And tell me, please, what was the plan of Nazi Germany in the event of victory over the USSR? What arrangement of territories was supposed in this case?
In Germany, there were several departments that operated the occupied territories, and each of them, as a rule, had its own approach to solving specific issues and implementing long-term prospects. The plans for the dismemberment of the USSR and the general leadership for the implementation of the occupation policy were carried out by a specially created ministry for the affairs of the occupied eastern regions, headed by A. Rozenberg. Special rights for managing the economy were given to "responsible for the implementation of the economic plan" Hermann Goering, and for police support - Heinrich Himmler. In addition, broad powers were given to large private concerns. Many questions of the future reorganization were not worked out in detail and were outlined only preliminary in the most general terms. For example, the colonization by German settlers of several small areas in the Baltic States was being prepared, and the settlement of the Crimea by the Germans was planned only at the next stage, taking into account the practice obtained during the first experiments with settlement. The implementation of all measures for the economic exploitation of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union was carried out by the "Economic Headquarters Vostok" (code name - Headquarters "Oldenburg"). Numerous bodies, organizations, campaigns entangled the population and territory like a web. During the years of occupation, 120 million tons of cargo were exported mainly by rail transport in the amount of 679 billion rubles. in state prices of 1941. For the accounting and evacuation of cultural property in the occupied territory, a special department was created as part of the Ministry of Eastern Territories and a special team - the "Kunsberg Group" at the German Foreign Ministry. The Nazis plundered 427 museums, destroyed and damaged 1670 churches, stole and destroyed 189 million books, 564 thousand works of art. It is easy to understand what this order would be like for the indigenous population from the realities of the occupation regime. The occupied territories of the USSR were divided into two parts. The first included the space from the front line to the rear borders of army groups. The second part covered the rest of the occupied territory. The management of the civilian population in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, parts of Belarus and the Leningrad region was in the hands of the "Reich Commissariat Ostland". The main part of Soviet Ukraine and part of Belarus was included in the "Reichskommissariat Ukraine". Part of the Ukrainian territory - Lviv, Stanislav, Ternopil, Drohobych regions were transferred to the "General-Governorship of the German Empire", created on the territory of Poland. Part of the Vinnitsa, Odessa, Nikolaev regions of Ukraine and the left-bank part of Moldova entered the province of "Transnistria", created by the Romanian occupation authorities. During the occupation, the Nazis committed countless crimes and atrocities unprecedented in their cruelty in the entire history of wars. The field gendarmerie and the secret state police (Gestapo), special units of the SS and SD (Einsatzkommandos) and the notorious "special Dirlewanger battalion" acted especially brutally. It is estimated that a total of 7.4 million people were deliberately exterminated in the occupied Soviet territory without trial and on the basis of court verdicts. Against the background of the destruction of other peoples in the territory controlled by Nazi Germany, the genocide of Jews stands out for its scale and cruelty. Several hundred ghettos were created in the occupied territory of the Soviet Union. The largest of these were the ghettos in Minsk, Riga, Pinsk, Vilnius, Kaunas, Shvenchen, Siauliai, Zhmerinka, Kremenchug, Smolensk, and Velizh. In the occupied territory of the Soviet Union, there were more than 260 concentration camps, their branches and departments, which can be classified as death camps. More than 200 thousand people were killed on the territory of the largest camp Trostenets. Throughout the occupied part of the USSR, the Germans introduced labor service. The working day, even at unhealthy enterprises, lasted 14-16 hours a day. The population was not provided with clothes, shoes, and basic necessities. The norms for issuing bread were 200-300 g per day. For example, in Polotsk a worker received about 250 grams of "bread" per day from a mixture of oats, vetch, barley and rye. Working women were entitled to 210 g of bread, children - 100 g. But even these official norms were often not respected. More than 4.1 million people died prematurely from hunger, infectious diseases, merciless exploitation, lack of medical and other assistance on Soviet territory occupied by the enemy. The German occupation authorities, with the assistance of the Wehrmacht, deported more than 5 million Soviet citizens to Germany, a significant part of them died due to overwork, malnutrition, beatings and the lack of any medical care.
In the USSR, overtime round-the-clock work at enterprises was the norm, but how did the Germans work? Was there a shortage in Germany at the beginning of the war in manpower and resources for the production of military products?
