Emmanuel Kant - the great German philosopher 18th - 19th centuries, founder of the German classical philosophy. Without the teachings of Kant, the development of the entire world philosophy from the 18th century onwards, up to the present day, would be unthinkable.
The fundamental provisions of Kant's worldview are set out in two of his fundamental theories: epistemology (theory of knowledge) and ethics (moral theory).
Theory of knowledge - basic provisions
The main work in which the foundations are concentrated is the Critique of Pure Reason.
The purpose of the work is to analyze the theoretical concept, which will later be called subjective dialectics. In it, the philosopher explores the phenomenon of reason.
Kant says that human activity in its basic form is represented by knowledge. This fundamental phenomenon is associated with the possibility individual person identify with all of humanity. In cognition, a person acquires the potency of his existence, endowed with limitless possibilities.
The emerging personality masters human experience, and therefore is also associated with cognition.
Kant introduces the concepts of object and subject of knowledge. They enter into a relationship of dialectical opposition, which is the contradiction of knowledge. The source and leading principle in this dialectical pair is precisely the subject of knowledge. He introduces the object into a relationship of subordination and is able to translate the energy essence of the object directly into his own.
What structure does the subject of knowledge have?
In answering this question, Kant's theory of knowledge distinguishes two levels: psychological and pre-experimental.
- The psychological level means the following. exist in a constantly changing quality, according to which their tasks take place in the form of curiosity, sensitivity, etc.
- The pre-experimental level (transcendental, innate) is understood as the existence of primary inclinations that allow one to feel, for example, time and space, home, etc.
The most important questions of knowledge:
What are its steps or stages;
What are its criteria.
Kant identifies three stages of knowledge:
- sensual;
- rational;
- reasonable.
The practical activity of transforming the mind is the criterion of cognition. creates new ideal objects, concepts and ideas. Ideas that develop and lead the whole of humanity, for example, the idea of God, are distinguished by a special criteriality.
Outside ideas, cognition is impossible, it simply does not exist there.
Thus, Kant's theory of knowledge for the first time in world philosophy raises the question of what are the limits of knowledge.
Despite the limitations of epistemology, reality, according to Kant, can be known in the fullness of reason. This is true for objects created by man himself, i.e. for the world of ideas. The most fundamental, great ideas personify the mind of mankind, they are the essence, source and foundation of faith (for example, the idea of God).
Kant's theory of knowledge for such objects introduces the concept of "things for us", contrasting it with "things in themselves". The latter belong to the world that lies beyond ideas. It is opposed to man, it is the very embodiment of the unknown. Kant argues that between the "thing in itself" and the "thing for us" there is and cannot be any transition. They are initially and forever isolated from each other.
Moral Theory - Fundamentals
The oldest philosophical discipline - ethics - studies It can be argued that Kant's ethical teaching in philosophy is the pinnacle of critical ethics.
Theoretical philosophy, as you know, is busy solving questions about the existence of truth and scientific knowledge.
In turn, practical philosophy, which should include Kant's teaching on ethics, considers the problem of the relationship between the moral law and actual freedom.
Kant's work Critique of Judgment is devoted to clarifying this problem.
Kant's theory speaks of the unity of the critical-philosophical doctrine and ethical philosophy. This unity is revealed due to the fundamental position of man in the universe. It is this position, as well as human behavior, capable of pushing the boundaries of knowledge, the essence, are one.
Morality should not be seen as a tool to get any results. In it, the subject himself realizes the necessary need for certain actions and forces himself to these actions.
Morality is autonomous, says Kant. People who affirm freedom are the creators of their own morality. They create the laws of moral action for themselves.
Humane behavior is measured by attitude to the imperative: the moral law must be respected. This is the main statement. Only a phenomenon of personality can be an expression of respect, since such respect is an a priori feeling. Realizing it, the person is identically aware of the lawful duty and acts in the character of the necessary-universal.
The moral principle differs significantly from the religious one. Recognizing that, thanks to God, happiness and duty coincide (not in this world), Kant emphasizes, however, that the sense of morality is in no way connected with faith, its main feature is autonomy, and it is born from itself.
Moral phenomena point to the fact of absolute inner human self-worth. Cognitive attitude does not keep them within its boundaries. The theoretical mind is incompetent in them.
The theory of knowledge and ethics of Kant are the greatest achievements of world philosophy. The entire history of the culture of subsequent centuries, in one way or another, is based on Kantian foundations.
One of the central problems of epistemology is whether a person, humanity is able to develop knowledge adequate to the processes taking place in reality, to obtain reliable knowledge about things that exist? Most philosophers and scientists answer this question in the affirmative. And this position can be called
epistemological optimism.
Skeptics doubt the possibility of obtaining reliable and
objective knowledge about the essence of the world around them, declare that human "knowledge" is nothing but the expression of opinions, which may or may not be true.
In the history of philosophy, the most famous agnostics were the English philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). According to Hume, it is impossible to rationally prove the reality of things behind our perception. Only sensations, their relations and complexes are available to a person. What is behind the sensations, in his opinion, cannot be the subject of our confident judgments, because they cannot be verified through direct comparison with the external world. Perhaps things are hidden behind sensory perceptions, as the materialists assure. And perhaps these perceptions are excited in a person by the World Mind or God, as the idealists assure. It is impossible to go beyond perceptions. Therefore, the process of cognition, according to Hume, is a combination, movement, increase and decrease in the material delivered to us by the senses.
Kant, unlike Hume, did not doubt the existence of material "things in themselves", entities, but he considered them in principle unknowable. Between the "thing-in-itself" and the phenomenon lies an impassable abyss, to jump over which human mind not given 19.
Kant proceeded from the fact that people have a certain knowledge - both in science and in Everyday life. But this knowledge is surrounded and intertwined with what only seems to be knowledge, but in fact can be either speculative metaphysics (Kant called it “the dream of the mind”), or a false claim to clairvoyance (“the dream of the senses”), or judgments about what goes beyond the limits of human knowledge (for example, about “the world as a whole”)20. It is important to develop an approach that reveals the foundations of various phenomena of knowledge, analyzes the conditions for their possibility and confirms or, on the contrary, rejects their claims to the role of knowledge.
In the mind, according to Kant, there is an ineradicable desire for unconditional knowledge, arising from the highest ethical demands. Under the pressure of this, the human mind strives to solve questions about the boundaries or the infinity of the world in space and time, about the possibility of the existence of indivisible elements of the world, about the nature of the processes taking place in the world. He believed that the attempt of the mind to go beyond sensory experience and to know "things in themselves" leads it to contradictions, to antinomies of pure reason. It becomes possible for two contradictory, but equally justified judgments to appear in the course of reasoning, of which Kant has four pairs (for example, the world is finite - the world is infinite, divisible and indivisible, all processes are causally conditioned and completely free, necessary and random).
Reflecting on them, Kant assumes that the source of such antinomies is rooted in the mind, and not in the Universe, and undertakes a critical examination of the mind itself, its limits and possibilities. He argues that while the mind deals with the finite world (the world of phenomena), our thinking is carried out consistently, but as soon as the mind enters the sphere of thinking about the world as a whole (the sphere of “things in themselves”, entities), it becomes entangled in contradictions. Therefore, according to Kant, it is necessary to limit the claims of reason to the knowledge of "things in themselves." In the event that in the process of spiritual and practical development of the world, a person is forced to deal with the facets of the absolute, he can avoid contradictions only by volitional choice in favor of one or another thesis.
When characterizing skepticism and agnosticism, the following should be kept in mind. Skepticism is important point any serious analysis of knowledge: no type of human knowledge is so perfect that its reliability cannot be questioned. It should be noted that a critical position in epistemology is appropriate and fruitful, because it avoids both dogmatic assumptions21 and the excessive suspicion of skeptics who deny the very possibility for a person to have reliable knowledge.
Agnosticism cannot be presented as a concept that denies the very fact of the existence of knowledge. We are talking about clarifying its capabilities and what constitutes knowledge in relation to reality. The persistence of agnosticism is due to the fact that it was able to capture some of the real difficulties and complex problems of the process of cognition, which to this day have not received a final solution. This is, in particular, the inexhaustibility of the world, the impossibility of fully comprehending the ever-changing being, its subjective refraction in the senses and thinking of a person - limited in their capabilities, etc. The world is too complicated for human understanding; there are always mysteries and unsolved problems in it22.
Many philosophers have shown the internal inconsistency of the reasoning of skeptics and agnostics. It was said that an agnostic doubts how many fingers he has, it was argued that, adhering to the position of agnosticism, a person can die of hunger ... But in such criticism there is more wit than real arguments. More convincing is the position of those philosophers who believe that the refutation of agnosticism is contained in the sensory-objective activity of people. If they, cognizing certain phenomena, deliberately reproduce them, then there is no place left for the unknowable “thing-in-itself” (essence).
