does not correspond to the apostolic teaching. After all, Peter teaches us to humbly submit not only to the good and honest, but even, as it is said in the second letter of Peter, to bad masters. Indeed, if someone suffers undeservedly, it will be a blessing for him; for when many Roman emperors tyrannically persecuted the faith of Christ, and a vast multitude of both nobles and common people were converted to the faith, they rejoiced, without resistance, humbly and courageously accepting death for Christ.<...>

It is dangerous both for the multitude and for its rulers if someone, on his own initiative, decides to kill a ruler, even a tyrant. More often, bad people expose themselves to this kind of risk than good people. For for the wicked, the reign of a king is usually no less difficult than the reign of a tyrant, since, according to the second proverb of Solomon (Proverbs of Solomon, XX, 26), “a wise king will drive out the wicked.” In this case, for the multitude, the consequence of this attempt will be rather the danger of losing the king, than a means of saving themselves from the tyrant. It seems, however, that against the cruelty of a tyrant, the action of some people will be successful not on their own initiative, but by the decision of society. First, if the right of a multitude extends to nominate a king for itself, it will not be unjust if the king nominated by that multitude is overthrown, or his power is limited, if he tyrannically abuses the royal power. It should not be considered that such a multitude is unjust, even if it has previously elevated it above itself forever; After all, he himself deserved this by behaving dishonestly in governing the multitude, therefore the agreement with him by his subjects was not respected. 18 Thus, the Romans deprived Tarquin the Proud of royal power, whom they themselves elected king, because of the tyranny that he and his sons then established. The power was replaced by a weaker one, namely the consular power. So Domitian, who, having replaced the most honorable emperors, his father Vespasian and his brother Titus, began to tyrannize, was destroyed by the Roman Senate, just as everyone who acted badly towards the Romans was legally and for the good eliminated by the decision of the Senate. It is known that Blessed John the Evangelist, the chosen disciple of the Lord, who was sent into exile by Domitian himself on the island of Patmos, was returned to Ephesus by decision of the Senate.

If the right to take care of the king for the multitude belongs to some higher authority, then a remedy against the excesses of the tyrant should be sought from him. Thus, when the Jews accused Archelaus of crimes against Caesar Augustus, who had already begun to reign in Judea after his father Herod, at first at least his power was reduced, since he lost the right to be called king, and in the middle of his reign the power was divided between his two brothers. Then, since this could not keep him from tyranny, he was sent into exile by Tiberius Caesar to Lugdunum, 19 city of Gaul. 20 If you cannot expect people’s help against the tyrant, you need to turn to the king of everything - God, your helper in both prosperity and suffering. For it is in his power to turn the hard heart of a tyrant to meekness.<...>After all, his hand did not weaken so that he could not free his people from tyrants. Through Isaiah, he promised his people rest from labor, and from vanity, and from the heavy bondage in which they had previously found themselves. And through Ezekiel (XXXIV, 10) he said: “I will exact my sheep from their hand,” namely, from the shepherds who feed themselves. But the people deserved to receive this mercy from God, and they need to be free from sins, since by divine permission the wicked receive bad rule as retribution for their sins.

Chapter XIV

ABOUT WHAT WAY OF GOVERNMENT BECOMES A KING, SINCE HE MUST FOLLOW THE DIVINE WAY OF GOVERNMENT. THIS CONTROL METHOD IS SHOWN BY THE EXAMPLE OF CONTROL OF A SHIP; HERE IS THE COMPARISON OF THE POWER OF THE PRIEST AND THE POWER OF THE KING

<...>So, people unite in order to live well together, which no one can achieve by living alone; but a good life follows virtue, for a virtuous life is the goal of human unity.<.. .> But to live following virtue is not the ultimate goal of the united multitude, the goal is to achieve heavenly bliss through a virtuous life.<...>To lead to this goal is the purpose not of earthly, but of divine power. This kind of power belongs to one who is not only a man, but also God, namely our Lord Jesus Christ.<...>

So, the service of his kingdom, since the spiritual is separated from the earthly, is entrusted not to earthly rulers, but to priests and especially to the highest priest, the heir of Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Pope, to whom all kings of the Christian world must obey, as to the Lord Jesus Christ himself. For those who are concerned with the preceding ends must submit to the one who is concerned with the ultimate end, and acknowledge his authority.

Chapter XV

THAT THE KING, GUIDING HIS SUBJECTS TO A VIRTuous LIFE, FOLLOWS THE PATH BOTH TO THE ULTIMATE GOAL AND TO THE PRECEDING GOALS. HERE IS SHOWN WHAT GUIDE TO A GOOD LIFE AND WHAT HINDERS IT, AND WHAT MEANS THE KING SHOULD USE TO ELIMINATE THESE OBSTACLES

<...>So, if, as has been said, the one who has care for the ultimate goal must lead those who have care for those heading towards the goal, and direct them with his authority, then from what has been said it becomes obvious that the duty of the king is both submission to what refers to the duties of a clergyman, so does the primacy over everything that relates to worldly affairs, directing them with the authority of his rule.<...>Since the goal of the life we now live, following virtue, is heavenly bliss, it is the duty of the king to take care of the good life of the multitude so that it is worthy of obtaining heavenly bliss, namely, that the king prescribes what leads to heavenly bliss and would prevent, as far as possible, that which is destructive of this purpose.<...>So, the king, versed in the law of God, should first of all be concerned with ensuring that the multitude subordinate to him lives a good life, and this concern consists of three parts: firstly, that he establish a good life in the subordinate multitude; secondly, to preserve what has been established; thirdly, to improve it.

<...>So, in connection with the mentioned triad, the king faces a triple task. First, take care of the continuity of people and the appointment of those who head the various services. In the same way, the divine government regarding what is perishable (for these things cannot remain unchanged forever) provides that, when born, one comes to the place of another, for this is how the integrity of the universe is preserved. Thus, through the king’s care, the goods of the subordinate multitude are preserved, while he carefully sees to it that others enter the abandoned places. Secondly, so that by his laws and regulations, punishments and rewards, he would restrain the people under him from sin and encourage them to do valiant deeds, following the example of God, who gave people the law, rewarding those who keep it, and those who transgress - punishment. The third task facing the king is so that the entire multitude subordinate to him can repel the enemies. After all, nothing will help avoid internal dangers if it is impossible to defend against external dangers.<...>

So, these are the things that relate to the duties of the king, they should be carefully analyzed separately.

Keywords

Aquinas / “On Government” / authorship / dating / sovereign / prince / Aquinas / De regimine / authorship / dating / Lord / Prince / ruler

annotation scientific article on philosophy, ethics, religious studies, author of the scientific work - Alexander Marey

The article is an introduction to the translation into Russian of the first book of the treatise “De regimine principum”. It examines the place of the treatise in the tradition of “mirrors of rulers” and provides a brief analysis of the problems of authorship and dating of the treatise. Within the framework of the European tradition of mirrors of rulers, the essay of Thomas Aquinas “On the Government of Princes” occupies a special place. Certainly not the first in the tradition, this text has become one of the most famous in this genre. Based on his model, the treatises of the same name by Ptolemy of Lucca and Aegidius of Rome were written. In the discussion about dating, the author is of the opinion that the treatise was written in 1271–1273, and its addressee was King Hugo III of Lusignan of Cyprus. A special place in the article is devoted to a discussion about the principles of translation, centered around approaches to the translation of the main categories of Aquinas’s political philosophy, primarily princeps. An opinion is expressed about the impossibility of translating it with the Russian concept of “sovereign” and the possibility of translating it with the words “prince” and “ruler” is discussed.

Text of scientific work on the topic “Thomas Aquinas and the European tradition of treatises on government”

Thomas Aquinas and the European tradition of treatises on government

Alexander Marey

Candidate of Legal Sciences, Associate Professor of the School of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Leading Researcher at the Center for Fundamental Sociology of the National Research University Higher School of Economics Address: st. Myasnitskaya, 20, Moscow, Russian Federation 101000 E-mail: [email protected]

The article is an introduction to the translation into Russian of the first book of the treatise “De regimine principum”. It examines the place of the treatise in the tradition of “mirrors of rulers” and provides a brief analysis of the problems of authorship and dating of the treatise. Within the European tradition of mirrors of rulers, Thomas Aquinas’s essay “On the Government of Princes” occupies a special place. Certainly not the first in the tradition, this text has become one of the most famous in this genre. Based on his model, the treatises of the same name by Ptolemy of Lucca and Aegidius of Rome were written. In the discussion about dating, the author is of the opinion that the treatise was written in 1271-1273, and its addressee was King Hugo III of Lusignan of Cyprus. A special place in the article is devoted to a discussion about the principles of translation, centered around approaches to the translation of the main categories of Aquinas’s political philosophy, primarily princeps. An opinion is expressed about the impossibility of translating it with the Russian concept of “sovereign” and the possibility of translating it with the words “prince” and “ruler” is discussed.