Before answering this question, I would like to define some terms. Businesses worked around the clock, not people. Yes, and overtime work can only be called conditionally, since they were mandatory, i.e. actually included in the normal working day. As for the German economy, it experienced similar trends, although it had its own characteristics. The first of these was the large-scale involvement in the production of prisoners of war and foreign workers. From the spring of 1941 to the middle of 1944, their number increased from 2.8 to 7.1 million people. The number of working women has changed insignificantly - from 14.6 million in 1939 to 14.8 million in 1944. The working day has not changed either. The maximum length of the working week was reached in September 1944 - 49.5 hours (the average result for different industries), and in March 1944 it was 48.3 hours. The maneuver of labor resources between industries was widely used. Thus, the share of those employed in the trade, banking and service sectors during the war decreased by 14-20%, due to which the growth in agriculture, industry and transport amounted to 5, 6 and 7%, respectively. In general, the situation with labor resources in Germany throughout the war was very tense. Thus, according to the report of the Office of Military Economic Planning from October 1, 1942 to the end of 1943, the increase in the labor force amounted to only 1 million people, while the need for it was approx. 2.5 million. As for raw materials, according to experts in the German economy, they have never been the reason for the disruption of plans for the production of weapons. Even in the most problematic sectors of raw materials - some types of non-ferrous metals (copper, nickel, chromium) - by the end of the war there were 6-9 monthly reserves. A much more difficult situation developed with liquid fuel, the absence of which, by the end of the war, chained numerous military equipment of the Wehrmacht to the ground.
To what extent was the deployment of the main industrial giants implemented with an eye to the possibility of hostilities? To what extent was the "reverse diversification" of enterprises envisaged?
In the Soviet Union during the years of the first five-year plans, the creation of industrial giants was determined by economic feasibility, so they were located depending on the availability of natural and human resources, as well as transport routes. The construction of metallurgical enterprises in the Urals, Siberia, Kuzbass was due to the availability of raw materials and fuel there. Mechanical engineering enterprises were concentrated in the central region (Moscow), the northwestern region (Leningrad), the Volga region (Gorky, Kuibyshev, Saratov, Stalingrad), in Ukraine (Kiev, Nikolaev, Zaporozhye, Kharkov, Donbass). Of course, when developing plans for the deployment of military industry enterprises, it was taken into account that construction should not be carried out in the immediate vicinity of the borders, in the zone of action of the aviation of a potential enemy. At the same time, no one imagined that the enemy troops would reach Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, the Caucasus. But the pre-war mobilization plans provided for the transfer of civilian enterprises to the production of military products, as well as the evacuation of enterprises and labor from the front line. This made it possible already during the war to carry out an unprecedented transfer of productive forces (mainly enterprises of mechanical engineering, chemical and light industry) to the eastern regions, where, just in the years of the first five-year plans, a raw material base was created for them. If by "reverse diversification" you mean conversion (the transfer of production from military to civilian products), then it began in the autumn of 1944 and was dictated by economic necessity. Enterprises gradually, in accordance with the plan, returned to the production of products according to their civilian profile.
Tell me, when did partisan formations and separate detachments appear and begin to operate in the war? Were they organized at the behest of the party, or were they spontaneously united people who were later led by party and military leaders? What, from your point of view, was the ambiguity of the partisan movement and is there any data on the number of participants in this movement?
Partisan struggle was the main form of armed struggle of the Soviet people against the German invaders in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR. Having arisen in a number of cases spontaneously in the first days of the enemy invasion, it soon became a cohesive, controlled force that fiercely resisted the occupation regime. The directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 29, 1941 and the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 18, 1941 "On organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops" became the organizing beginning of the deployment of a mass partisan movement. These documents determined the procedure for the preparation of the partisan underground, the deployment of the partisan movement and its main tasks: the destruction of enemy manpower and equipment, logistics bases, disruption of its communications, reconnaissance, assistance to the Red Army troops in conducting operations. The organizers of the partisan movement were party committees and organizations of the CPSU (b). In the autumn of 1941, there were 278 underground regional, city. and district committees of the CPSU (b), and in 1943 - 394. At the end of 1941, there were more than 2 thousand partisan detachments (over 90 thousand people). In the future, their number and number constantly increased. In total, there were over 6 thousand partisan detachments and more than 300 formations in the rear of the enemy, in which more than 1 million partisans fought. The general strategic leadership of the armed struggle of the partisan forces was carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which determined their main tasks in each campaign and strategic operation, the basics of interaction with the fronts, and the procedure for providing material resources. The working body of the Headquarters in this link of management was the TsShPD that existed from 30.5.1942 to 13.01.1944 (chief of staff - P.K. Ponomarenko). In turn, the partisans received weapons, ammunition, food and some other types of supplies from the "mainland". During its existence, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) sent 59960 rifles and carbines, 34320 machine guns, 4210 light machine guns, 2556 anti-tank rifles, 2184 mortars, about 540 thousand hand grenades, a large amount of ammunition and other property to partisan formations. Partisan movement was an important factor in achieving victory over Nazi Germany and its satellites. It covered the entire occupied territory of the USSR and created a powerful front of armed struggle behind enemy lines, closely cooperating with regular troops. The partisan forces inflicted enormous damage on the enemy: about 1 million people were destroyed, wounded and captured, 58 armored trains, 12 thousand bridges were blown up, 65 thousand vehicles were destroyed, 20 thousand enemy railway trains were wrecked, more than 10 thousand steam locomotives, 110 thousand wagons and platforms. The partisans diverted over 10% of the enemy ground forces operating on the Soviet-German front. For selfless and skillful actions, courage and heroism, more than 311 thousand partisans were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, 248 people received the title of Hero of the Owls. Union, and Kovpak and Fedorov were awarded this title twice.