Kant first tried to connect the problems of epistemology (theory of knowledge) with the study historical forms activities of people: the object as such exists only in the forms of activity of the subject. He sought to substantiate the activity approach to understanding cognition. The starting point of the activity approach in cognition is the understanding of cognition as a constructive work to reproduce an object in thought, due to a certain position of the subject of cognition, the means, prerequisites and attitudes used by him.
Thus, Kant, having substantiated the thesis that the cognizing subject determines the method of cognition and constructs the object of knowledge, makes a revolution in philosophy, which is often called the "Copernican revolution".
Essence scientific knowledge consists not in the contemplation of the intelligible essence of the object, but in the activity of constructing it, generating idealized objects.
The main merit of Kant is in a new approach to the nature of knowledge, its possibilities and limits. He was the first to propose understanding knowledge not as a reflection of reality, but as its construction through the prism of a priori schemes and principles inherent in reason and reason. Kant was convinced that the means of science alone are not enough to create a complete and adequate picture of the world. Having pointed out its limits to science, Kant proclaims the independence of aesthetic and moral thinking.
Kant showed that if a person with his mind begins to reason about the universal, which goes beyond the limits of his finite experience, then he inevitably falls into contradictions.
The essence of Kant's theory of knowledge.
Kant argued that our mind can cognize the objects of the surrounding world only because everything cognizable in these objects is created by the same mind according to its a priori principles and schemes. We do not cognize things in themselves, but their manifestations to consciousness.
Kant divides the surrounding reality into that which is accessible to knowledge, and that which cannot be known by man. Knowable reality is called the sphere of phenomena, "things-for-us", "phenomena". Unrecognizable objects are called "things-in-themselves", "noumena". The world is divided not according to the ontological (the doctrine of being), but according to the epistemological principle. This position is called "cognitive-theoretical dualism."
Kant's doctrine of a priori principles of knowledge
The object of knowledge is created by the operation of a priori synthesis of the material of sensory perception with the help of rules and principles rooted in the mind and reason. With the help of the categories of space and time, given a priori to the mind, a world of sensory phenomena is created. Then, this world of sensory phenomena, with the help of a priori rules of reason, is transformed into a world of experience, subject to scientific consideration.
Kant divides the principles of pure reason into four kinds: categories of quantity; quality categories; categories of relationship; categories of modality. In addition to the conditions and principles of the understanding, the action itself is also necessary, with the help of which these feelings could be transformed into true knowledge. Kant called this action "transcendental apperception".
The doctrine of a priori principles of sensory knowledge is called "transcendental aesthetics". The doctrine of the principles of pure reason is the domain of transcendental analytics. Transcendental dialectics explores the ideas and principles of reason and shows the impossibility of philosophy as a science.
Kant on the Antinomies of Pure Reason
Kant divides reason as a faculty into pure (speculative) reason and practical reason. Pure reason is limited by the limits of the world of phenomena, practical reason is aimed at "things-in-themselves." Kant demonstrates the limits of pure or speculative reason by proving the cosmological idea as an example. In an attempt to carry out such a proof, the mind becomes entangled in internal contradictions, which Kant called the antinomies of pure reason. "There are four such antinomies:
First antinomy. Thesis: The world has a beginning in time and space. Antithesis: The world has no beginning in time and is infinite in space.
Second antinomy. Thesis: Everything in the world consists of the simple and the indivisible. Antithesis: There is nothing simple in the world, but only complex bodies.
Third antinomy. Thesis: There is freedom in the world. Antithesis: There is no freedom in the world, but everything is necessary and causally determined.
Fourth antinomy. Thesis: God exists. Antithesis: There is no God.
Both the thesis and antithesis can be equally true, therefore, their objects cannot serve as the subject of scientific knowledge. But they can be a matter of practical reason
The Essence of Practical Reason
Kant's practical reason regulates the sphere human freedom. It means the right to freedom of choice. Often practical reason is identified with morality. Speaking of the relationship between pure and practical reason, Kant prefers the latter. This means that in difficult situations, a person must first of all listen to the voice of the heart, conscience, even if this goes against the requirements of logic.
The core of the theory of practical reason is Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of the human will.
Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, formulated his famous question, "What can I know?" and took upon himself the labor of substantiating by means of reason the very conditions and possibilities of human cognition.
In his theory of knowledge, he solves the problem: how, starting from subjectivity, from human consciousness, you can come to objective knowledge. Kant makes the assumption that there is some kind of proportionality between consciousness and the world. He connects the dimension of cosmic processes with human existence.
Before cognizing something, it is necessary to identify the conditions of cognition. Kant's conditions of cognition are a priori forms of cognition, i.e., not dependent on any experience, pre-experimental, or, more precisely, super-experimental forms that make it possible to understand the world. The comprehensibility of the world is ensured by the conformity of the mental structures that the subject has with the connections of the world.
Knowledge is a synthesis of sensibility and reason. Kant defines sensibility as the ability of the soul to contemplate objects, while the ability to think the object of sensuous contemplation is reason. “These two abilities,” writes Kant, “cannot perform the functions of each other. The understanding cannot contemplate anything, and the senses cannot think anything. Only from their combination can knowledge arise.”
Kant's teaching on the limits of knowledge was not directed against science, but against blind faith in its limitless possibilities, in the ability to solve any problem. scientific methods. “Therefore,” writes Kant, “I had to limit my knowledge in order to make room for faith.” Critical philosophy required an awareness of the limitations of human knowledge, which is limited to scientifically reliable knowledge, in order to make room for a purely moral orientation in the world. Not science and not religious faith, but “the moral law within us” serve for Kant as the basis of morality.
The Critique of Practical Reason answered Kant's second fundamental question: "What should I do?" Kant introduces a distinction between theoretical and practical reason. This difference is as follows. If pure or theoretical reason “determines” the object of thought, then practical reason is called upon to “implement”, i.e., produce a moral object and its concept (it should be borne in mind that for Kant the term “practical” has a special meaning and does not mean some kind of productive activity, but simply an act). The sphere of activity of practical reason is the sphere of morality.
As a philosopher, Kant realized that morality cannot be derived from experience, empiricism. The history of mankind demonstrates a great variety of norms of behavior, often incompatible with each other: actions considered as a norm in one society are subject to sanctions in another. Therefore, Kant took a different path: he substantiates the absolute nature of morality by philosophical means.
Moral action, as Kant showed, does not apply to the world of appearances. Kant revealed the timeless, i.e., independent of knowledge, of the development of society, the nature of morality. Morality, according to Kant, is the most existential basis of human existence, that which makes a man a man. In the realm of morality, the thing-in-itself, or free causality, operates. Morality, according to Kant, is not derived from anywhere, is not substantiated by anything, but, on the contrary, is the only justification for the rational structure of the world. The world is arranged rationally, since there is moral evidence. Conscience, for example, possesses such moral evidence, which cannot be further decomposed. It acts in a person, prompting to certain actions, although it is impossible to answer the question why this or that action is performed, since the act is performed not for one reason or another, but according to conscience. The same can be said about debt. A person acts according to a sense of duty, not because something forces him, but because some kind of self-coercive force operates in him.
Unlike theoretical reason, which deals with what is, practical reason deals with what should be. Morality, according to Kant, has the character of imperativeness. The concept of imperativeness means the universality and obligatory nature of the requirements of morality: “the categorical imperative,” he writes, “is the idea of the will of every being, as the will that establishes universal laws.”
Kant wants to find the highest principle of morality, i.e., the principle of revealing the moral content itself, and gives a formulation of how a person should act, striving to join the truly moral. “Act only according to such a maxim, guided by which you can at the same time wish it to become a universal law.”
Kant distinguished between socially approved norms of behavior and norms of morality. Socially approved norms of behavior are historical in nature, but far from always being the realization of the requirements of morality. Kant's teaching was just aimed at revealing in it the historical and timeless characteristics of morality and was addressed to all mankind.
2. Trends in the physicalization of chemistry. Advantages and disadvantages of "chemistry in vitro".
The interaction of physics and chemistry is constantly deepening, which poses a number of questions for philosophy and natural science: 1) The question of the possibility of reducing higher forms of motion to lower ones and, in particular, of reducing chemical processes to physical ones. 2) The question of the status of chemistry as an independent science and its place in the system of natural science.
In the history of the interaction between physics and chemistry, researchers distinguish three stages: 1) the penetration of individual concepts of physics into chemistry; 2) penetration into chemistry of physical laws; 3) creation of integrative physical and chemical theories at the intersection of sciences.