Thomas Aquinas and the tradition of the treatises “On Government”

Among the series of treatises usually called “mirrors of rulers”1, the short text of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)2 “De regimine principum” has a special significance. Of course, this kind of instruction has been an important part of the political culture of Western Europe, at least since the formation of the so-called “barbarian” kingdoms, and from this point of view, Aquinas’s treatise fits perfectly into the tradition, being an organic part of it. On the other hand, there are several important points that distinguish this text from previous works of the same genre.

1. About the genre of “mirrors of rulers” and the role of these texts in the formation of the political culture of the European Middle Ages, see: Anton, 2006; Bagge, 1987; Darricau, 1979; De Benedictis, Pisapia, 1999.

2. Thomas seems too famous a figure to describe his biography here. Let me refer to several fundamental works in which you can read a detailed outline of his life and work: Finnis, 1998; Stump, 2012; Stetsyura, 2010.

Russian sociological review. 2016. vol. 15. no 2

First, Aquinas not only updated, but radically changed the apparatus with which the usual problems of royal power were analyzed. Unlike previous “mirrors”, which, as a rule, were built on a thorough exegesis of Holy Scripture and patristic tradition, Thomas built his text, taking as a basis primarily the Aristotelian theory of politics. Of course, he was fluent in both the Old and New Testaments, and the material presented in the Bible was fully reflected in his treatise. However, even the usual biblical arguments, considered in the light of Aristotelian logic, already looked different. In this regard, Thomas should be recognized as an innovator and, one might even say, the founder of a new tradition of “mirrors” - “treatises on government.” Almost all subsequent authors, among whom we can recall Ptolemy of Lucca, Aegidius of Rome, Dante Alighieri, Marsilius of Padua, etc., already used research optics developed by Thomas in their works.

Secondly, the treatise in question was written by Aquinas already at a very mature age, towards the end of his life, when the health of the great theologian left much to be desired. Perhaps the consequence of these circumstances was, on the one hand, the size of the treatise - even if it had been completed by Thomas himself, it would hardly have exceeded 40-45 chapters grouped into 4 books, and on the other hand, the density of the presentation of the material. Concentrating his attention primarily on the problem of tyranny and its difference from righteous royal rule, Aquinas, in fact, summarized in this small treatise all those observations that he had generously scattered throughout several of his large works (Summa Contra Pagans, Summa Theologica ", "Comments on the Sentences" first of all). Unlike, for example, the treatise of the same name by Aegidius of Rome, in the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas there is not a word about how a king should be raised, how he should dress, what and how much to drink at the table, etc. There are no everyday recommendations to the ruler at all; on the contrary, Aquinas is abstract and quite abstract. This is, rather, not an instruction to the king, in the proper sense of the word, but reflections on the essence and form of royal power, written in seemingly simple, but at the same time very dense language, requiring calm, thoughtful, slow reading.

Perhaps it was this feature that became the reason for the relatively low popularity of the treatise “On the Government of Princes” in the Middle Ages. For example, the above-mentioned treatise of the same name by Aegidius of Rome, despite its enormous size, was much more widely distributed and almost immediately after writing it was translated into several European languages. Thomas's treatise was preserved in 10 major manuscripts (Aquinas, 1979: 448) and, unlike his Summas, was quoted by medieval authors quite rarely. However, the same brevity and theoretical nature of the presentation, along with the personality of the author, who had been canonized by that time, brought this treatise to one of the first places in the early modern period, when it literally became a reference book for anyone who thought about the problems of royal power and tyranny. Finally, it is precisely this feature of Thomas's text that makes this treatise

one of the most interesting and difficult objects for a translator. However, before talking about the translation of the treatise, it is necessary to briefly examine the issues related to its authorship and the problem of dating. Inextricably linked with the last question is another, smaller scale, but also important - the question of the addressee of the treatise, the very king of Cyprus, at whose request Thomas wrote this text.

Active research into the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas began in Europe in the late 70s of the 19th century, after the encyclical “Aeterni Patris”, in which Pope Leo XIII called for the study of Christian philosophy, and above all the philosophy of Thomas. However, researchers seriously got to the treatise “On the Rule of Princes” only in the 20s of the 20th century. The Italian researcher E. Fiori and the Englishman M. Brown were among the first to address the issues of authorship and dating of the treatise (Browne, 1926; Fiori, 1924). Questioning the fact that Thomas was the author of the entire treatise, they initiated a discussion in which A. O'Rahilly (1929a, 1929b) also took part somewhat later, expressing the opinion that the text, starting from 4- The th chapter of the 2nd book of the treatise was written by the student and secretary of Thomas Aquinas - Ptolemy of Lucca. This same statement was confirmed - seemingly definitively - by Martin Grabmann in his monumental work "The Works of St. Thomas Aquinas" (Grabmann, 1931).

From this time on, the opinion that Aquinas wrote the first book of the treatise and the first 4 chapters of the second book acquired the status of a proven fact and remained so almost without exception until 1979. This year, the German researcher Walter Mohr, in his “Notes on the treatise “De regimine”,” questioned the authorship of Thomas Aquinas and suggested that the author of the treatise was someone else who remained unknown to us (Mohr, 1974). His position, discussed in detail by J. . Blythe in his preface to the translation of “De regimine” (Blythe, 1997: 3-5), today has practically no supporters, with the exception of E. Black (Black, 1992), however, as the same Blythe notes. , in the absence of an exhaustive codicological and paleographic study of all manuscripts of the treatise, this question still remains open.

For my part, while recognizing the importance of the arguments of More and Blythe, I join those researchers who clearly attribute the first part of the treatise “On the Government of Princes” (De regimine, I-II.4) to Thomas Aquinas. The two most striking arguments concern, firstly, the serious stylistic differences that exist between this treatise and Aquinas’s Summa, and, secondly, changes in the author’s political position (in the Summa Theologica, Aquinas argues in favor of a mixed constitution, then as in “De regimine” clearly states that the best type of government is monarchy), can be countered as follows. Stylistic differences can be explained by differences in genres - if the "Sums" were, in fact, university notes -

Thomas’s classical lectures, the treatise “On Government” was, rather, a consultation, a response to a private question posed by one of the European monarchs. As for ideological differences, as Léopold Genicot rightly noted, this could be the result of the evolution of Thomas's political views throughout his life (Genicot, 1976). However, as mentioned above, the final answer to the questions of both authorship and dating can only be given by a modern critical edition of the monument.

There are two main versions regarding the dating of the treatise. Supporters of the first of them date the treatise to 1266, naming the young king of Cyprus Hugo II of Lusignan (1253-1267) as its addressee. The cessation of work on the treatise, within the framework of this hypothesis, is associated with the death of the king, which followed at the end of 1267 (Browne, 1926; Grabmann, 1931; O'Rahilly, 1929a; Sredinskaya, 1990; Aquinas, Dyson, 2002).

The second version, which is much closer to me, belongs to the famous German historian, author of the German translation of “The Monarchy” Dante Christoph Flüeler. In his book on the medieval reception of Aristotle's Politics, Flüeler draws attention to the fact that the text of Thomas' treatise under consideration contains references to almost all books of the Politics. This, in turn, suggests that Thomas was familiar with the full text of the Politics, translated into Latin by William of Moerbeke only in 1267-1268. Consequently, the dating of the treatise is shifted by several years, to 1271-1273. (Flüeler, 1993: 27-29), its addressee becomes the next in order king of Cyprus - Hugo III of Lusignan (1267-1284), and the reason for the termination of work on the treatise is the death of Thomas.

Notes on translation. Context

Today, Anglo-Saxon scholarship holds a confident lead in the number of translations of the treatise in question - I know of the existence of six English-language versions of “De regimine”. Since some of them became available to me thanks to the kind assistance of A. A. Fisun only in preparing this article for publication, in the course of working on my translation I used three of them, prepared by J. B. Phelan, J. Blythe and R. W. . Dyson (Blythe, 1997; Aquinas, Dyson, 2002; Aquinas, Phelan, 1949). Almost all of them are distinguished by increased attention to the sources used by Aquinas, and at the same time they do not devote enough space and effort to conceptualizing the main concepts of Thomas's political philosophy. This is largely due to linguistic proximity - a fairly large number of terms passed into English from Latin and practically do not require translation.