Miroslav, tell us where Lunin ended up during the attack on Tirpitz. And then in popular literature and even on the first channel of Russian TV, they periodically talk about hits and even the sinking of the Tirpitz (sic!).
Yes, information about this periodically pops up, although official historical science back in the Soviet period recognized the fact that the K-21 submarine missed the Tirpitz battleship. The attack was successful only in the sense that it forced the German command to abandon the continuation of the operation to intercept the Allied convoy PQ-17 by surface ships. So, in the fundamental work "The Combat Way of the Soviet Navy". M.: Voenizdat, 1988, p. 197 wrote: “The boat launched an attack, but the enemy ships (there were 12 of them) made a turn, and the attack failed. Skillfully maneuvering, the submarine again laid down on a combat course and at 18 hours 1 minute fired a four-torpedo volley from stern tubes from a distance of 17-18 cables. The boat commander did not observe the results of the attack, but 2 minutes after the salvo, the acoustician reported two explosions. The submarine K-21 surfaced, and the commander reported to the command of the Northern Fleet about the meeting with the German squadron and about the Tirpitz attack. This report was intercepted and deciphered by the Nazis. The fascist German command, believing that his plan had been prematurely revealed, ordered the squadron to return to the Norwegian skerries. In the Combat Chronicle of the Navy 1941-1942, published in 1992. us. 100 it was stated: “July 5, at about 11 a.m., the German squadron (the battleship Tirpitz, the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper, Admiral Scheer, 7 destroyers and 2 destroyers) went to sea. Soon, in the area north of Hammerfest, the K-21 submarine (k. 2 r. N.A. Lunin) discovered it, attacked the battleship with torpedoes and reported this to the command. Thus, in both publications there was no information about the damage to the battleship, which confirms the fact of the K-21 miss. Finally, on February 19, 1993, a conference "Allied naval convoys in the North in 1941-45 in archival documents" was held in Moscow Russian Federation, Great Britain and the USA". Among other speakers was one of the authors of the "Combat Way of the Soviet Navy", Doctor of Historical Sciences, Captain 1st Rank A.V. Basov. In his report "New Documents on the Sea Convoy PQ-17" was mentioned examination of the Tirpitz hull by a commission from the Northern Fleet in August 1945. It contained a very definite conclusion about the absence of damage from torpedoes and traces of repair on the Tirpitz hull.
How many factories and large enterprises were evacuated at the beginning of the war? In what time? And most importantly: were there any serious overlays, failures? Were the leaders of any enterprises repressed as "failed"?
In the first months of the war, the country's economy found itself in extremely difficult conditions. By November 1941, most of the western regions of the country were occupied, which accounted for 63% of coal production, 58% of steel production, 71% of iron, 60% of aluminum. In these areas, not only large industrial enterprises were located, but also a significant part of agricultural products was produced. Due to military destruction, the evacuation of enterprises from the west to the east of the country, the volume of gross industrial output of the USSR from June to November 1941 decreased by 2.1 times. The last two months of 1941 were the most difficult. So, if in the third quarter of 1941 6000 aircraft were produced, then in the fourth - only 3177. The most important integral part military-economic program was a massive relocation of productive forces in the eastern regions of the country. On June 24, 1941, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council for Evacuation under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was created under the chairmanship of L.M. Kaganovich. On July 3, the Council was headed by N.M. Shvernik, it included: A.N. Kosygin, M.G. Pervukhin, A.I. Mikoyan, L.M., Kaganovich, M.Z. Saburov, V.S. Abakumov, M.V. Zakharov. IN last days In June, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution “On the procedure for the export and placement of human contingents and valuable property.” In terms of traffic and effort expended, the evacuation process was unprecedented in the history of all wars and countries. The evacuation required enormous effort from the railroad workers: by the end of 1941, 1.5 million wagons or 30,000 trains with people, machines, raw materials, and fuel were sent to the east. From July to November 1941, 1,523 industrial enterprises were relocated from the front-line regions to the East. Almost 70% of the industrial facilities displaced from Russia were located in the Urals, Western Siberia, Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Together with the relocated factories and factories, up to 30-40% of workers, engineers and technicians arrived in the East. In total, more than 12 million people were transported to the rear areas by rail and highways, as well as water and air routes from the beginning of the war until the end of 1941. The largest factories and workshops, within a few days after unloading, right under the open sky, began to manufacture individual components and assemblies, and after one or two months they began to assemble military equipment. There were not enough pre-planned places for evacuated enterprises. Warehouses, bases, shops, schools, theaters were rebuilt for industrial premises. All these measures led to the fact that most of the evacuated enterprises were soon put into operation. By the end of 1941, 122 enterprises of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry, 43 of the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry, 71 of the People's Commissariat of Armaments, 96 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, 80 of the People's Commissariat of Mortar Weapons, 199 of the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy, 91 of the People's Commissariat of the Chemical Industry, 45 - People's Commissariat of non-ferrous metallurgy, etc. In addition to enterprises, stocks of grain, food, agricultural machinery, about 2.5 million heads of livestock were evacuated to the rear areas of the country. An entire industrial power in the conditions of war moved many hundreds, and even thousands of kilometers. Thanks to the unprecedented patriotic upsurge of the Soviet people in the rear, it was possible, in an unprecedentedly short time, not only to restore the pre-war volume of production of military products, but from March 1942 and significantly exceed it. Already in the first half of 1942, the Soviet Armed Forces received from the military industry 11,000 tanks, about 10,000 aircraft, and almost 54,000 guns. In 1943, the gross industrial output was 90% of the pre-war level, and in the defense industries it increased 2.2 times. There were no major setbacks in the evacuation, although the pace was somewhat behind schedule, which was initially drawn up with unrealistic timelines. As for the repressions against the leadership of industry, there were none.