From classical mechanics, the concept of force penetrates into chemistry, under the influence of which the doctrine of chemical affinity begins to develop, i.e. on the reactivity of substances. Such physical concepts as "mass", "energy" also played an important role in the design of the first truly scientific theories in chemistry. The penetration of the laws of thermodynamics into chemistry led to the emergence of chemical thermodynamics. The discovery of the electron and the complex structure of the atom led to the emergence of electronic theories in chemistry. But a qualitative breakthrough in the relationship between the two sciences occurred after the advent of quantum mechanics. The physical nature of chemical bonds was revealed. Phenomena that were studied exclusively by chemistry were explained by physics. This explanation turned out to be quite complete, accurate and meant more deep level penetration into the essence of chemical phenomena. At present, most chemical concepts, laws and theories have received a physical interpretation.
In philosophy, there is the following most general classification of forms of movement by level of complexity: mechanical movement, physical, chemical, biological and social. There are strict interconnections between the forms of motion of matter. 1) Each more complex form of the motion of matter has historically developed from less complex ones (except mechanical and physical). 2) More complex forms of movement include all previous, less complex ones. 3) More complex forms of the motion of matter are not qualitatively reducible to any of the less complex forms, nor to a combination of them. Violation of the third rule leads to reductionism. Reductionism- this is a methodological approach, which consists in reducing the complex to the simple, in reducing the properties of the whole to the sum of the properties of the parts. In some cases, reduction is not only justified, but also acts as a completely fruitful method of cognition. Combining analysis and synthesis, reduction makes it possible to cognize the whole through cognition of parts, the complex through cognition of simple components. But at the same time, one cannot identify the complex and the simple, or perceive the complex as a mechanical combination of simple components. In this form, reductionism is a simplification and leads to erroneous conclusions (for example, the identification of chemical and physical processes).
The opposite methodological approach is anti-reductionism also exists in various forms. While emphasizing the specifics of different forms of movement, many anti-reductionists misunderstand it. It is a mistake to believe that in chemical processes, along with physical ones, some other special, non-physical phenomena appear that cannot be explained from the standpoint of physics. Similarly, in a living organism there are no special biological processes that do not have a physical and chemical basis.
Dialectical-materialistic philosophy denies the extremes of primitive reductionism and anti-reductionism. The higher forms of movement arise on the basis of the lower ones and include them in themselves. Therefore, in nature there are no barriers separating physical, chemical and biological processes. Therefore, physics successfully explains chemical phenomena, and physicochemical methods are fruitfully used to understand the specifics of living things. If reductionism is understood only as a proof of the genetic interconnection of the forms of movement, then it does not contradict dialectics and acquires a positive scientific significance. Such reductionism proves the unity of material processes and promotes the integration of sciences.
At the same time, dialectics emphasizes the qualitative specifics of the forms of movement and the irreducibility of higher forms to lower ones. Quality is the certainty of an object, which characterizes its most important features, essential properties. The higher forms of movement are not qualitatively reduced to the lower ones, which means that they have new essential features that the lower forms do not have. So an essential feature that distinguishes the qualitative definiteness of chemical movement is the process of transformation of substances, changes in their composition and chemical structure. It is this feature that makes up the specificity of chemical processes, and, consequently, the subject of chemistry as a science of substances and their transformations.
Chemical motion is not only qualitatively different from physical motion, it is a more complex form of motion: 1) The simple can exist without the complex, but the complex cannot exist without the simple. There are many physical processes in which chemical transformations do not occur. But there is not a single chemical phenomenon that would not be accompanied by physical processes. 2) In the history of the development of the Universe, there was a time when only physical processes took place, and chemical ones were not possible. The high temperature made the formation of atoms impossible. The subsequent appearance of atoms, molecules and chemical processes meant the complication of matter. 3) Further complication of matter is already associated with chemical motion, on the basis of which an infinite variety of substances, properties, processes arises. More and more complex structures arise, including organic macromolecules, and biological processes begin.
That. it is a mistake to deny the qualitative specifics of chemical motion. For this reason, despite the increasing penetration of physics into chemistry, the latter will never be reduced to the former. The history of chemistry proves that, along with the process of physicalization, there is also a process of deepening traditional chemical concepts, theories, and methods. Just as in science in general, along with integration, differentiation occurs, the emergence of new sciences with their own specific subjects of research.
essay on Yuki's philosophy
Moscow, 2003
- Introduction
- Problems of scientific knowledge
- The emergence of science
- The problem of justifying knowledge
- The problem of rationality
- Theories of the development of scientific knowledge
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
1. Introduction
The entire history of the 20th century demonstrates to us the enormous transformative power and cognitive value of science. Many abstract theoretical constructions were realized in material objects that not only changed the utilitarian-material life of a person, but reflected on culture as a whole. The most odious example of this series is nuclear weapons and the chemical industry, less popular, but no less significant, are electricity, electronics, and medicine.
But it was the 20th century that gave rise to the most acute philosophical disputes in the field of scientific knowledge. These are reincarnations of eternal questions: what is truth? What is the source of our knowledge? Do we know the world? And in general, how does science differ from a system of religious beliefs, philosophy or art?
There are no unambiguous answers to these questions, but this only means that everyone decides them on their own. In the activities of different philosophers, different facets of the general problem of cognition have been embodied. The topic is far from exhausted as long as it exists thinking person, thinking itself will not cease to be a most interesting area for research.
2. Problems of scientific knowledge
2.1 Emergence of science
There is no consensus on what exactly is considered science: according to one approach, science is a method of cognition, according to another, it is a kind of religion. However, there is no doubt that the emergence of scientific knowledge is associated with a sharp increase in human capabilities to influence the environment. It is by changing the transforming abilities that one can trace the stage of the birth of science, which took place not only within the framework of European civilization, but then the beginning of the actual scientific and technological progress in Europe.
In my opinion, it would be wrong to say that the emergence of science is associated with some specific economic conditions. In our time, science can be regarded as a kind of production, but at the beginning of its development it was not so. Isaac Newton, for example, saw no practical use for his work in optics. In this matter, we find ourselves in a "grey zone": did material conditions require the emergence of science, or did scientific activity create certain material conditions? One way or another, work on comprehending the accumulated empirical material was carried out even before it began to bring a visible economic effect. This was facilitated, so to speak, by the ideological attitudes that existed among European thinkers of the 16th and 17th centuries. The foundations of the scientific worldview were formed in the period preceding the emergence of the natural sciences. This was facilitated by the popularity of Greek philosophy, which would not have been possible without the specific mechanism of the functioning of medieval philosophy. Church scholasticism became a prototype scientific activity, the first "paradigm", a research program, though operating within the framework of a very peculiar theory.
Much has been said about the influence of Greek philosophy on European thinkers. This does not mean that outside of Greece people did not think about anything. The underlying motive for acquiring knowledge is the desire for security. Only by knowing and explaining what is happening can a person use the most powerful tool for survival - his brain. Various explanations of reality have been put forward. Some of them took the form of harmonious philosophical or religious systems, magical practices, prejudices. This does not mean that they were useless or ineffective - it is not even necessary to use logic to create a guide to action, many useful habits do not have a clear explanation at all. A distinctive feature of ancient philosophy was the allocation of the role of reason in the process of cognition. Without denying religious practice, the Greeks designated reflection as a way by which a person can independently reach the Truth. Moreover, the ancient philosophers approached the intuitive knowledge of what became essential and obvious a millennium later: only the human mind is able to single out the objectively general in the chaos of sensual images. Eternal and unchanging is by its nature intelligible. The ancient authors were inclined to absolutize the principle they discovered, but this allowed them to attribute special value to reflections. Unlike the more contemplative worldview systems of India and China, Greek philosophy refers to the understanding of the very process of obtaining knowledge. The result is the emergence of disciplines devoted to the organization of mental activity: dialectics, rhetoric and, above all, logic. It is not surprising that in the philosophy of ancient Greece, the main problems of cognition are identified that are still relevant today: the inclination of the mind to inconsistency (Zeno's aporias) and relativism (sophists and in particular Gorgias) judgments. European philosophy will inherit from the ancient setting of rationality, but just acquaintance with the works of predecessors for the emergence of science would not be enough (philosophers of the Arab East were also familiar with the works of Greek authors). In order to go beyond arithmetic and geometry, a systematic approach was needed, so to speak. It was the practice of medieval philosophy that contributed to the development of such a tradition.