The same can be said of the existing translations of De regimine into French and Spanish. I used them sporadically and, unfortunately, turned out to be almost useless - the practice of tracing terminology, in my deep conviction, entails its “disenchantment”, transforming

rotation from terms into ordinary words of everyday language. This way they certainly become clearer, but they lose a fair amount of their original meaning. The same, unfortunately, can be said about the translation of the treatise into German prepared by Fr. Schreyvogl (Aquin, Schreyvogl, 1975). It is distinguished by the translator's rather weak attention to translation terminology. This is especially evident when Schreifogl refers to such multi-layered concepts as, for example, “royal service” (officium regis), etc.

Finally, in preparing my translation, I constantly consulted the only existing translation of the treatise “On the Government of Princes” into Russian. This translation was carried out by N.B. Sredinskaya and partially published in 1990 in a textbook on the history of feudal society (Sredinskaya, 1990). During publication, it was brutally mutilated - almost all fragments with theological content were cut out of it, and only the reception of Aristotelian thought was left. At the same time, it is obvious that Aquinas was first and foremost a theologian, and his political theory is also primarily a theological theory. Without taking this into account, including when translating some key terms of the treatise, you can lose its entire meaning. To my regret, the complete manuscript of the translation by N.B. Sredinskaya remains inaccessible to me today, and its author, in a personal conversation, expressed concern that it has been completely lost. In some cases, I found it possible to follow Sredinskaya’s translation, but in others, specifically stated, I diverged from her. All cases of my discrepancy in the interpretation of certain concepts with other translations of the treatise are indicated everywhere in the footnotes to the translation.

Notes on translation. Terminology

A few words about the principles that guided me when translating Thomas’s treatise into Russian. The main difficulty for me was the poorly developed dictionary of Russian political philosophy, which is why the translation of many terms in the text should be considered purely conventional and subject to further discussion and adjustment.

The thematic specificity of the treatise determined the large proportion of terminology related to management in it. A special place, as can be seen even from the title, is occupied by the figure of princeps. In the Russian translation by N.B. Sredinskaya, princeps, in full accordance with Russian tradition, turns into a sovereign, which seems completely unacceptable to me.

In short, my arguments against such a translation can be summarized in three points. Firstly, princeps implies a relationship of primacy (this word was used to describe the first senator in Rome), while the sovereign marks a relationship of dominance. As a matter of fact, only the Latin dominus can be translated etymologically and semantically by the word sovereign. Secondly, where there is a sovereign, the presence of a state in the understanding of this word is implied,

characteristic of European modern times, while the connection between the princeps and the state as a whole does not exist. Thomas Aquinas, as we know, lived in a stateless era - one can argue whether the state existed, say, in Rome, but not with the fact that feudalism as the type of social relations is absolutely opposite to any statehood. Where there is feudalism, that is, where legal and political pluralism reigns, where there is no single power, a single legal space, there is no state and there cannot be. Finally, thirdly, the concept of a sovereign implies. absolute, complete and undivided power. The phrase “limited sovereign” evokes, at best, a grin, and at worst, simply misunderstanding, but the very idea of unlimited, absolute power in relation to any secular ruler was alien to Aquinas.

Princeps requires a different translation. Based on the fact that Thomas relied, on the one hand, on the Roman tradition, going back through Augustine to Cicero, and on the other, on the theological tradition, going through the same Augustine to the Holy Scriptures, I believe that it is necessary to look for an adequate translation for the concept of princeps in line with these traditions. This largely explains why I propose to use the Russian word prince as the main equivalent for this concept, meaning by this not an appanage ruler, but, as generally as possible, a person with power and access to government. This word has serious roots in our political history, but it is also actively used in line with the biblical tradition, to translate the Greek concepts archontes and basileus (I note that the word sovereign turns out to be reserved there for the Greek concept kurios, the Latin equivalent of which is precisely dominus) . I see the second version of the translation of the Latin princeps as a simple ruler. What prevents me from taking it as the main one is that the same word - ruler - in my translation conveys the Latin rector, and the same root word ruling - the Latin regens and presidens.

The rest of the political vocabulary used by Thomas in the treatise raises virtually no questions. Thus, the words “helmsman” and “governor,” depending on the context, convey the Latin concept of governor; words “king” or “king” - rex. The word power is used to translate the concept of potestas, and sometimes dominium. However, the latter, as a rule, is translated by the concept of dominion, as well as its cognate dominatio. The Latin regnum, as long as possible, is rendered either as a kingdom or as a royal or kingly power. Regimen, in turn, is translated as rule, as well as principatus; if these two terms are used as homogeneous terms (as, for example, at the beginning of the 4th chapter of the treatise), the first is translated as rule, the second as domination.

I will devote a separate study to the analysis of the vocabulary used by Aquinas to describe social reality, which will be published in the next issue of the journal. Therefore, here I will limit myself to a short list of words with variants of their translation found in the treatise. The key concept for social fi-

Thomas's losophy is a multitudo, which I, at least for now, translate as a totality. The word community in the text conveys the Latin communitas, and the word communication - societas. Here it is necessary to make a reservation that for Thomas the concept of societas is not a certain subject or object of social relations, not a certain collection of people, but the very process of their unity, communication, communication, which determines the choice of word for translation. The concept of people is traditionally conveyed by the Latin populus, and by the word city - civitas.

Quotes from the Holy Scriptures in translation are given according to the Synodal Text of the Bible, with the exception of a few fragments, separately indicated in the footnotes, when Thomas, wittingly or unwittingly, distorted the biblical text or when Jerome's translation is particularly at odds with modern tradition. Aquinas’s “Summa Theologiae” is given in the translation by A. V. Appolonov. Cicero and Sallust are quoted in the translation by V. O. Gorenshtein, Titus Livy - in the translation by M. E. Sergeenko. Quotes from Aristotle are given from translations by N. V. Braginskaya (“Nikomakhova Ethics”) and S. A. Zhebelev (“Politics”).

Literature

Sredinskaya N. B. (1990). Thomas Aquinas. On the rule of sovereigns // Political structures of the era of feudalism in Western Europe (VI-XVII centuries). Leningrad: Science. pp. 217-243.

Stump, E. (2012). Aquinas / Trans. from English G. V. Vdovina. M.: Languages of Slavic cultures.

Stetsyura T. D. (2010). Economic ethics of Thomas Aquinas. M.: ROSSPEN. Anton H. H. (2006). Fürstenspiegel des frühen und hohen Mittelalters: Specula princi-pum ineuntis et progredientis medii aevi. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Aquin T. von, Schreyvogl F. (1975). Über die Herrschaft der Fürsten (De regimine princi-

pum). Stuttgart: Advertising. Aquinas Th. (1979). Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. Edita.

T.XLII. Roma: Commissio Leonina. Aquinas Th., Dyson R. W. (2002). Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aquinas Th., Phelan G. B. (1949). De regno ad regem Cypri. Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Bagge S. (1987). The Political Thought of the King's Mirror. Odense: Odense University Press.

Black A. (1992). Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blythe J. M. (1997). On the Government of Rulers / De regimine principum; with portions attributed to Thomas Aquinas. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Browne M. (1926). An sit authenticum opusculum S. Thomae “De regimine principum” // Angelicum. Vol. 3. P. 300-303.

Darricau R. (1979). Miroirs des princes // Dictionnaire de spiritualité: ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire. Vol. IV. Paris: Beauchesne. P. 1025-1632.

De Benedictis A., Pisapia A. (eds.). (1999). Specula principum. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Finnis J. (1998). Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fiori E. (1924). Il trattato De regimine principum e le dottrine politiche di S. Tommaso d'Aquino // La Scuola Cattolica. Ser. 7. P. 134-169.

Flüeler C. (1993). Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter. Bohum: B. R. Grüner.

Genicot L. (1976). Le De regno: Speculation ou realisme? // Verbeke G., Verhelst D. (eds.). Aquinas and Problems of His Time. Louvain: Leuven University Press. P. 3-17.

Grabmann M. (1931). Die Werke des Hl. Thomas von Aquin. Münster: Aschendorff.