Are there known facts of negotiations between the German and Soviet command during the Second World War?
The only negotiations conducted by the Soviet command with the German command were negotiations regarding the surrender of the Berlin garrison on May 1-2, 1945.
Chronicle footage is often shown that Soviet people who worked in factories worked enthusiastically for the front, wrote on the shells "For Stalin! For Victory!" And how were things with enthusiasm in Germany? Also? Or was the war perceived by the Germans in the rear without emotions, just like work?
Unlike the First World War, the Second World War began in Germany without much enthusiasm among the population. There were no rallies or demonstrations. The war was perceived by the majority of the population as "fulfillment of duty", as work. But there was also enthusiasm, which the Ministry of Propaganda constantly sought to develop. One of the brightest examples can be Goebbels' speech on February 18, 1943 at a huge rally in the Berlin Sports Palace in front of an audience of thousands of "representatives of the German people" with a famous speech about 10 so-called "questions of the fate of the German people." He asked questions, and the mass of people jumped up from their seats and shouted “Yes!”. The rally was supposed to give the impression of a popular expression of will. The most famous of the questions was: "Do you want total war?" He was also met with thousands of jubilation and approval. The next day, newspapers in Germany came out with the subheadings: “The hour has struck, get up, people! The nation has decided on a total war!” Such "enthusiasm", mixed with fear for the future, contributed to the fact that the German troops continued to offer fierce resistance to the Red Army until May 9, 1945.
Where and how was military equipment restored? Were they restored at all, or were abandoned tanks on the battlefield the norm of wartime? Are there any documents on technology after the Battle of Prokhorov?
Naturally, they tried to evacuate the damaged equipment from the battlefield. Most often this was done at night, catching the tanks with a rope and pulling them out with a tractor. They were evacuated to the so-called SPAM (assembly point for emergency vehicles). This is where repair options are identified. Independent mechanized formations (tank and mechanized corps) had their own repair units, individual regiments were provided with front repair equipment. More complex types of repairs were carried out at PTRZ (mobile tank repair plants) or even at industrial enterprises. Quite often, tanks were repaired three or four times after combat damage. By the way, tanks with traces of welded holes can be seen in the exposition of the museum on Poklonnaya Hill. It was necessary to abandon the equipment in case of a large retreat. In this case, even machines prepared for recovery from SPAMs became the trophies of the attacker. It concerned both us in 1941-42. and the Germans in 1943-45. Burnt tanks were deliberately left on the battlefield. Armor after the fire was released and lost its properties. Such a tank was suitable only for scrap metal. Losses near Prokhorovka are currently known and published by L.N. Lopukhovsky and V.N. Zamulin. It is practically impossible to establish exact data for the Germans specifically for July 12 due to the availability of documents only for a period of time of several days.
Balloons can be seen in old films and chronicles. What was their function? On the balance sheet of which troops were they? Really air defense?
Aerostats had two uses. First, they were used in air defense. The balloons were raised on ropes at the approaches to the protected object, often a mine was attached to the rope. The plane ran into a cable that cut the wings or caused a mine to explode. Most often, such a meeting was fatal for the aircraft. To avoid collision with balloons, bombers were forced to rise above them and thereby reduce the accuracy of dropping bombs. There were also special aircraft with cutters on the wings, designed to break through balloon fields. Secondly, balloons were used by artillery observers. An observer sat in the basket and by phone reported the results of firing at a target invisible to the gunners. In this case, balloons belonged to artillery reconnaissance units. They were used for air supremacy. So, for example, the Germans raised the balloon and corrected the fire from it at the Brest Fortress.