Some authors considered and still consider it good form to dissociate themselves from medieval ecclesiastical philosophy, declaring it metaphysics and verbiage. The term "scholasticism" itself was introduced by the humanists of the 16th century to derogately refer to the entire period, from the ancient "classics" to the Renaissance. With all the variety of schools and trends that fall under this inaccurate definition, in general, scholasticism can be characterized as a movement that flourished in the period from the 13th to the 15th centuries, giving Special attention rationale religious faith. Scholasticism is not characterized by specific views, but rather by a way of organizing theology based on a highly developed method of presenting materials. The works of scholastic theologians were distinguished by reasoning, attention to terms, knowledge of previous authors, and the desire to cover all aspects of reality. It was the first attempt at a rational systematization of human knowledge in any one area. Under the auspices of the Church in Europe, a system of higher education was created. Universities become a breeding ground for the emergence of a new tradition, since, in essence, science is associated with learning. Researchers of scientific knowledge note this function of it, we can say that the requirements for the "simplicity" and "beauty" of theories, which facilitate their memorization and teaching, follow from it. In addition, it is impossible to overestimate the influence that the tradition of disputes had on the development of philosophy as a whole, in which the most important problems of theology were resolved. Perhaps the original premises of scholasticism were vulnerable, but the experience of the work done could not just go to the sand. It is characteristic that the first steps in the field of natural sciences were also the systematization of a huge amount of factual material, often sinning with subjectivity and inaccuracy. It is difficult to say whether such work could have been done without the experience of previous attempts.
The underestimation of the role of medieval philosophy, in my opinion, is an echo of the struggle of freethinking with the dominance of the official church, which can be clearly seen in the example of the French materialists. By this point, the program of rational explanation of faith had failed and was replaced by dogmatic tendencies. However, one should not forget that at a certain stage church scholasticism became a necessary stage in the development of European philosophy.
The rational approach alone does not allow theology to get rid of heresies. To resolve contradictions in worldviews, some other means besides logic is required, and in relation to knowledge of nature, experiment becomes such a means. Roger Bacon was the first to use the phrase "experimental science" in the 13th century, gradually this approach is gaining more and more popularity. There is a kind of rehabilitation of "sensory experience", which is especially characteristic of the English philosophical tradition.
The combination of passive observation, theoretical reflection, and controlled experiment resulted in the emergence of science as we understand it. After realizing the importance of the experiment, adding mathematics to this bundle, abandoning the "qualitative" Aristotelian physics in favor of "quantitative", was a completely natural step (astronomy used such methods with ancient times). In my opinion, the use of mathematics in natural science was not decisive, since it is possible only if the object could be described in numbers (some sciences still use mathematical methods very poorly). An attempt to consider the internal processes of the development of scientific knowledge will be made in section 2.4.
2.2 The problem of justifying knowledge
At all times, knowledge was considered to be evidence-based, but thinkers doubted that this could be done already two thousand years ago. The problem of substantiating knowledge began to be developed most deeply and in detail with the advent of the natural sciences, since the declared goal of the activities of scientists was initially the search for objective truth about the world around them.
The problem includes two aspects: determining the source of knowledge and determining the truth of knowledge. And with that, and with the other, everything is not so simple.
All attempts to determine the source of human knowledge can be divided into two directions. The first can be described as an approach from within, since it is assumed that all the initial premises of true knowledge are inside a person. At the same time, it doesn’t matter whether they manifest themselves in the form of divine insight, communication with the “world of ideas” or are innate, the main thing is that in order to receive them there is no need for external activity, only for internal spiritual work (rational reflection, introspection, meditation or prayer). Within the framework of this concept, there are many variants of philosophical systems. For the problem of scientific knowledge, the position of rationalism, formulated by Rene Descartes and called Cartesianism, is important. Descartes seeks to build a comprehensive picture of the universe, in which the universe appears as separate material bodies, separated by emptiness and acting on each other by means of a push, like parts of a once-wound clockwork. With regard to knowledge, Descartes believes that by critically analyzing the content of his own beliefs and using intellectual intuition, an individual can approach some indestructible foundation of knowledge, innate ideas. However, this raises the question of the source of the innate ideas themselves. For Descartes, that source is God. For such a system to work, everyone's innate ideas must be the same, and such that they accurately reflect the outside world. This is the weak point of the “from within” approach as a whole – the unresolved problem of choosing between theories. If the opponents do not come to a consensus with the help of intellectual intuition, the choice of position will turn out to be purely a matter of taste.
The second direction of the search for the source of knowledge is “external”. Human cognition of reality comes exclusively through feelings, experiences. With the advent of the natural sciences, this approach takes on a new meaning. In the development of these views in England, the concept of empiricism is being formed, the importance of which for the development of scientific knowledge cannot be overestimated. In fact, the empirical approach underlies all scientific practice. Its basis is well formulated by Francis Bacon: knowledge is obtained by gradual ascent from facts to law, by induction. Classical empiricism is characterized by treating the scientist's mind as a tabula rasa, a blank slate free from prejudices and expectations.
Consistently adhering to the ideas of empiricism, David Hume also indicates the limits of its applicability. With a purely empirical approach, a term that is not associated with sensory experience does not make sense. The content of the mind is clearly divided into synthetic statements (relationships between ideas) and facts (single statements, knowledge about the world, the truth of which is determined in an extralogical way). Turning to the origin of facts, Hume discovers that they are based on the relationship of cause and effect, obtained from experience, and in fact - habit. From this follows the restriction, characteristic of empiricism, on the fundamental cognizability of general principles (ultimate causes) and a skeptical attitude towards attempts at such cognition. One can only believe that such principles in the next moment of time will not change arbitrarily. However, can all knowledge be reduced to experience? The process of generalization itself turns out to be inexpressible in empirical terms. Starting with the rejection of vague terms, the empiricist inevitably ends up rejecting knowledge in general. Hume justifies the existence of a habit by its necessity for survival. human race, but the mechanism of the emergence of such an infallible instinct is still beyond the scope of consideration. Thus, strict empiricism does not allow one to obtain empirical knowledge.
The first serious attempt to take into account the external, empirical and internal, rational principle is philosophical system Kant. Trying to resolve those raised by Hume, Kant assumes that sensory experience is ordered with the help of a priori forms of cognition, not innate, but formed under the influence of culture and environment. Without these initial mechanisms, no knowledge is simply possible. Kant distinguishes two components of mental activity: reason, as the ability to make judgments based on sensory experience, and reason, always directed to the concepts of reason. Since the mind is not directly connected with feelings, it is able to operate with abstract concepts, ideas. Sensory experience is considered as the limit of possible knowledge, beyond which the mind is doomed to fall into contradictions.
We come to the conclusion that human knowledge has its sources both in the work of the mind and in the testimony of the senses. In an array of knowledge, elements of both are inevitably mixed in some way. But what is the relationship between these two components and can they be clearly separated? Anyone who does not risk trusting "innate instincts" or believing that a priori forms of cognition are ideal inevitably tries to evaluate the result of the mental process and approaches the issue of substantiating the truth of knowledge. Any attempt to manage the process of thinking rests on the issue of evaluating the results. How to distinguish true conclusions from false ones? Apart from subjective arguments such as intellectual intuition or brilliant insight, since ancient times philosophers have used logic to do this. Logic is a tool that transfers truth from premises to conclusions. Thus, only that which is inferred from true premises is true. This conclusion was the basis of the concept that had a fundamental impact on the current state of the theory of scientific knowledge. I mean positivism in all its varieties.
This concept arises in the 19th century under the influence of the success of the natural sciences and combines classical empiricism and formal logic. In fact, this is an attempt to ignore the questions raised by Hume. The first formulation of such an approach is associated with the name of Auguste Comte. Through some changes, positivism reaches highest point development in the early 20th century in the form of logical positivism. Within the framework of this approach, science is seen as the only way to achieve objective truth, and the distinguishing feature of science is its method. All branches of human knowledge that do not use the empirical method cannot claim to be true and therefore are equivalent (or equally meaningless). What, according to positivism, is the peculiarity of the scientific method? First, a clear distinction is made between an empirical basis and a theory. The theory must be proven, verified, and the elements of the empirical basis do not need logical proof. These elements correspond to Hume's "facts", their truth is determined in an extralogical way (in different interpretations they are "given in the senses", "certainly known", "directly observable"). Each such element takes the value "true" or "false". Only such propositions are considered scientific theory that are reducible to an empirical basis by means of certain rules, by which existential logic is usually meant. Everything that is not reducible to sensory experience is declared metaphysics and nonsense. From the point of view of positivism, there is not much difference between religion, all previous philosophy, and most general scientific theories. The task of science is not in explanation, but in the phenomenological description of the totality of experimental facts, the theory is considered solely as a tool for ordering data. In fact, science is identified with an axiomatic logical system, and philosophy is seen as a theory of the scientific method. It is clear that this approach is too narrow. In addition, positivism raises a number of problems that it cannot solve on its own.