Mohr W (1974). Bemerkungen zur Verfasserschaft von De regimine principum // Möller J., Kohlenberger H. (eds.). Virtus politica. Stuttgart: Fromann. S. 127-145.

O"Rahilly A. (1929a). Notes on St Thomas. IV: De regimine principum // Irish Ecclesiastical Record. Vol. 31. P. 396-410.

O"Rahilly A. (1929b). Notes on St Thomas. V: Tholomeo of Lucca, Continuator of the De regimine principum // Irish Ecclesiastical Record. Vol. 31. P. 606-614.

Thomas Aquinas and the European Tradition of Treaties on the Government

Alexander V. Marey

Associate Professor, Faculty of Humanities, Leading Researcher, Center for Fundamental Sociology, National Research University Higher School of Economics Address: Myasnitskaya str. 20, 101000 Moscow, Russian Federation E-mail: [email protected]

This article is an introduction to the Russian translation of the first book of Thomas Aquinas" treatise "De regimine principum." The author considers the place of the text within the framework of the European tradition of the Mirrors of Princes, while describing, in brief , the problems of the authorship and the dating of the treatise. Among the European Mirrors of the Princes, the work of Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship; or, On the Government of Princes, has a special place. , this text became one of the most famous influences in both European Late Medieval Philosophy and Modern Political Philosophy. Additionally, this treatise has become a model for two famous works of the same name, On the Government of Princes, written by Ptolemy of Lucca, and Egidio Colonna. In the discussion of the dating of Aquinas" book, the author holds the opinion that this work was composed between 1271 and 1273, and was addressed to Hugh III

Lusignan, the king of Cyprus. The special place in this article is occupied by a small terminological discussion of the Russian translation of the Latin word "princeps." The author affirms that the existing translation of this word as "Lord" (gosudar) is impossible and quite incorrect. In the author's opinion, the correct translation is "the ruler," or "the Prince."

Keywords: Aquinas, De regimine, authorship, dating, Lord, Prince, ruler References

Anton H. H. (2006) Fürstenspiegel des frühen und hohen Mittelalters: Speculaprincipum ineuntis et

progredientismediiaevi, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Aquin T. von, Schreyvogl F. (1975) Über die Herrschaft der Fürsten (De regimine principum), Stuttgart: Reclam.

Aquinas Th. (1979) Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. Edita. T. XLII, Roma: Commissio Leonina.

Aquinas Th., Dyson R. W. (2002) Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aquinas Th., Phelan G. B. (1949) De regno ad regem Cypri, Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Bagge S. (1987) The Political Thought of the King's Mirror, Odense: Odense University Press. Black A. (1992) Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blythe J. M. (1997) On the Government of Rulers / De regimine principum; with portions attributed to

Thomas Aquinas, Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press. Browne M. (1926) An sit authenticum opusculum S. Thomae "De regimine principum". Angelicum, vol. 3, pp. 300-303.

Darricau R. (1979) Miroirs des princes. Dictionnaire de spiritualité: ascétique et mystique, doctrine et

histoire. Vol. IV, Paris: Beauchesne, pp. 1025-1632. De Benedictis A., Pisapia A. (eds.) (1999) Specula principum, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Finnis J. (1998) Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, New York: Oxford University Press. Fiori E. (1924) Il trattato De regimine principum e le dottrine politiche di S. Tommaso d "Aquino. La

Scuola Cattolica, ser. 7, pp. 134-169. Flüeler C. (1993) Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter, Bohum: B. R. Grüner.

Genicot L. (1976) Le De regno: Speculation ou realisme? Aquinas and Problems of His Time (eds.

G. Verbeke, D. Verhelst), Louvain: Leuven University Press, pp. 3-17. Grabmann M. (1931) Die Werke des Hl. Thomas von Aquin, Münster: Aschendorff. Mohr W. (1974) Bemerkungen zur Verfasserschaft von De regimine principum. Virtus politica (eds.

J. Möller, H. Kohlenberger), Stuttgart: Fromann, S. 127-145. O"Rahilly A. (1929) Notes on St Thomas. IV: De regimine principum. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, vol. 31,

O"Rahilly A. (1929) Notes on St Thomas. V: Tholomeo of Lucca, Continuator of the De regimine

principum. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, vol. 31, pp. 606-614. Sredinskaya N. (1990) Foma Akvinskij. O pravlenii gosudarej. Politicheskie struktury jepohi feodalizma vZapadnoj Evrope (VI-XVII vv.), Leningrad: Nauka, pp. 217-243. Stump E. (2012) Akvinat, Moscow: Jazyki slavjanskih kul"tur.

Stetsura T. (2010) Hozjajstvennajajetika FomyAkvinskogo, Moscow: ROSSPEN.

Four mnemonic rules, five proofs that God exists, the tasks of theology, the superiority of oral speech over written language, the reasons why the activities of the Dominicans make sense, and other important discoveries, as well as facts about the biography of the Sicilian Bull

Prepared by Svetlana Yatsyk

Saint Thomas Aquinas. Fresco by Fra Bartolomeo. Around 1510-1511 Museo di San Marco dell'Angelico, Florence, Italy / Bridgeman Images

1. On origin and unfavorable kinship

Thomas Aquinas (or Aquinas; 1225-1274) was the son of Count Landolfo d'Aquino and nephew of Count Tommaso d'Acerra, Grand Justiciar of the Kingdom of Sicily (that is, the first of the royal councilors in charge of justice and finance), and also the second cousin of Frederick II of Staufen . Relationship with the emperor, who, trying to subjugate all of Italy to his influence, constantly fought with the popes, could not but do a disservice to the young theologian - despite Aquinas’s open and even demonstrative conflict with his family and the fact that he joined the Dominican Order, loyal to the papacy . In 1277, part of Thomas's theses was condemned by the bishop of Paris and the church - apparently mainly for political reasons. Subsequently, these theses became generally accepted.

2. About the school nickname

Thomas Aquinas was distinguished by his tall stature, bulkiness and clumsiness. It is also believed that he was characterized by meekness, excessive even for monastic humility. During discussions with his mentor, the theologian and Dominican Albertus Magnus, Thomas spoke rarely, and other students laughed at him, calling him the Bull of Sicily (even though he was from Naples, not Sicily). Albertus Magnus is credited with a prophetic remark, allegedly uttered to pacify the students who were teasing Thomas: “Do you call him a bull? I tell you, this bull will roar so loudly that his roar will deafen the world.”

Posthumously, Aquinas was awarded many other, more flattering nicknames: he is called the "angelic mentor", "universal mentor" and "prince of philosophers".

3. About mnemonic devices

Early biographers of Thomas Aquinas claim that he had an amazing memory. Even during his school years, he remembered everything that the teacher said, and later, in Cologne, he developed his memory under the guidance of the same Albertus Magnus. The collection of sayings of the church fathers on the four Gospels that he prepared for Pope Urban was compiled from what he remembered by looking through, but not copying, manuscripts in various monasteries. His memory, according to his contemporaries, had such strength and tenacity that everything he ever read was preserved in it.

Memory for Thomas Aquinas, as for Albertus Magnus, was part of the virtue of prudence, which should be nurtured and developed. To do this, Thomas formulated a number of mnemonic rules, which he described in the commentary to Aristotle’s treatise “On Memory and Recollection” and in the “Summa Theology”:

- The ability to remember is located in the “sensitive” part of the soul and is connected with the body. Therefore, “sensible things are more accessible to human knowledge.” Knowledge that is not associated “with any bodily resemblance” is easily forgotten. Therefore, one should look for “symbols inherent in those things that need to be remembered. They should not be too famous, since we are more interested in unusual things, they are more deeply and clearly imprinted on the soul.<…>Following this, it is necessary to come up with similarities and images." Summa Theologiae, II, II, quaestio XLVIII, De partibus Prudentiae..

“Memory is controlled by reason, so Thomas’s second mnemonic principle is “to arrange things [in memory] in a certain order, so that, having remembered one feature, one can easily move on to the next.”

- Memory is connected with attention, so you need to “feel attached to what you need to remember, because what is strongly imprinted on the soul does not escape from it so easily.”

— And finally, the last rule is to regularly reflect on what you need to remember.

4. On the relationship between theology and philosophy

Aquinas identified three types of wisdom, each of which is endowed with its own “light of truth”: the wisdom of Grace, theological wisdom (the wisdom of revelation, using reason) and metaphysical wisdom (the wisdom of reason, comprehending the essence of being). Based on this, he believed that the subject of science is “the truths of reason,” and the subject of theology is “the truths of revelation.”