What factory produced the T-34?
The T-34 was produced at six different factories during the war. By the beginning of the war, it was being produced at plant No. 183 (KhPZ) in Kharkov and at the STZ in Stalingrad. STZ only mastered the issue. Of the 1110 T-34s produced in the first half of 1941, 294 T-34s were made in Stalingrad. With the outbreak of war, plant No. 112 Krasnoye Sormovo was connected to the production of tanks. When the Germans approached Kharkov, plant No. 183 was evacuated to the Urals, to Nizhny Tagil. In 1942, ChKZ in Chelyabinsk was connected to the production of 34-k, by reducing the production of KV tanks, UZTM in Sverdlovsk (known for installing a turret stamped from a 45-mm armor plate on the T-34) and plant No. 174 in Omsk. Tanks were produced at the STZ before the start of the battles for the city of Stalingrad in September 1942. Production at different factories created certain problems. Despite all the efforts to unify tanks from different factories, the turrets turned out to be non-interchangeable, which made it difficult to repair them in the field. The quality of the produced combat vehicles was also not the same. The best quality tanks were produced by factory #183. The worst "thirty-fours" for a long time produced plant No. 112 Krasnoe Sormovo. They were even called, and Stalin himself, "Sormovo freaks." Later, the Omsk plant was considered the worst in quality.
What period of the Patriotic War do you consider the most unexplored? Why?
Strange as it may sound, 1944. The events whose 65th anniversary we are celebrating this year remain in the shadow of the “birth trauma” of 1941, as well as the catastrophes and positional battles of 1942. They remain unexplored at the modern level as successes ( Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya and in general the spring of 1944, Yassko-Kishinevskaya, "Bagration"), and failures on westbound winter 1943-44 It is difficult to explain this; 1944 occupies a prominent place in the history of the war. Suffice it to say that in 1944, according to German data, 45% of the losses of the German army were killed in the entire period of 1941-44. Perhaps after it became possible to talk about the failures of the Red Army, they talked and talked about them and forgot about the successes. Perhaps catastrophes fascinate with their drama and scale.
How often do you face the so-called rewriting of history today?
Often enough. For example, recently a journalist from the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper, Minkin, called absolutely monstrous, absurd and in no way consistent with the opinion of historical science, the figures for the losses of Soviet troops near Berlin, hundreds of thousands of people killed. History is regularly rewritten in films and TV films about the war. Also, the manipulations with historical facts in some former Soviet republics, and now independent states, make a painful impression.
The data on the relations of Soviet soldiers with the inhabitants of the liberated territories are too contradictory. Were there documented facts of looting by Soviet soldiers? What was the punishment and were the soldiers tried for it?
Such facts were recorded, and they took place both on the territory of the USSR and in Germany. For example, I met the proceedings conducted by the command of the 1st tank army of Katukov shortly before the Kursk Bulge regarding the conflict between one of its commanders and the chairman of the collective farm, which ended in assault. The conflict arose over the withdrawal of food from the collective farm. Even before the entry of troops into Germany in January 1945, Zhukov warned the troops of his 1st Belorussian Front about the need to behave appropriately. In general, the command with the phenomenon, which then received the name "junk" in every possible way fought. For obvious reasons: looting is the shortest way to the decomposition of the army. The guilty were threatened with a tribunal and sent to penal units. I cannot say that proceedings in these cases are common; the scale of the phenomenon was significantly lower than is now sometimes thought, but come across.
What was the difference between Soviet and German loss accounting statistics?
In order to explain the differences, one must first point out common features. Both in the USSR and in Germany, the accounting of losses was tied to a time interval of about ten days. “Approximately” is adjusted for the number of days in a month. Because the next ten-day period ran from February 20 to February 28, and the next one began on March 1. The same with the 30th and 31st of the month. Accordingly, the troops reported on losses, reporting them every ten days. From this point on, the differences begin. Firstly, the German armies and associations equated to them reported on losses, counting them from June 22, 1941. That is, even in 1945 it was reported that, for example, the 2nd Army lost so many people from June 22, 1941 to February 1, 1945. It sounds absurd, but it's true. Secondly, the Germans clearly singled out officers in the losses. If we had three counts (officers, sergeants, privates), then the Germans most often had two - officers and non-commissioned officers with soldiers. Even indicating the total number of losses, the Germans in the reports specifically noted how many of them were officers. Strange as it may sound, in general the Soviet system was more perfect than the German one. The widespread opinion about German accuracy and accuracy in this case is not entirely true. There were uniform forms for reporting losses for the entire Red Army, and formations and associations were uniformly and constantly reported. Among the Germans, such data are found in documents less often and more chaotically. They also mixed casualty and current status data in one document, the so-called meldung. In fact, it is often necessary to calculate losses from the difference in the number of connections on different dates. Also, the Germans were characterized by a shift in data on losses over time. So the losses during the "Bagration" were calculated in the fall of the 44th, the losses of the 17th Army in the Crimea in April and early May 1944 were calculated by June. In general, the calculation of losses after major defeats is a separate big topic. The ten-day cycle in this case was interrupted. Thus, in the reports of the Western Front about the losses for October 1941, a figure of about 60 thousand people appears, obviously less than the losses in the Vyazemsky "boiler". Those. losses in the encirclement due to the termination of communication with the armies that fell into it fell out of the reporting, they began to count again from the recreated front. Proceedings on losses in the environment went separately. Here it was necessary to give estimated figures, however, for example, the count of those who fell into the Kiev "cauldron" preserved in the archive is remarkable for its amazing scrupulousness.