First, there is the problem of the empirical basis. What is considered directly observable, “given in the senses”? Any observation is psychologically loaded with expectation, the senses different people differ, moreover - most of the measurements are carried out indirectly, through measuring instruments. Consequently, in obtaining the result, at least the “theory of observation” is involved, according to which the device is built (for astronomy, this will be optics). But what about experiments that became possible only because their result was predicted by theory? In addition to psychological objections, there is a purely logical one: any statement about observed facts is already a generalization. Upon a detailed examination of the problem, it turns out that there is no insurmountable natural boundary between observation and theory.
Second, even if an empirical basis existed, other logical problems would remain. The problem of inductive logic (verification) is that logic only allows one to transfer truth from premises to conclusions, it is impossible to prove a universal statement like "x (for any x) with any number of singular statements. An attempt to demarcate (differentiate science and other forms of consciousness) according to the principle of verifiability came up against the need to reject recognized scientific theories as unprovable. All this required a consistent weakening of all criteria, the introduction of the controversial term “meaningfulness ". The problem of reducing the terms of a theoretical language to protocol sentences remained unresolved (for example, the difficulty of formulating the meaning of dispositional predicates). Attempts to develop a special "language of science" ended in failure.
Thirdly, an attempt to reduce the functions of theory to purely instrumental ones comes up against serious objections. According to the positivist interpretation, interpretation is a means of obtaining knowledge that can be dispensed with. Upon closer examination, it turns out that theoretical terms do not just simplify the theory and make it more convenient. Terms can be thrown out only from a ready-made theory, and how to separate theory and experience, etc., etc. Moreover, if a theory is a tool, why does it need to be proven at all?
As a result, by the middle of the twentieth century, philosophy approached with the conviction that the largest scientific theories are fiction, and scientific knowledge is the result of an agreement. Real science stubbornly did not fit into such a framework. Domestic developments of the problem on the basis of the Leninist theory of reflection, in my opinion, give too much general interpretation problems are useless in practice. In addition, dialectical materialism insists on the consistent approach of relative truth to absolute truth, on progress, accumulation, and not just the growth of knowledge. There are serious objections to the cumulative theory of the development of knowledge, which will be discussed in detail in Section 2.4. The only interesting development of dialectical materialism is the attitude to knowledge as an ideal plan of activity and the orientation of all knowledge to practice. The current state of the philosophy of science in general and the problem of substantiating truth in particular is a reaction to the collapse of the concept of positivism.
The first attempt to revise the tradition of knowledge verification is made by Karl Popper. He shifts the emphasis from the logic of scientific action to the logic of the development of scientific knowledge. In his approach, the influence of positivism is felt, in particular, Popper draws a clear line between experiment and theory. In the question of determining truth, the key point of Popper's concept is the rejection of inductive logic. A singular proposition cannot prove a universal proposition, but it can disprove it. A popular example of this is that no amount of white swans can prove that ALL swans are white, but the appearance of one black swan can disprove it. According to Popper, the growth of knowledge proceeds as follows: a certain theory is put forward, consequences are deduced from the theory, an experiment is set up, if the consequences are not refuted, the theory is temporarily preserved, if the consequences are refuted, the theory is falsified and discarded. The task of a scientist is not to search for evidence of a theory, but to falsify it. The criterion for the scientific character of a theory is the presence of potential falsifiers. Truth is understood as correspondence to facts. Later, Popper develops his concept, considers scientific theories as more complex formations with false and true content, but the principle that any change in a theory requires considering it as a completely new theory remains. The cumulative law of the progress of knowledge becomes optional. Falsificationism successfully explains some of the features of real science, in particular, why the prediction of facts is more important for science than explaining them in hindsight, but does not avoid criticism. First, all questions about the use of the concept of “empirical basis” remain. It turns out that without agreement on what part of knowledge to consider as a basis, no science is possible. Second, by forbidding any observable state, the theory proceeds from the initial conditions, a consistent theory of observation, and a ceteris paribus constraint (ceteris paribus). Which of the three elements is considered a refuted observation depends on the decision of the observer. Third, it remains unclear at what point a falsified theory should be discarded. Why do we still use Newton's theory even though it was disproved AT THE MOMENT when Mercury's perihelion precession was discovered (long before Einstein's theory)? It turns out that the most significant scientific theories are not only unprovable, but also irrefutable.
Popper's concept gave rise to a whole range of theories of the development of science, which will be discussed in Section 2.4. In the question of substantiating the truth of knowledge, the methodology of science came to the conclusion that knowledge is not possible without certain agreements. This prompts the most consistent proponents of conventionalism to claim that all knowledge is nothing more than a figment of the imagination. For example, Paul Feyerabend comes to a complete relativism of truth and considers science as a kind of religion. Starting with the proclamation of science as the main value, philosophers have come to a complete depreciation of its results.
The fact is that in the interpretation of science as a method, the importance of truth as a regulative principle has fallen out of consideration. The scientist embarks on a search for truth, not being sure that he will find it, nor that it exists in principle. Consciously or unconsciously, but he makes a choice between advantages in case of success and losses in case of failure. Anyone who is sure that the truth, as he understands it, is unattainable, does not participate in the scientific enterprise or drops out of it. This dictates a biased attitude towards the issue among scientists - belief in the attainability of truth by scientific methods is an ideological prerequisite for choosing a profession, therefore, it must be justified as a value.
A comprehensive concept of substantiating the truth of knowledge does not yet exist. It is clear that such a concept, if it appears, should be considered as an objective reality not only the world of things around us, but also our beliefs. But the question of whether it is possible to substantiate the truth of the worldview has to be left open.
2.3 The problem of rationality
As the consideration of the problem of substantiating the truth of knowledge shows, the subjective moment is inseparable from scientific knowledge. The main feature of science is not a monopoly on the ultimate Truth, but a focus on achieving knowledge by rational methods. At some point, science was regarded as a model of rational activity, and this was precisely the pathos of positivism. But when trying to formulate the laws of science, the whole picture crumbled like a house of cards. The collapse of the positivist program of rationality is perceived as a catastrophe precisely because it was formulated not just a method, but a regulative principle, the basis of a worldview. The reality has once again turned out to be more complicated than we imagined, this is a very typical picture, but trying to take the edge off the problem with such an argument means abandoning attempts to solve it.
On the one hand, rationality is an ideological problem concerning the relationship of man with man and man with Being, and in this role is within the competence of philosophy. On the other hand, within the boundaries of the general approach, particular problems of rational behavior, the rationality of history, the rationality of knowledge, etc., are distinguished. It is quite obvious that without solving the problem at the philosophical level, the consideration of particular problems encounters serious difficulties. Meanwhile, in the philosophical literature there is no unambiguous definition of rationality, specific interpretations of the concept depend on the position of the author, if he seeks to define this concept at all. Some perceive this as evidence of the phantom nature of the problem, in my opinion, everything is just the opposite. We can reason much more definitely about abstract problems, like the customs of the Papuans of New Guinea, but the closer the subject is to us, the more subjective our judgment becomes. Rationality is an integral part of our culture, so it is extremely difficult to talk about it objectively. Apparently, it makes sense to consider the attitude of the author to the problem of reason as a whole, in order thus to try to find something in common in the discord of opinions.
The definition of the boundaries and possibilities of the mind largely depends on how the rational principle itself is understood. The idea of the need to divide reason into practical and theoretical can be traced already in Kant. Developing this idea, we can say that within the boundaries of the human mind there are two abilities: reason as the ability to set rules, and reason as the ability to rebuild the system of rules. The activity of the mind is distinguished by clarity, consistency and articulation. The mind is capable of a critical revision of the initial mindsets of reason, resolving contradictions, it is characterized by some spontaneity and extranormality. Naturally, all human activity is not described by two abilities, but, apparently, they are characteristic of a person. Such, at least, the duality of the carrier of a rational principle leads to a huge range of options for its interpretation. Depending on which of the abilities the author focuses on, two approaches to rationality can be traced.
First, it is a pragmatic-functional approach, which includes the philosophy of science and positivism in all its forms. Measures and criteria, rules for different types of reason act as the main content of reason. Rationality is considered as a method, a description of the norms of the validity of opinions, the choice of practical action. The main characteristic of rational activity is consistency; any normalized human activity, for example, magic, can fall under the definition. Due to the difficulty of substantiating general theories, the emphasis is shifted from explanations to typology and description, which leads to blurring of concepts and, if carried out consistently, to complete nihilism. Such an approach is characterized by the conventionalism of definitions and bringing rationality to the position of a pseudo-problem. The spectrum of possibilities: from the dogmatization of the rules of logic to the relativism of truth.