Philosophy, using its rational methods of cognition, is able to study the properties of the surrounding world. Tenets of faith, proven with the help of rationalized philosophical arguments (for example, the dogma of the existence of God), become more understandable to a person and thereby strengthen him in faith. And in this sense, scientific and philosophical knowledge is a serious support in substantiating Christian doctrine and refuting criticism of faith.

But many dogmas (for example, the idea of the created nature of the world, the concept of original sin, the incarnation of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, the inevitability of the Last Judgment, etc.) cannot be rationally justified, since they reflect the supernatural, miraculous qualities of God. The human mind is not capable of comprehending the divine plan in full, therefore true, higher knowledge is beyond the reach of science. God is the domain of supramental knowledge and, therefore, the subject of theology.

However, for Thomas there is no contradiction between philosophy and theology (just as there is no contradiction between the “truths of reason” and the “truths of revelation”), since philosophy and knowledge of the world lead a person to the truths of faith. Therefore, in the view of Thomas Aquinas, when studying things and natural phenomena, a true scientist is right only when he reveals the dependence of nature on God, when he shows how the divine plan is embodied in nature.

Saint Thomas Aquinas. Fresco by Fra Bartolomeo. 1512 Museo di San Marco dell'Angelico

5. About Aristotle

Albertus Magnus, the teacher of Thomas Aquinas, was the author of the first commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics written in Western Europe. It was he who introduced into use Catholic theology the works of Aristotle, previously known in the West mainly as presented by the Arab philosopher Averroes. Albert showed the absence of contradictions between the teachings of Aristotle and Christianity.

Thanks to this, Thomas Aquinas was able to Christianize ancient philosophy, primarily the works of Aristotle: striving for a synthesis of faith and knowledge, he supplemented the doctrinal dogmas and religious and philosophical speculations of Christianity with social, theoretical and scientific reflection based on the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle.

Thomas was not the only theologian who tried to appeal to the works of Aristotle. This was done, for example, by his contemporary Siger of Brabant. However, Seeger's Aristotelianism was considered "Averroist", retaining some of the ideas introduced into the works of Aristotle by his Arab and Jewish translators and interpreters. Thomas’s “Christian Aristotelianism,” based on the “pure” teaching of the ancient Greek philosopher, which does not contradict Christianity, won - and Siger of Brabant was put on trial by the Inquisition and killed for his beliefs.

6. About the conversational genre

Answering the question why Christ preached but did not write down the postulates of his teaching, Thomas Aquinas noted: “Christ, turning to hearts, put the word above scripture.” Summa Theologiae, III, quaestio XXXII, articulus 4.. This principle was generally popular in the 13th century: even the system of scholastic university teaching was based on quaestio disputata, discussion on a given problem. Aquinas wrote most of his works in the genre of “summa” - a dialogue consisting of questions and answers, which seemed to him most accessible to theological students. The Summa Theologica, for example, a treatise he wrote in Rome, Paris and Naples between 1265 and 1273, consists of article chapters, the title of which includes a controversial issue. To each, Thomas gives several arguments that give different, sometimes opposite, answers, and at the end he provides counterarguments and the correct solution, from his point of view.

7. Evidence of the existence of God

In the first part of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas substantiates the need for theology as a science with its own purpose, subject and method of research. He considers its subject to be the root cause and ultimate goal of all things, that is, God. That is why the treatise begins with five proofs of the existence of God. It is thanks to them that the Summa Theologica is primarily known, despite the fact that out of the 3,500 pages that this treatise occupies, only one and a half are devoted to the existence of God.

First proof the existence of God is based on the Aristotelian understanding of movement. Thomas states that "whatever moves must be moved by something else" Here and further: Summa Theologiae, I, quaestio II, De Deo, an Deus sit.. Trying to imagine a series of objects, each of which causes the previous one to move, but at the same time sets the next one in motion, leads to infinity. An attempt to imagine this must inevitably lead us to the understanding that there was a certain prime mover, “who is not moved by anything, and by whom everyone understands God.”

Second proof is a little reminiscent of the first and also relies on Aristotle, this time on his doctrine of four causes. According to Aristotle, everything that exists must have an efficient (or generating) cause, something from which the existence of a thing begins. Since nothing can produce itself, there must be some first cause, the beginning of all beginnings. This is God.

Third proof the existence of God is proof “from necessity and chance.” Thomas explains that among the entities there are those that can either exist or not, that is, their existence is accidental. There are also necessary entities. “But everything necessary either has a reason for its necessity in something else, or it does not. However, it is impossible for [a series of] necessary [beings], having a reason for their necessity [in something else], to go into infinity.” Therefore, there is a certain essence that is necessary in itself. This necessary entity can only be God.

Fourth proof“comes from the degrees [of perfection] found in things. Among things, more and less good, true, noble, and so on are discovered.” However, the degree of goodness, truth and nobility can only be judged in comparison with something “the truest, the best and the noblest.” God has these properties.

In the fifth proof Aquinas again relies on Aristotle's doctrine of causes. Based on the Aristotelian definition of expediency, Thomas states that all objects of existence are directed in their existence towards some goal. At the same time, “they achieve their goal not by accident, but intentionally.” Since objects themselves are “devoid of understanding,” therefore, “there is something thinking by which all natural things are directed to [their] goal. And this we call God.”

8. About the social system

Following Aristotle, who developed these issues in Politics, Thomas Aquinas reflected on the nature and character of the ruler’s sole power. He compared royal power with other forms of government and, in accordance with the traditions of Christian political thought, spoke unequivocally in favor of the monarchy. From his point of view, monarchy is the fairest form of government, certainly superior to aristocracy (the power of the best) and polity (the power of the majority in the interests of the common good).

Thomas considered the most reliable type of monarchy to be elective, not hereditary, since electivity can prevent the ruler from turning into a tyrant. The theologian believed that a certain number of people (he probably meant bishops and part of the secular nobility participating in the election of secular sovereigns, primarily the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope) should have the legal opportunity not only to give the king power over themselves, but and deprive him of this power if it begins to acquire the characteristics of tyranny. In Aquinas's view, this "multitude" should have the right to deprive the ruler of power, even if they had "previously subjected themselves to him forever," because the bad ruler "exceeds the bounds" of his office, thereby violating the terms of the original contract. This thought of Thomas Aquinas subsequently formed the basis of the concept of “social contract”, very significant in modern times.

Another way to combat tyranny, which Aquinas proposed, makes it possible to understand which side he was on in the conflict between the empire and the papacy: against the excesses of a tyrant, he believed, the intervention of someone higher than this ruler could help - which could easily be interpreted contemporaries as an approval of the pope's intervention in the affairs of “bad” secular rulers.

9. About indulgences

Thomas Aquinas resolved a number of doubts associated with the practice of granting (and purchasing) indulgences. He shared the concept of the “treasury of the church” - a kind of “excessive” supply of virtues, replenished by Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary and the saints, from which other Christians can draw. The Pope can dispose of this “treasury” by issuing special acts that are legal in nature—indulgences. Indulgences work only because the holiness of some members of the Christian community outweighs the sinfulness of others.

10. About the Dominican mission and preaching

Although the Dominican Order was founded by Saint Dominic in 1214, even before the birth of Aquinas, it was Thomas who formulated the principles that became the rationale for their activities. In the Summa against the Pagans, the theologian wrote that the path to salvation is open to everyone, and the role of the missionary is to give a specific person the knowledge necessary for his salvation. Even a wild pagan (whose soul strives for good) can be saved if the missionary manages to convey to him the saving divine truth.

From the standpoint of Christian theology, the original philosophical and legal concept was developed by Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274), the most prominent authority in medieval Catholic theology and scholasticism, with whose name the ideological movement that has been influential to this day is associated - Thomism(in an updated form - neo-Thomism).

His philosophical and legal views are set out in the treatises “Summa Theology”, “On the Government of Sovereigns”, as well as in commentaries on Aristotle’s “Politics” and “Ethics” 1 .

The issues of law and law are interpreted by Thomas Aquinas in the context of Christian ideas about the place and purpose of man in the divine world order, about the nature and meaning of human actions. Covering these issues, he constantly appeals to the theologically modified provisions of ancient authors on natural law and justice, Aristotle’s teachings on politics and man as a “political being” (Thomas also talks about man as a “social being”), etc.