How was the fate of Russian prisoners of war? Were any attempts made by the Wehrmacht to force the prisoners to fight on their side? Are there data on the quantitative and qualitative composition of such formations?
The fate of the prisoners was tragic. According to German data, about 5.7 million Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner during the war years. More than 3 million of them died. The German command did not force the Soviet prisoners to fight on their side. Moreover, Hitler sharply rejected numerous proposals to form troops from prisoners of war as part of the Wehrmacht, coming from German officers "experts in Russia" and emigrants. Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1942, Hitler's prohibitions began to be circumvented by front-line commanders who recruited prisoners for rear positions in the troops (builders, auxiliary workers in the army, convoys). Thus, the prisoners were given a choice between a slow death from starvation and overwork and half-starved service. At about the same time, the formation of "Caucasian", "Asian", "Ukrainian" reconnaissance battalions from prisoners was begun. By the end of 1944, several divisions were formed from the prisoners. Some were defeated by the Red Army (SS division "Galicia", Baltic divisions of the SS), two divisions of the ROA began to participate in hostilities only in April 1945. According to the calculations of domestic historians, through service in the "eastern" formations of the Wehrmacht (excluding police) passed up to 900 thousand Soviet citizens. Up to 238 thousand served in the police. According to Russian official data, 1836 thousand prisoners were released from captivity during the war and after it, about 1 million were returned to the Red Army, 600 thousand were sent to work battalions, 234 thousand were transferred to the Gulag. You can see more about this in the books: Drobyazko S.I. under the banner of the enemy. Anti-Soviet Formations in the German Armed Forces 1941-1945. M. "EKSMO". 2004. Semiryaga M.I. Collaborationism. Nature, typology and manifestations during the Second World War. M. 2000. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: a statistical study. M. 2002.
Did the Russian emigration help the Soviet troops or the rear?
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Russian emigration was divided into three parts: those who advocated an alliance with Hitler, those who continued to live the ordinary life of an inhabitant (sympathizing with both, and at the same time not fully accepting either side) and those who actively fought the Nazis in the ranks of the French, British, American armies, French and Belgian resistance. For obvious reasons, they could not provide direct assistance to the Soviet troops and rear.
What percentage of enterprises worked for the needs of the front? And were there enterprises that produced "civilian consumption" goods: shoes, clothes, etc.?
After the transfer of the economy to a military footing, there were virtually no enterprises that were engaged in the production of exclusively civilian products. However, a number of plants and factories produced dual-use products. Thus, work clothes (overalls and quilted jackets) were sewn at the same factories where military uniforms were produced. The same can be said about shoes. Since the spring of 1942, non-food items began to be distributed using cards. The need for these goods was extremely acute, and it was satisfied by no more than 25%. In rural areas, non-food products were received irregularly and significantly below the annual limit. I had to do home weaving and weaving bast shoes. At the same time, in order to prevent a slide into the black market and barter in kind, the government has taken a number of measures to streamline the activities of shops and markets. So collective farmers had the right to sell agricultural products grown on their own farms, which were exchanged for special coupons and subsequently could be sold in the form of consumer goods in state stores that sold pre-war stocks.
What were the norms for supplying the population in the rear? Who developed these norms, how often did they change up or down? Is it true that entire villages were starving to death?
To evenly distribute the available resources, by October 1941, a system of distribution by cards was introduced throughout the country. According to the supply standards, the entire population was divided into four groups: workers, employees, dependents and children under 12 years old. The norms for the supply of bread in the first category ranged from 800 to 1000-1200 g per day; the second - 500 g, and dependents and children - 400. Since 1942, directors of enterprises have been given the right to establish advantages in supplying workers who meet and exceed production standards. Norms for the supply of meat, fish, fats, sugar, cereals, pasta were also differentiated. So, industrial workers were usually supposed to receive 1.8-2.0 kg of meat or fish per month, 400-600 g of fat, 600-800 g of sugar, 1.2-1.5 kg of cereals and pasta. Dependents received only 500 g of meat, 200 g of fat and 600 g of cereals and pasta per month. A difficult situation with food has developed in rural areas, especially in the northern regions and Siberia. After the delivery of state supplies in some collective farms, there was no product left for distribution among collective farmers. In 1945, 75% of the collective farms did not distribute potatoes, and 5.4% did not even distribute grain on workdays. From malnutrition and hunger, people got sick and often died. The government tried to establish food through the allocation of part of the land for the construction of subsidiary farms and personal gardens. By 1945, the number of gardeners reached 18.6 million people.