The second approach can be designated as a value-humanitarian one. This approach is characterized by belittling the value of rational forms of reason and science. The supporters of this position include existentialists and followers of Nietzsche. Within this approach, rationality, as a rule, is not interpreted. Often, any form of consciousness is summed up under the definition of mind, and the emphasis is on spontaneity and non-logic (“creative intelligence”, “innovative ability”). Consistent rejection of the rational forms of reason leads to the rejection of attempts at comprehension in general, the emphasis is shifted to the search for new means of expression that exclude the word and concept. There is also some ideological moment: the mind is declared an instrument of violence against the individual by the apparatus of power, true freedom - the rejection of any concepts as imposed by society (goes back to Nietzsche). Such categoricalness is largely a reaction to the dictates of positivism and totalitarian tendencies in society.
Both of these tendencies in their pure form gravitate toward relativism and irrationality. Logic gives in to development, the moment of going beyond the established system of rules. The flight of thought perishes, not fixed by a word. In the first case, normativity reaches pseudo-problematicity, in the second - spontaneity to utopia. It must be clearly understood that the dialogue about rationality is not between rationalism and irrational delirium, but between different versions of the rational position, even if the authors deny it. Life is opposed not by thought, but by the absence of any thought. At some point, attempts to glorify the impulsive, inexpressible, bodily, lead to the triumph of the animal nature in man. At this level, thought is absent and discussion is impossible.
The essence of the problem is that so far, any attempt to formulate the criteria of rationality has been immediately refuted, and the introduction of certain "relative" criteria inevitably led to relativism and irrationality. Relativism, the denial of the existence of an objective position, leads to the destruction of all social institutions. Irrationality means the death of society as we understand it. For most people, such alternatives to rationality are unacceptable, a sense of self-preservation requires us to bring our views into line with reality in some more acceptable way.
The situation of "challenge to reason" can be solved in two ways. The synthetic solution is to try to combine the two approaches to the mind within one concept. Empiricists are beginning to be more interested in situations of creative mind and imagination (G. Anderson comes to the conclusion that creative and critical mind are complementary), subjectivists are more appreciative of moments of objectivity (it is not only about the emergence of new concepts, but also about changing existing ones towards analyticity). Often, such a synthesis is attempted on the basis of language problems. At the same time, the authors proceed from the fact that any meaningful thought is public and requires symbolism, which is best seen in the example of language. In this case, rationality becomes a solution to the question of the interpersonal significance of argumentation, when rational thought goes beyond the personality. For Y. Khabrams, such a way out is a communicative action, a transition from the individual to the social, for P. Riker it is the development of the individual not through self-deepening, but through inclusion through language into culture. An original approach to rationality is offered by A.L. Nikiforov. In his opinion, rationality is a two-place predicate, the meaning of which is contained in the phrase: action A is rational in relation to goal B under conditions C. Rationality arises at the time of drawing up an ideal plan of activity, the degree of rationality can be considered the degree of approximation of the result to the goal. Thus, the conclusion about the rationality of the activity can be made only when the activity is completed and the result is obtained. An attempt to introduce intermediate criteria is the creation of rules of rational activity that summarize all previous experience of successfully achieving goals. This approach is good as the basis of the theory, but in practice the question arises of the criterion for approaching the result to the goal, especially in a situation where the totality of the acting forces is unknown. In addition, the author considers rational activity as deterministic (with respect to goals, methods and conditions) and, in fact, not free. The very appearance of a goal determines the course of action, which implies that free activity should not have a goal at all (in the manner of waving hands).
An alternative to the synthetic approach is immersion in "pre-conceptuality". In fact, this is an attempt to resolve the issue by removing the subject of the dispute. Such views are characteristic of P. Feyerabend, cognitive sociology. The complexity of describing the phenomenon of rationality is often explained by the fact that rationality is different for everyone, but we have no indication of the existence of fundamentally different forms of rationality. The discovery of the "features" of the rationality of exotic societies is often explained by the fact that the researcher concentrates precisely on the exotic, ignoring the commonality of housekeeping, agriculture, and the rules of the hostel. Non-European philosophers tend to challenge the monopoly of European civilization on rationality, while emphasizing that no human community could exist for a long time without "observation, experiment and reason" . But, perhaps, the main argument against such an approach is that, in principle, it does not give hope for a description of the phenomenon.
Despite the abundance of theories and an avalanche of literature, there is still no single approach to rationality in general and scientific rationality in particular. This does not mean that there is no mind, it only means that every thinking person has to solve this problem anew. It is necessary to realize the importance of such a decision: rationality is the attitude that a person is able to independently achieve the Truth (opinions regarding the nature of Truth may be different), thus, the antithesis of rationality will be the assertion of the existence of boundaries that the human mind is not able to overcome without opening itself to the action of some external force. The final refusal to trust the intellect would be the end of human development. New concept, when it appears, will have to clarify the relationship between rationality and the phenomenon of reason in general. It is obvious that it will not be possible to reduce rationality to logic: the mind is always balancing on the verge of the new and the repetitive, any interpretation of it must include a dynamic element. Another important point will be to clarify the role of rationality in interpersonal communication. It is clear that the rational organization of knowledge is important primarily for the convenience of its transfer. It is not for nothing that the centers of rational thinking have so often become educational institutions. The third point should be the consideration of the question of the growth of the efficiency of rational activity. In one isolated case, a spontaneous decision may be more effective than a rationally planned one (especially in a very typical situation of lack of information). However, under conditions of repetitive action, the efficiency of rationally organized activity grows, while the other one remains at the initial level. And, finally, the question of the applicability of rationality to the interpretation of higher values must be resolved, since serious rationalist philosophers have never denied their existence. According to Peter Abelard, without them, human thought is blind and aimless, and the founder of positivism, Auguste Comte, was guided by the idea of creating new religion, in the center of which there will be a person. What is the relationship between values and reason?
Only a comprehensive solution to the problem can rehabilitate rationality as a worldview position. The crisis of the concept of rationality is closely connected with the crisis of modern civilization. The point is not the viciousness of the system, but the fact that it is losing its ability to change, yielding to the tendencies of traditionalism. A new round of development will inevitably be associated with a new understanding of many philosophical problems including the concept of rationality.
2.4. Theories of the development of scientific knowledge
What has been said in the previous paragraphs makes one wonder how the development of scientific knowledge is possible at all. How to understand the term "development"?
The comparative novelty of the phenomenon of science and the tendency of scientists to document their actions provide us with a gigantic material describing the state of affairs in various branches of knowledge in the last three hundred years. However, the interpretation of this material encounters significant difficulties. Modern theories development of scientific knowledge bear the imprint of which of the branches of science the author focuses on - each has some uniqueness, each asks its own range of questions and answers. Why is the choice so difficult? At the dawn of science, its development could be traced by the appearance of such fundamental works as Newton's Elements and Optics or Lavoisier's Chemistry. The history of science could be limited to describing the circumstances of the appearance of these works and the study of personalities. Such a "personal" approach created the prerequisites for dividing the content of science into true theories and delusions. Obsolete theories were either misconceptions (like the phlogiston theory of combustion, which preceded Lavoisier's concept), or were considered as the first approximations of the true one (the systems of celestial mechanics of Copernicus and Kepler). Over time, the number of scientists working in one area or another has grown. The paths indicated in the writings of the founders were refined and developed. The belief that science would continue to follow the path of progress, accumulating its successes (the cumulative model of development), received significant reinforcement. A reflection of such sentiments was the emergence of the "positive philosophy" of Auguste Comte, which was considered by the creator as "the last philosophy." However, by working through recognized theories, scientists simultaneously marked the limits of their applicability and created the conditions necessary for new breakthroughs. In this regard, the 19th and early 20th centuries became significant: shifts similar to those made by Lavoisier began to occur in other branches of science. Such shocks include the discovery of the divisibility of the atom, the creation of Einstein's theory of relativity, Boltzmann's molecular-kinetic theory of gases, the successes quantum physics. Tracing the line of "continuous progress" became more and more problematic. If we do not consider calls to abandon the search for patterns in the development of science or the vague statements of dialecticians that "relative truth strives for absolute truth in a dialectical way", the current state of the theory of the development of scientific knowledge is as follows.
To understand the current moment, the works of Karl Popper are significant, most authors, if they do not use his developments, then argue with them, whether they want it or not. Popper was the first to speak out against the "obviousness" of science and turned his attention to its real history.
The cumulative model of the development of science looked something like this: some theory is derived from experimental data, as the array of experimental data increases, the theory improves, and knowledge is accumulated. Each subsequent version of the theory includes the previous one as a special case. It is assumed that the discarded theories were accepted by mistake or due to prejudice. The reason for the falsity of a theory must lie either in an incorrect inference procedure, or in the fact that the theory was not based on facts. Scientific activity is a process of continuous approximation to the truth. As shown in Section 2.2, it is impossible to unambiguously reduce theory to experimental data. An attempt to introduce the concept of "probable" (in the sense of calculating probability) truth faces the difficulty of determining the degree of probability. Thus, within the framework of the cumulative model, there is no way to determine the true theory and there is no justification for refuting the theory.