According to Thomas Aquinas, "man is related to God as With some purpose of its own" (Summa Theology, I, q. I, p. 1). At the same time, God, according to Thomas’s interpretation, is the root cause of everything, including human existence and human actions.

At the same time, man is a rational being with free will, and reason (intellectual abilities) is the root of all freedom.

According to Thomas' concept, free will is good will. He considers the freedom of human will and action according to free will to be a manifestation of the proper directness of the will in relation to divine goals, the implementation of rationality, justice and goodness in earthly life, the observance of the divine law in its original origins, which determines the necessary order of the universe.

1 See more details: Rare I.G. Encyclopedia of Legal and Political Sciences. St. Petersburg, 1872/1873. pp. 809-858; History of political and legal doctrines. Middle Ages and Renaissance. M., 1986. S. 27-39; Borgosh Yu. Thomas Aquinas. M., 1975; Anthology of world philosophy. M, 1969. T. 1. Part 2. P. 823-862; Das Naturrecht in der politischen Theorie. Wien, 1963.

niya and human society. In the light of this theological concept of the relationship between freedom and necessity, developed by Thomas 1 - the relationship mediated by the mind that knows and determines the practical behavior of people -: freedom appears as action in accordance with rationally known necessity, arising from the divine status, character and goals of the order of the universe and the laws determined by this (goal-determined, goal-oriented and goal-implementing rules).

Thomas specifies these provisions in his doctrine of law and justice.“The law,” he writes, “is a well-known rule and standard of action by which someone is induced to act or refrains from it” (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 90). He sees the essence of the law in the ordering of human life and activity from the angle of bliss as the ultimate goal. Specifying your characteristics law as a general rule, Thomas emphasizes that the law must express common good all members of society and should be established by the whole society(either directly by society itself or by those to whom it has entrusted care of itself). In addition, Thomas considers the necessity of it to be an essential characteristic of the law. publication, without which its very action as a general rule and measure of human behavior is impossible.

Thomas summarizes his characteristics of the law in the following definition: “The law is a known institution of reason for the common good, promulgated by those who have care for society” (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 90).

Thomas gives the following classification of laws: 1) eternal law (lex aeterna), 2) natural law (lex naturalis), 3) human law (lex humana) and 4) divine law (lex divina).

Eternal Law is a universal law of the world order, expressing the divine mind as the supreme universal guiding principle, the absolute rule and principle that governs the universal connection of phenomena in the universe (including natural and social processes) and ensures their purposeful development.

The eternal law, as a universal law, is the source of all other laws of a more particular nature. A direct manifestation of this law is natural law according to which all divinely created nature and natural beings (including humans), due to their innate properties, move towards the realization of goals predetermined and conditioned by the rules (i.e., the law) of their nature.

Subsequently, the idea of the relationship between freedom and necessity was developed from anti-theological positions by a number of thinkers, including Spinoza and Hegel.

The meaning of natural law for man as a special being, endowed by God with soul and mind (innate, natural light of understanding and knowledge), is that man, by his very nature, is endowed with the ability to distinguish between good and evil, is involved in goodness and is inclined to actions and deeds free will aimed at realizing good as a goal. This means that in the sphere of practical human behavior (in the field of practical reason, which requires doing good and avoiding evil), there are rules and commands that naturally determine the order of human relationships due to human innate drives, instincts and inclinations (to self-preservation, marriage and childbearing, to community life, knowledge of God etc.). For man, as a rational natural being, to act according to natural law means at the same time the requirement to act at the behest and direction of human reason.

Differences in natural (physical, emotional and intellectual) properties and qualities of different people, diversity of life circumstances, etc. lead to unequal understanding and application of the requirements of natural law and different attitudes towards them. The resulting uncertainty associated with lack of specificity commands of the natural law, contradicts their universally binding and essentially uniform character and meaning for all people. From here, that is, from the essence of natural law itself, follows the necessity of human law, which, taking into account the need for certainty and discipline in human relations to the rules and principles of natural law, takes them under protection and concretizes them in relation to the various circumstances and particulars of human life. life.

Human Law in Thomas's interpretation, this is a positive law, equipped compulsory sanction against his violations. Perfect and virtuous people, he notes, can do without human law; for them, natural law is sufficient. But in order to neutralize people who are vicious and unyielding to conviction and instruction, fear of punishment and coercion are necessary. Thanks to this, innate moral properties and inclinations develop in people, and a strong habit of acting wisely, according to free (i.e., good) will, is formed.

Human (positive) law, according to the teachings of Thomas, are only those human institutions that correspond natural law(the dictates of the physical and moral nature of man), otherwise these regulations are not law, but only a distortion of the law and a deviation from it. Related to this is Thomas's distinction just and unjust human (positive) law.

Chapter 2. Philosophy of law in the Middle Ages

The purpose of human law is the common good of people, therefore law is only those regulations that, on the one hand, have in mind this common good and proceed from it, and on the other hand, regulate human behavior only in its connection and correlation with common good, which appears in the form necessary (constitutive) feature and the qualities of positive law.

From the correspondence of human law to natural law also follows the need to establish in a positive law realistically feasible requirements, the observance of which is feasible for ordinary, imperfect people in the majority. A positive law must take people as they are (with their shortcomings and weaknesses), without making excessive demands (in the form, for example, of prohibiting all vices and all evil).

Related to this is sameness (equality) of requirements, imposed by positive law in the interests of the common good to all people (equality of burdens, duties, etc.). The universality of the law thus implies a moment of equality, in this case in the form of applying equal measures and the same scale of requirements to everyone.

A positive law, in addition, must be established by the appropriate authority (within the limits of its powers, without exceeding power) and promulgated.

Only the presence of all these properties and signs in human institutions makes them a positive law, obligatory for people. Otherwise, we are talking about unjust laws, which, according to Thomas, not being laws themselves, are not binding on people.

Thomas distinguishes two type unfair laws. Unfair laws of the first type (they lack certain mandatory features of the law, for example, instead of the common good, there is the private good of the legislator, he exceeds his powers, etc.), although they are not obligatory for subjects, they are compliance is not prohibited in the form of general tranquility and the undesirability of cultivating the habit of not observing the law.

The second type of unjust laws are those that contradict natural and divine laws. Such laws are not only not mandatory, but also Not must be observed and be fulfilled.

Under divine by law refers to the law (rules of confession) given to people in divine revelation (in the Old and New Testaments). When justifying the need for divine law, Thomas points to a number of reasons requiring the addition of human institutions with divine ones.

Firstly, divine law is necessary to indicate the ultimate goals of human existence, the comprehension of which exceeds man's own limited capabilities. Secondly, bo-

Section V. History of legal philosophy and modernity

the natural law is necessary as the highest and unconditional criterion that should be used to guide the inevitable (for imperfect people) disputes and disagreements about what is proper and just, about numerous human laws, their advantages and disadvantages, ways to correct them, etc. Thirdly, divine law is needed in order to direct internal (spiritual) movements, which remain entirely outside the sphere of influence of human law regulating only external human actions. Thomas very consistently substantiates and pursues this most important principle of positive legal regulation throughout his teaching on law and law. And fourthly, divine law is necessary to eradicate everything evil and sinful, including everything that cannot be prohibited by human law.

Thomas supplements his interpretation of the laws doctrine of law.

Right (ius) is, according to Thomas, the action of justice (iustitia) in the divine order of human society. Justice is one of the ethical virtues, which refers to a person’s relationship not to himself, but to other people and consists in rewarding everyone with what is due to them. Thomas, following Ulpian, characterizes justice as the unchanging and constant will to provide everyone with their own. He shares and Aristotle's idea of two types of justice - equalizing and distributive.

IN In accordance with this, right (also understood as righteous and fair) is characterized by Thomas as a certain action, equalized in relation to another person due to a certain method of equation. In the equation according to the nature of things we are talking about natural law(ius naturae), when adjusted according to human will - about civil, positive law (ius civile).

Thomas also calls the right established by human will (or human law) human right(ius hu-manum). The law, therefore, plays a legal role here and acts as a source of law. But it is important to keep in mind that, according to the teaching of Thomas, human will (and expression of will) can make law (and right) only that which corresponds to (does not contradict) natural law.

Natural law, as interpreted by Thomas, as by Ulpian, is common to all living beings (animals and people). Thomas believes that natural law, which applies only to people, law of peoples(ius gentium).

In addition, Thomas identifies divine right(ius divinum), which in turn is divided into natural divine law (direct conclusions from natural law) and positive divine law (for example, the law given by God to the Jewish people).