From what age were children involved in work in the USSR and Germany? What is the percentage of children working in factories? Was it done for the sake of extra soldering, or mostly on enthusiasm?
Even during the second half of 1941, about 360,000 schoolchildren voluntarily came to work instead of their fathers who had gone to the front. In February 1942, labor mobilization was announced by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. All unemployed men aged 16 to 55 and women aged 16 to 45 were subject to it. Somewhat later, the decree was extended to the rural population. In total, from 1942 to June 1945, about 18 million people were called up for labor mobilization. In accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of May 20, 1942, during wartime it was allowed to accept teenagers who had reached the age of 14 for industrial training, setting a 6-hour working day for them. Although enrollment in such training was on a voluntary basis, there were very serious incentives for it, in the first place - the receipt of work ration cards. In addition, the mobilization of children aged 14-16 - full or partial for a certain period - took place according to Komsomol mobilizations. In German industry, child labor of children of the titular nation was not practiced, which cannot be said about the labor of underage prisoners of concentration camps and forcibly mobilized foreign teenage workers.
I'm interested in the aluminum-aircraft theme. 1. There was an acute shortage of aluminum in the USSR, while Germany had enough of it. Now they rarely talk about it, although there are plenty of fans to compare all-metal German fighters with semi-wooden Soviet ones and conclude that "ours" was no good, no good and will not be good. My opinion: Glory to the Soviet designers/manufacturers that quite competitive aircraft were made from the worst material. 2. The mass evacuation of industry at the beginning of the war could not but affect the quality (of the same aircraft)? 3. The role of the "freedom-loving" European peoples (Czechs, French and others) in providing Germany (with the same aluminum and aircraft), which they quite conscientiously did almost until the end of the war. What is your professional opinion?
Dmitry, your questions are very correct. The shortage of aluminum in our country did not lead to a decrease in the rate of production of aviation equipment, but forced the adoption of a number of types of aircraft that had a mixed design. In terms of their characteristics, they could not be inferior to all-metal German aircraft, but in real battles their outcome depends more on the combat skills of the pilots than on the quality of equipment. The same can be said about the problems of operating equipment that had just arrived from the factories: competent pilots and technical staff first examined and, if necessary, brought it up, and only then they fought on it, while the illiterate could make an accident on a completely serviceable aircraft. Yes, the military industry of the countries occupied by Germany made a rather large contribution to ensuring the combat readiness of the Wehrmacht. Suffice it to recall the Czech 38(t) tanks, the self-propelled units produced later on their basis, and the French Renault cars. Unfortunately, we have to admit that the Germans managed to force a number of enterprises to work on the territory of the USSR, primarily in the raw materials sector.
Are there any statistics on the number of refuseniks, i.e. those who did not want to leave for evacuation due to, say, material considerations (for example, I don’t want to leave the household; the Germans will soon be stopped, and if I leave, looters will plunder)?
I have not seen such statistics in documents and literature. However, by the time the main enterprises were evacuated, there was no longer any doubt about the Germans' ability to move forward quickly. In addition, for the workers, the evacuated enterprise was the main source of income, and it would be strange to leave it in the name of some illusory hopes for a quick release. In addition, there were enterprises that were evacuated from the frontline zone, the Germans did not reach them and people were returned back.
Could you tell me, please, whether the military echelons were accompanied by air defense forces, how was this carried out in practice? Were they mobile units?
Yes, there were so-called escort companies with air defense systems. Most often, however, these were anti-aircraft machine guns, not cannons. Those. the platforms of the escort company were attached to the echelon for the duration of the journey along a certain one. If the echelon included anti-aircraft units, then they were routinely loaded onto the platforms so as to be able to fire from it. It concerned anti-aircraft machine guns and automatic guns. The most densely covered stations, even armored air defense trains were used for this.
What is the difference between rear and deep rear? What is the radius of action of the rear units of the armies, both on one side and on the other? What were the features of the formation of rear units of the Soviet and German armies?