At the forefront of his scheme for the development of science, Popper puts the principle that every scientist certainly uses in practice - the need for criticism. Scientific development occurs through the advancement and refutation of theories. First the theory is formulated and it does not matter which forces are involved in this process. Further, consequences are deduced from the theory, which contain specific statements regarding the nature of things, and therefore are capable, in principle, of entering into conflict with reality. These consequences are called potential falsifiers. The presence of such falsifiers is a criterion for the scientific character of a theory. An experiment is set up, if the statements of the theory contradict the facts - it is ruthlessly discarded, if not, it is temporarily preserved. The main task of the scientist becomes the search for rebuttals. Popper reveals the reason why the growth of scientific knowledge is the fundamental condition for its existence. However, falsificationism is also unable to describe real science. Firstly, it is also not so easy to refute a theory (see Section 2.2), and secondly, it is not clear why we continue to use theories that clearly contradict the facts (for example, Newton's theory of gravitation). At what point should the theory be discarded? Why (even temporarily) hold on to false theories? Feeling the discrepancy between such a scheme and the realities of science, Popper introduces into his concept the concept of the structure of the theory. The theory should be based on a set of independent statements (postulates), some of which may be true, and some may be false. Thus, each new theory must either have less false content, or more true content, only in this case it creates a progressive shift in the problem. However, building bridges between these principles and real science is quite difficult. Despite a number of important achievements, Popper's model of the development of scientific knowledge does not correspond to practice.
The reaction to Popper's criticism of inductivism in general and the cumulative theory of the development of science in particular, as well as to the shortcomings of falsificationism, was the strengthening of the position calling for abandoning the search for patterns in the development of science and focusing on the study of the Scientific Mind, i.e. on the psychology of science. One of the options for such a position is the theory of T. Kuhn. It is based on the identification of two main "regimes" of scientific development: periods of "normal science" and scientific revolutions. During periods of normal science, scientists work within a recognized "paradigm." Kuhn's concept of a paradigm is rather amorphous: it is scientific theory, and the method of experiment, and in general - the whole set of existing statements regarding the structure of reality, what questions a scientist can pose about it and by what methods he should achieve answers to these questions. A characteristic consequence of the presence of a paradigm is the creation of textbooks and the introduction of educational norms. The presence of a system of rules turns science into "puzzle solving". The scientific community is doing its best to impose its rules on nature for as long as possible, ignoring any contradictions, but there comes a time when such activities cease to bring the expected result. The scientific revolution begins. If during the period of paradigm dominance it was considered almost sacrilege to criticize it, now it has become commonplace. There is a proliferation of ideas - the creation of many competing theories, differing in varying degrees of reliability or elaboration. Which of these theories will take the place of the paradigm depends on the opinion of the scientific community. This is an important point - only the scientific community, and not society as a whole, should participate in the decision-making, the opinion of non-professionals is not taken into account. Disputes can continue indefinitely (including with the use of non-scientific means) until the entire scientific community converts to a new faith. The old paradigm disappears completely only with the death of its last supporter (usually natural). Kuhn indicates the importance of the emergence of theory for the development of science: it allows you to systematize facts, organize work, direct research. But, on the other hand, the change of paradigms becomes an exclusively subjective matter, depending on the number of persistence of supporters of a particular theory. A similar position is brought to the absolute by Paul Feyerabend, who persistently likens science to a kind of religion. In Feyerabend's presentation, truth in general turns out to be exclusively an object of belief. To the attempt to draw insurmountable boundaries between the content of past and present theories, it may be objected that for some infantile persons this may be so, but the serious scientist is expected to be able to keep in mind a more complex picture of reality. It is a fact that a person of a European mindset is capable, in principle, of learning foreign languages that have a completely different structure of grammar, not to mention vocabulary. There is not a single living language which, at least in in general terms, could not be translated into English. Thus, there is no reason to talk about the insurmountability of the boundaries between paradigms. As well as the absence of any general patterns in science.
In my opinion, the most acceptable, although far from final, at the moment is the theory of the structure and development of science by Imre Lakatos. Lakatos calls himself a follower of Popper, but goes far beyond his concept. The key point is that the theory should not just be falsified and discarded, but must be replaced by another theory. Lakatos recognizes both the importance of proof and the importance of refutation. Such theories are accepted (considered scientific) for consideration, which, in comparison with the previous one, have additional empirical content, form a "theoretically progressive shift of the problem" (lead to the discovery of new facts, although how long it will take to confirm them is unknown). An old theory is considered falsified if a new theory is proposed that a) has additional empirical content, b) explains the success of the previous theory within observational error, c) some of the additional content is reinforced. The last point is understood as "empirically progressive problem shift". It is necessary to consider not separate theories, but some larger formations - research programs. Theories that succeed each other within the framework of the research program should form a "progressive shift" both theoretically and empirically. Only the entire sequence of theories can be called scientific or non-scientific. Activities within the framework of the research program are reminiscent of activities under the conditions of Kuhn's "paradigm". The program consists of rules about what to avoid (negative heuristic) and where to strive (positive heuristic). A negative heuristic is a "hard core" of a program that cannot be refuted. "Auxiliary hypotheses" are subject to change, with the help of which they "rescue" the theory as long as this ensures a progressive shift of the problem. A positive heuristic sets a work plan within which success can be achieved. A progressive shift creates confidence in the program while it exists, even contradictions are forgiven the theory (with the condition that they will be resolved later). Anomalies are not taken into account and become painful only in the phase of the regressive shift or at the "start" stage of the program by trial and error. The reason for replacing the research program is not even a regressive shift, but the success of a rival program. The most difficult moment is when you should stop protecting an outdated program.
Lakatos sees a way out of most of the difficulties of his predecessors in the adoption of certain "decisions" that form a complex system for him. A decision is made on what to consider as an empirical basis. Deciding which part of the "theory of prediction-theory of observation-conditions of observation" should be considered refuted (the right to appeal). Deciding what techniques to avoid when protecting a program (limiting conventionalist tricks). It is explained how within the framework of the research program the theorist can move ahead of the experimenter.
The adoption of the theory of research programs allows Lakatos to divide the history of science into several stages: 1) the accumulation of empirical material, 2) the development of hypotheses by trial and error (according to Popper), 3) the development of research programs.
The strength and weakness of Lakatos's theory is that it describes well the events that have already happened and almost nothing about the future (except for the observation that the research program of quantum physics has exhausted its explanatory power as a prediction). This allows Jan Haginen to say: “Lakatos is supposed to be talking about epistemology. Indeed, he is usually thought to be developing a new theory of method and rationality, and therefore he is admired by some and criticized by others. But if you consider his theory of rationality as his main achievement, it seems rather chaotic. It does not help us in any way to decide what is reasonable to think or do at the present time. It is entirely retrospective. but cannot help us in the future." In a sense, by its own definition, Lakatos's theory is unscientific.
It seems to me that a real change in science in the coming decades will be essential for the theory of the development of scientific knowledge. The material of past years is no longer enough for an unambiguous choice between theories.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, I want to repeat what I said at the beginning: the deepest motive for acquiring knowledge is the desire for security. We seek not the triumph of reason, but the triumph of ourselves. Compared with the Delphic oracle, science has an undeniable advantage - it predicts at least something unambiguously, but promises to predict even more. This, in my opinion, is the reason for the great prestige of science. The titanic array of amorphous “experience” has been transferred to the sphere of “reliable knowledge”, faceless and replicated. The latest masterpiece of this approach is the computer, sitting at which I write all these words. Having once experienced the opportunity to move the border of the unknown away from itself, the opportunity NOT to THINK, humanity will never refuse it. In this case, the limit of the human will be precisely the rejection of the last effort. The unknown will still remain, somewhere out there. At least in the image of the notorious asteroid, which, in full accordance with the laws of celestial mechanics, will cross the Earth's orbit in n hours m minutes plus or minus three seconds. There will always be things in the world that cannot be avoided, impossible to prevent, but you can learn about them and, ultimately, use them.
Is it fair to say that we are able to answer all questions NOW? Cognition is guaranteed not possible only if the universe is in a state of complete chaos or the duration of the laws is comparable to the timing human life. At the same time, stars burn for billions of years, and apples stubbornly fall to the ground throughout the existence of mankind. There is every reason to believe that the human mind has less inertia than the universe. It is possible that modern man is in principle unable to cognize the world as it is, but on this basis it cannot be concluded that this will continue to be the case. It is possible that over time some other form of thinking will arise, not comparable to ours, and not one, but any number of such forms, because the living has an advantage over the inanimate - the living can change its behavior without changing the carrier, and the inanimate is not able to change at will. In any case, giving up trying to know the world would be a tragic mistake. It must be understood that the current crisis of trust in science is not connected with material, but rather with moral problems of knowledge.