Chapter 2. Philosophy of law in the Middle Ages

Overall, Thomas Aquinas developed a very consistent and profound Christian-theological version of legal

legal understanding. His philosophical and legal views were further developed in Thomist and neo-Thomist concepts of natural law.

2. Medieval lawyers

A notable milestone in the history of philosophical and legal ideas is associated with the work of medieval jurists.

In general theoretical terms, the legal understanding of medieval jurists in one way or another revolved around the provisions of Roman law and the ideas of Roman jurists as its epicenter and starting point for various kinds of interpretations and commentaries 1 .

In a number of legal schools of that time (X-XI centuries), which arose in Rome, Pavia, Ravenna and other cities, in the course of studying the sources of current law, considerable attention was paid to the relationship between Roman and local (Gothic, Lombard, etc.) law , interpretation of the role of Roman law to fill the gaps of local customs and codifications.

Under these conditions, the norms, principles and provisions of Roman law in their significance go beyond the scope of the sphere where they directly play the role of an active source of law, and begin to acquire a more general and universal meaning. A significant place in the legal understanding of that time begins again to be given to the idea of justice (aequitas) developed in Roman jurisprudence and accepted in the system of Roman law and the associated natural law concepts and approaches to valid, positive law.

I.A. Pokrovsky noted that “in the jurisprudence of the Pavia school, the conviction early arose that to supplement Lombard law one should turn to Roman law, that Roman law is common law, lex generalis omnium. On the other hand, the novelists of Ravenna took into account Lombard law. In the same cases, when legal systems clashed with each other and

1 Noting the positive aspects of such an orientation of medieval legal thought and various legal schools and movements towards Roman law, the pre-revolutionary Russian legal historian A. Stoyanov wrote: “War and scholastic dreams absorbed the activities of the majority in medieval society. Brute force and pompous, stillborn reasoning were the dominant phenomena. Meanwhile, the human mind needed healthy food, positive knowledge. Where could one look for them? In general, one can say positively and impartially “that Roman law was the most practical and healthy product of human thought at the time when the European peoples began to feel a thirst for knowledge... The learned schools of Roman law, as an organ of legal propaganda, were necessary under such conditions.” - Stoyanov A. Methods of developing positive law and the social significance of lawyers from glossators to the end of the 18th century. Kharkov, 1862. P. 250-251.

444 Section V. History of legal philosophy and modernity

contradicted each other, jurisprudence considered itself to have the right to choose between them for reasons of justice, aequitas, as a result of which this aequitas was elevated by them to the supreme criterion of all law. Hence the further view that within each individual legal system, every norm is subject to evaluation from the point of view of the same aequitas, that an unjust norm when applied can be rejected and replaced by a rule dictated by justice... The concept of aequitas is identified with the concept of ius naturale and Thus, the jurisprudence of this time, in its general and main direction, is the predecessor natural law school later era" 1.

This direction was later replaced (late 11th - mid-13th centuries) by the school of glossators (or exegetes), whose representatives began to focus on interpretation (i.e. exegesis, glossator activity) of the text itself of the sources of Roman law - the Code of Justinian and especially Digest. This turn from the assessment of certain norms from the point of view of aequitas to the study of Roman law as a source of positive law is associated primarily with the activities of lawyers at the University of Bologna, which arose at the end of the 11th century. and soon became the center of the then legal thought.

A similar approach to law was developed in other universities (in Padua, Pisa, Paris, Orleans).

Famous representatives of the school of glossators were Irnerius, Bulgar, Rogerius, Albericus, Bassianus, Pillius, Vakarius, Odofredus, Atso. The main glosses - the result of the activity of the entire movement - were collected and published by Accursius in the mid-13th century. (Glossa Ordinaria). This collection of glosses enjoyed high authority and played the role of a source of valid law in the courts.

Glossators made a significant contribution to the development of positive law, to the formation and development legal-dogmatic method interpretation of current legislation. “First of all,” wrote A. Stoyanov about the activities of glossators, “they explain to themselves the meaning of individual laws. Hence the so-called legal exegesis (exegesa leqalis), the first step, the ABC of the science of positive law. But the higher, theoretical demands of the mind led us away from the explanation of individual laws lawyers to a logically connected presentation of entire doctrines within the same legal limits of sources. In addition, the legal literature of the early 13th century represents an attempt to present the teachings of Roman law independently, without adhering to the order of titles and books of the Code. Thus, the germ of the systematic element. glossators attacked those living parties who should be in

1 Pokrovsky I.A. History of Roman law. Petrograd, 1918. pp. 191-192.

Chapter 2. Philosophy of law in the Middle Ages

the method of jurisprudence as a science in the true sense of the word. The study of positive law cannot do without without exegesis, without dogmatic and systematic treatment. Here are expressed the basic, unchanging techniques of the human mind, which are called analysis and synthesis" 1.

The problem of the relationship between law and law, justice (aequi-tas) and positive law, in the presence of contradictions between them, was resolved by glossators in favor of official legislation, and in this sense they were lawyers, standing at the origins of European medieval legalism. In this regard, I.A. Pokrovsky rightly noted: “...In contrast to the previous freedom of treatment of positive law and freedom of judicial discretion, the Bologna school demanded that the judge, having abandoned his subjective ideas of justice, adhere to the positive norms of the law, i.e. Corpus uris Civilis. Already Irnerius proclaimed that in the event of a conflict between ius and aequitas, its resolution belongs to the legislative power" 2.

Postglossators (or commentators), having taken a dominant position in jurisprudence in the 13th-15th centuries, the main attention began to be paid to commenting on the glosses themselves. Representatives of the school of post-glossators (Ravanis, Lull, Bartolus, Baldus, etc.), relying on the ideas of scholastic philosophy, sought to provide a logical development of such a system of general legal principles, categories and concepts, from which more specific legal provisions, norms and concepts can be derived deductively.

Unlike glossators, postglossators again refer to ideas of natural law and the corresponding teachings of the Roman jurists and others of his predecessors. At the same time, they interpret natural law as an eternal, reasonable law, deduced from the nature of things, compliance with which acts as a criterion for the recognition of certain norms of positive law (norms of legislation and customary law).

A number of the main provisions of this school were formulated by its prominent representative Raymond Lull(1234-1315).

Jurisprudence, as interpreted by Lull and other glossators, turns out to be permeated with the ideas and concepts of scholastic philosophy and theology. But Lull “has also other, secondary for him, but essentially more scientific aspirations, namely: 1) to give jurisprudence a compendial presentation and to derive special rights from universal principles, in an artificial way; 2) in this way to impart to the knowledge of law the property of science; 3) to reinforce the meaning and power of written law, coordinating it with natural law, and to refine the mind of a lawyer" 3.

Stoyanov A. Decree. Op. pp. 4-5. " Pokrovsky I.A. Decree. Op. P. 194. Stoyanov A. Decree. Op. P. 10.

Nersesyants “Philosophy of Law”

Section V. History of legal philosophy and modernity

Outlining the techniques of his new approach to law and his understanding "legal art" Lully puts forward, in particular, the following demands: “reducere ius naturale ad syllogysmum” (“reduce natural law into a syllogism”); "ius positivum ad ius naturale reducatur et cum ipso concordet" ("positive right to reduce to natural law and harmonize with it") 1.

The relationship between law and law is decided by Lull in such a way that the recognition of the primacy of natural law over positive law is combined with the search for agreement and correspondence between them. Even when rejecting one or another unjust position of positive law that contradicts natural law, one should, according to Lulli, avoid critical opposition between them. “A lawyer,” he wrote, “is obliged to investigate whether a written law is fair or false. If he finds it fair, then he must draw correct conclusions from it. If he finds it false, then he must not just use it, without blaming it and without disclosing it.” about him, so as not to bring shame on the elders" (i.e., legislators) 2.

In addition to the moment of substantive compliance of the norms of positive law with the meaning and essence of natural justice and reasonable necessity, Lull, in the spirit of scrupulous scholastic logic, also outlines a formalized way of checking the compliance or non-compliance of a positive law (secular and canonical) with natural law. “This method,” he notes, “is this: first of all, the lawyer must divide the law, secular or spiritual, on the basis of the paragraph on the difference... After division, agree its parts one with the other on the basis of the paragraph of agreement... And if these parts, having united, constitute a complete law, it follows that the law is fair... If the spiritual or secular law does not stand up to this, then it is false and there is no need to care about it" 3.