The fundamental philosophical questions raised by science in its development are still waiting to be resolved.
4. References
- Alistair McGrad "The Theological Thought of the Reformation"
- T. Kuhn “Logic and methodology of science. The structure of scientific revolutions”, M., 1977
- P.S. Taranov “120 Philosophers”, Simferopol, Tavria, 1996
- D. Hume “Research on human understanding”, M., Progress, 1995
- bourgeois philosophy XX century. M., 1974
- I. Lakatos “Falsification and methodology of research programs”, DoctoR, 2001-2002
- A.L. Nikiforov “From formal logic to the history of science”, M., Nauka, 1983
- "Introduction to Philosophy", ed. I.T. Frolov, M., Publishing house of political literature, 1990
- K. Popper “Logic and growth of scientific knowledge”, M., Progress, 1983
- P. Feyerabend “Selected works on the methodology of science”, M., Progress, 1986
- E.A. Mamchur " Relativism in the interpretation of scientific knowledge and the criteria of scientific rationality”, Philosophical Sciences, 1999. N5
- “Rationality as a subject of philosophical research” ed. B.I. Pruzhinin, V.S. Shvyrev, M., 1995
- A. Migdal “Is the truth different from a lie?”, Science and Life, No. 1, 1982
First of all, Kant changes his idea of the relationship between the rational and empirical moments in cognition. For Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, sensory perception appeared as a vague and confused knowledge, as the lowest form of what is clearly and distinctly comprehended only with the help of reason. Leibniz considered sense cognition only as a vague stage (perception) of rational knowledge (apperception).
Kant, on the other hand, declares that sensibility and reason have a fundamental difference between them; they represent 2 different trunks of the process of cognition. Sensations without concepts are blind, and concepts without sensations are empty, says Kant. Therefore, scientific knowledge can only be thought of as a synthesis of these heterogeneous elements - sensibility and reason. Knowledge arises from the combination of the forms of sensibility and reason.
How, according to Kant, is the process of cognition carried out? He goes through 3 steps.
The formation of perceptions
At the first, sensual stage, the chaos of sensations is ordered with the help of subjective forms space and time, a priori (before experience) located in the sensory area of consciousness of the cognizing subject. As a result, objects of sensory perception, the world of phenomena, are formed.
Development of concepts and judgments
At the second, rational stage, the diversity of sensory material is brought under the unity of concepts, or categories, which are also contained in the cognizing consciousness a priori, but only in the field of reason.
In the structure of knowledge, Kant distinguished between analytical and synthetic judgments, understanding the former as knowledge that is explanatory in nature, and the latter as knowledge that expands our knowledge about the object being known. According to Kant, all experiential, empirical judgments are synthetic.
Reason and its metaphysical claims
- Finally, the third stage of cognition, which Kant called rational, is characterized by the exit of cognition beyond the limits of possible experience, within the boundaries of which it was at the previous stages. Reason, in contrast to reason, arrogantly strives to comprehend the sphere of the transcendent, to comprehend no longer phenomena, but the things themselves.
However, reason is powerless here: having no support in empirical experience, it resorts to conjectures and fantasies. Therefore, Kant believed, it is necessary to recognize that reality in itself is one thing, and our knowledge of this reality, not based on the data of our senses, is another. An attempt to combine them leads to contradictions, which the philosopher called antinomies. Antinomies are statements that are equally proven, excluding each other, but referring to the same phenomenon. To such conclusions comes the mind, which seeks to embrace the world as a whole, to know the essence of the soul and to prove or disprove the existence of God.
- Is there among our cognitive abilities such that could direct the activity of the mind, setting before it certain goals? According to Kant, such a faculty exists, and it is called reason. Reason, according to Kant, always passes from one conditioned to another conditioned, not being able to finish this series with some last - unconditional - because in the world of experience there is nothing unconditional. At the same time, it is natural for a person to strive to acquire absolute knowledge, i.e., in the words of Kant, to obtain the absolutely unconditional, from which, as from some kind of root cause, the whole series of phenomena would flow and their entire totality would be explained at once. This kind of unconditional offers us the mind in the form of ideas (models). When we look for the last unconditional source of all phenomena of inner feeling, we, says Kant, get the idea of the soul, which traditional metaphysics considered as a substance endowed with immortality and free will. Striving to rise to the last absolute of all phenomena of the external world, we come to the idea of the world, the cosmos as a whole. And finally, wishing to comprehend the absolute beginning of all phenomena in general - both mental and physical, our mind goes back to the idea of God.
Introducing the Platonic concept of an idea to designate the highest unconditional reality, Kant understands the ideas of reason in a completely different way from Plato. If Plato's ideas are supersensible intelligible entities that have real being, then Kant's ideas are simply ideas about the goal towards which our knowledge strives, about the task that it sets for itself. The ideas of reason perform a regulatory function in cognition, prompting the mind to activity (“turn it on”), but nothing more. Denying a person the opportunity to know objects that are not given to him in experience, Kant thereby criticized the idealism of Plato and all those who, following Plato, shared the belief in the possibility of inexperienced knowledge of things in themselves.
Thus, the achievement of the last unconditional is the task towards which the mind aspires. But here an irresolvable contradiction arises. In order for the understanding to have a stimulus to activity, it, prompted by reason, strives for absolute knowledge: but this goal always remains unattainable for it. And therefore, striving for this goal, the understanding goes beyond the limits of experience; yet only within these limits do its categories have legitimate application. In this case, the mind falls into an illusion, deluded, assuming that with the help of categories it is able to cognize inexperienced things in themselves. This self-confident illusion, according to Kant, is characteristic of all previous philosophy.
- Reason, according to Kant, is the receptacle of appearance: reason dialectically leads further and further away from the empirical application of categories, which is the boundary of knowledge. This natural and inevitable illusion generally arises from the activity of the mind, which is to look for conditions for the conditioned and find them in the unconditioned. The way to do this is to infer. Ultimately, the mind always operates with ideas, under which all phenomena and concepts are summed up.
The main task of transcendental dialectics is only to reveal the "dialectical semblance" of "sophistical conclusions." As transcendental ideas - in the spirit of the school philosophy of his era - Kant considers the soul, the world and God: "Consequently, all transcendental ideas can be reduced to three classes, of which the first contains the absolute unity of the thinking subject, the second - the absolute unity of a number of conditions of the phenomenon, the third - the absolute unity of the conditions of all objects in general." Kant tries to prove that these ideas, considered as an object, lead to contradictions. He reveals his proof in the chapters devoted to: paralogisms (soul), antinomies (world), ideal (God) of pure reason.
How is universal and necessary knowledge possible?
“Without a doubt, all our knowledge begins with experience... No knowledge precedes experience in time, it always begins with experience. But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not at all follow that it comes entirely from experience. It is quite possible that even our experiential knowledge is made up of what we perceive by means of impressions, and of what our own cognitive faculty (only stimulated by sense impressions) gives of itself, and we distinguish this addition from the basic sensory material only when a long exercise draws our attention to it and makes us capable of isolating it. Therefore, the question arises: is there such a cognition independent of all sensory impressions? Such knowledge is called a priori; they are distinguished from empirical knowledge, which has an a posteriori source, namely in experience.
The answer to the question of what is the nature of scientific (in this case, true) knowledge lies in the answer to the question: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?
A systematic analysis of this problem in the “Critique of Pure Reason”, which, according to I. Kant, goes back to the works of D. Hume, who “woke him from a dogmatic sleep”, led to the idea that the “thing in itself” is unknowable. We always deal only with phenomena, with what is given to us with the help of the senses, and only this we can know with certainty. At the same time, although knowledge begins with experience, it is not reduced to it, since part of our knowledge is It is the a priori and transcendental character that gives knowledge its universal and necessary character.
Fundamental to Kant's epistemology is the idea that the universal and necessary knowledge, which the philosopher so cherishes, cannot follow from experience, cannot be a posteriori (following in relation to experience), because experience is always incomplete, not completed. On the contrary, it must be preexperiential, a priori (prior to experience). Kant calls his philosophy transcendental (from the Latin transcendere - to cross, to cross), because he explores the transition of experience data into a system formed by our consciousness, as a result of which there is a universal and necessary knowledge.
Doubtful - mathematics, natural science and metaphysics
Kant studies how universal and necessary knowledge is possible in the sphere of action of the 3 main cognitive abilities - sensibility, reason and reason, i.e. in the corresponding types of scientific, theoretical (pure) knowledge - in mathematics, natural science and metaphysics.