Legal content the characteristic of positive legislation from the standpoint of natural law is thus combined and complemented in Lull’s approach with the requirement formallogical procedures for checking the internal integrity, consistency and consistency of the law as a source of valid law. The injustice of a law contrary to natural law, understood by Lull as at the same time its falsity and irrationality (divergence from the necessities arising from reason), also meant its self-contradiction, its inconsistency also in the formal-logical plane. This idea underlies the logical procedure for checking the legal value of a law proposed by Lull.

1 Ibid. P. 11.

2 See ibid.

3 See ibid.

Chapter 2. Philosophy of law in the Middle Ages

Similar ideas about the nature of the relationship between natural and positive law were developed by Baldus, who argued that natural law is stronger than the principate, the power of the sovereign (“po-tius est ius naturale quam principatus”) 1.

The legal provisions developed and substantiated by lawyers of the post-glossator school have received wide recognition not only in theoretical jurisprudence, but also in legal practice and judicial activity. For the judges of that time, the comments of a number of outstanding post-glossators were the source of the current law, so without any exaggeration we can talk about their law-making role 2 .

From the beginning of the 16th century. in jurisprudence, the influence of the post-glossator school is noticeably weakening. At this time, the so-called humanistic school(humanistic direction in jurisprudence). Representatives of this trend (Budaus, Alciatus, Tsaziy, Kuyatsy, Donell, Doiren, etc.) again focus on a thorough study of the sources of current law, especially Roman law, an intensified process reception which required the coordination of its provisions with the historically new conditions of socio-political life and with the norms of local national law. Techniques begin to take shape and be applied philological and historical approaches to the sources of Roman law, the rudiments of historical understanding and interpretation of law develop.

For lawyers of the humanistic school, law is, first of all, positive law, legislation. Lawyers XVI V. are predominantly legalists, opposing feudal fragmentation, for the centralization of state power, unified secular legislation, and the codification of existing positive law. Such legalism, along with the defense of the absolute power of kings, included in the work of a number of lawyers and the idea of legality and legalism in a broader sense (the idea of universal freedom, equality of all before the law, criticism of serfdom as an anti-legal phenomenon, etc.). Characteristic in this regard, in particular, is the anti-serfdom position of the famous French lawyer Beaumanoir, who asserted that “every person is free” 3 and sought to implement this idea in his legal provisions and structures.

The focus of the lawyers of this direction on positive law, however, was not accompanied by a complete denial of natural law ideas and concepts. It's already obvious

1 See: Pokrovsky I.A. Decree. Op. P. 198.

2 Thus, the comments of Bartolus (1314-1357) “enjoyed extraordinary authority in the courts; in Spain and Portugal they were translated and were even considered mandatory for the courts.” - Pokrovsky I.A. Decree. Op. P. 199.

3 See: Stoyanov A. Decree. Op. P. 35.

448 Section V. History of legal philosophy and modernity

from the fact that the current positive law also included Roman law, which included these ideas and concepts. It is significant that a number of lawyers of that time (for example, Donell), characterizing the place and role of Roman law among the sources of current law, regarded it as “the best objective norm of natural justice” 1.

The concepts of legal understanding of medieval jurists (legal and legal character and profile) significantly deepened the development of the problems of distinguishing between law and law and later - as an important theoretical source - played a significant role in the process of formation of the philosophy of law and legal science of the New Age.

Grotius

Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) is one of the early creators of the “legal worldview” of the New Age. He made a huge contribution to the formation of the modern doctrine of international law, to the formation of the foundations new rationalistic philosophy of law and state.

All social issues (domestic and international) are examined by Grotius from the standpoint of natural law, through the prism of ideas and requirements of legal justice that should prevail in relations between individuals, peoples and states.

Also, the theme of war and peace - the subject of special research by Grotius - turns out to be a legal problem in his interpretation, which he expresses in concentrated form as the law of war and peace.

At the heart of Grotius's entire legal approach is the idea justice as a necessary feature of law. At the same time, justice is interpreted by him as requirement of reason the dictates of the nature of a rational being. “For right,” he notes, “here means nothing more than what is fair, moreover, mainly in a negative, and not in an affirmative, sense, since right is that which does not contradict justice. What contradicts justice is that contrary to the nature of creatures possessing intelligence

1 See ibid. P. 72. It is also noteworthy that, referring to the “best parts of Roman law” as natural law and the law of peoples, Donell recognized their universal significance and suitability for all peoples.

2 Grotius G. On the law of war and peace. Three books ~explaining natural law and the law of nations, as well as the principles of public law. M., 1956. P. 68.

Chapter 3. Philosophy of law of modern times

Following Aristotle, Grotius divides the right to what is natural and volitional.“The best division of law in the accepted meaning,” he notes, “was proposed by Aristotle, according to which, on the one hand, there is natural law, and on the other, volitional law, which he calls legal law, using the word “law” in a narrower sense. Sometimes he calls it established law. The same difference is found among the Jews, when they express themselves precisely by calling natural law "mit-svot", and established law "kukkim", and the Hellenistic Jews render the first word by the Greek word "justice", and the second - the Greek word "command" 1.

Natural law is defined by him as “a prescription of common reason” 2 . According to this prescription, this or that action - depending on its compliance or contradiction with rational nature (i.e., the requirements, the nature of reason) - is recognized as either morally vicious or morally necessary. Natural law, thus, acts as the basis and criterion for distinguishing what is due (permissible) and what is not due (illegal) by its very nature, and not by virtue of any volitional (by people or God) prescription (permission or prohibition).

Volitional right, having as its source the will (human or divine), it is accordingly divided into human law and divine law. Human law, in turn, is divided by Grotius into domestic law, human law in the narrow sense (compared to domestic law) and human law in the broad sense.

Domestic law characterized by Grotius as a right that comes from civil power. This is the so-called positive law (civil laws). State at the same time, it is defined as “a perfect union of free people, concluded for the sake of respect for law and common benefit” 3. Therefore, we are talking about contractual concept of the state.“...The mother of domestic law,” he writes, “is the obligation itself, accepted by mutual agreement, and since the latter receives its force from natural law, nature can be considered as the progenitor of domestic law” 4. The very principle of compliance with contracts (including the contract establishing the state and, therefore, also state laws) is dictated by natural law, for, Grotius notes, it is necessary that there be some kind of order of mutual obligations between people.

1 Ibid. P. 71.

3 Ibid. P. 74.

4 Ibid. P. 48.

450 Section V. History of legal philosophy and modernity

Natural law appears in Grotius as a necessary basis for the doctrine of domestic law in the form scientific system. Domestic law varies over time and varies from place to place (community). And only thanks to the doctrine of natural law is it possible, according to Grotius, to give jurisprudence the form and character of a scientific, strictly theoretical discipline 1 . “Many people have so far,” he notes, “attempted to give this branch a scientific form, but no one has been able to do this, and, to tell the truth, it was impossible to do this except by carefully separating what arose through establishment from what follows from nature itself; until now, due attention has not been paid to such a circumstance, for what follows from the nature of a thing always remains identical to itself and therefore can be easily brought into a scientific form; but what arose through establishment often changes over time and varies in different places, and therefore is devoid of any scientific system, like other concepts about individual things" 2.

The doctrine of unchangeable natural law forms, according to Grotius, “a natural, unchangeable part of jurisprudence” 3. Grotius’s idea also has a much broader, general methodological significance, consisting in indicating that jurisprudence as a science of law and a scientific system of law deals not with the changing provisions of successive laws, but with the objective nature and essence of law. And that's why legal system acts as a scientific basis legislative systems.

Volitional human law in a narrower(compared to domestic law) sense, according to Grotius, is of a different nature and covers the command of the father (paternal law), the command of the master (master's law), etc. This right, although it does not emanate from civil authority, is subject to it. Will-established human law in the wider(than domestic law) in the sense - h this, according to Grotius, is “the law of peoples, namely, that which receives binding force by the will of all peoples or many of them” 4.

Volitional divine right has, according to Grotius, the will of God as its immediate source.

1 It is appropriate to note that the aspirations Grotius- with all the specificity of his approach and vocabulary - in its theoretical, conceptual and logical meaning are consonant with modern ideas about the theory (and philosophy) of law as the basis of the doctrine of law. An essential and relevant aspect of this issue is the idea of the need for scientifically based systems of branches of law as an objective basis for proper legislative activity, to determine appropriate branches (and areas) of legislation.

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