The “radius of action,” or rather, “the depth of the rear area,” was determined by the sphere of responsibility of associations of different levels. Simply put, who brought ammunition, fuel and food to what point. This was determined by the capabilities of vehicles. So the army rear area was limited by the possibilities of horse-drawn transport and trucking, the rear area of the front was larger. the front could already use not only vehicles, but also railways for transportation. According to the last pre-war draft of the Field Regulations of 1939 (PU-39), the depth of the rear areas was regimental - 10-12 km, divisional (without regimental area) with motorized transport - 40-50 km, with horse transport - 25-30 km. The army rear had a depth of 150-200 km. The depth of the rear area of the front could reach 500-800 km from the front line. Beyond this frontier there was already a real “deep rear”. I emphasize: the depth of the rear areas of all levels was considered from the front. Those. both regimental and front-line, they overlapped. For the Germans, the special security divisions that were part of the rear were responsible for the security, and in the USSR this responsibility was assigned to the NKVD bodies. For this, the NKVD even had armored trains that ensured security railways. The troops were responsible for the security of the divisional rear areas, the NKVD and the troops jointly for the army, and the NKVD for the front.
home front patriotic war
Undertaking attacks on the USSR, the leaders of fascist Germany expected to defeat the main forces of the Red Army with the very first powerful blows. The Nazis also assumed that military failures would demoralize the Soviet population in the rear, lead to the collapse of the economic life of the Soviet Union, and thereby facilitate its defeat. Such predictions were wrong. The Soviet Union had such socio-economic advantages that fascist Germany did not and could not have. The Soviet state entered the war in the most difficult conditions. The Armed Forces and the national economy of the country had to face great difficulties. During the retreat, huge human, material and production resources were lost.
To conduct a modern war, a lot of military equipment and especially artillery weapons are needed. War requires constant replenishment of the material part and ammunition of the army, and, moreover, many times more than in peacetime. In wartime, not only defense factories increase their output, but also many "peaceful" factories switch to defense work. Without the powerful economic foundation of the Soviet state, without the selfless labor of our people in the rear, without the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, without their material and moral support, the Soviet Army would not have been able to defeat the enemy.
The first months of the Great Patriotic War were very difficult for our industry. The unexpected attack of the Nazi invaders and their advance to the east forced the evacuation of factories from the western regions of the country to a safe zone - to the Urals and Siberia.
The relocation of industrial enterprises to the east was carried out according to the plans and under the leadership of the State Defense Committee. At deaf stations and half-stations, in the steppe, in the taiga, new factories grew with fabulous speed. The machines began to work in the open air as soon as they were installed on the foundation; the front demanded military products, and there was no time to wait for the completion of the construction of factory buildings. Among others, artillery factories were deployed.
A huge role in strengthening our rear and mobilizing the masses for the defense of the Motherland was played by the speech of the Chairman of the State Committee. Defense I.V. Stalin on the radio July 3, 1941. In this speech, I.V. Stalin, on behalf of the Party and the Soviet Government, called on the Soviet people to reorganize all work on a war footing as soon as possible. “We must,” said I.V. Stalin - to strengthen the rear of the Red Army, subordinating all our work to the interests of this cause, to ensure the intensified work of all enterprises, to produce more rifles, machine guns, guns, cartridges, shells, aircraft, to organize the protection of factories, power plants, telephone and telegraph communications, to establish local air defense."
The Communist Party quickly reorganized the entire national economy, all the work of the Party, state and public organizations on a war footing.
Under the leadership of the Communist Party, our people were able not only to fully provide the front with weapons and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserves for the successful completion of the war.
Our Party has turned the Soviet country into a single fighting camp, armed the home front workers with an unshakable faith in victory over the enemy. The productivity of labor has increased enormously; new improvements in production technology have drastically reduced the production time for armaments for the army; the output of artillery platoons increased significantly.
The quality of artillery weapons was also continuously improved. The calibers of tank and anti-tank artillery guns have increased. Significantly increased the initial speed. The armor-piercing ability of Soviet artillery shells increased several times.
The maneuverability of artillery systems has been greatly increased. The most powerful self-propelled artillery in the world was created, armed with such heavy weapons as a 152-millimeter howitzer cannon and a 122-millimeter cannon.
Especially great success was achieved by Soviet designers in the field of armaments. Our rocket artillery, very powerful and mobile, was a thunderstorm for the Nazi invaders.
Neither fascist artillery nor fascist tanks could compete with Soviet artillery and tanks, although the Nazis robbed all of Western Europe, and the scientists and designers of Western Europe mostly worked for the Nazis. The Nazis had the largest metallurgical plants in Germany (the Krupp plants) and many other plants in the European states occupied by the Nazi troops. And, nevertheless, neither the industry of all Western Europe, nor the experience of many Western European scientists and designers could provide the Nazis with superiority in the field of creating new military equipment.
Thanks to the care of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, a whole galaxy of talented designers has been bred in our country, who during the war created new models of weapons with exceptional speed.
Talented artillery designers V.G. Grabin, F.F. Petrov, I.I. Ivanov and many others created new, perfect models of artillery weapons.
Design work was also carried out at factories. During the war, factories produced many prototypes of artillery weapons; a significant part of them went into mass production.
For the Second World War, a lot of weapons were required, incomparably more than for previous wars. For example, in one of the greatest battles of the past, the Battle of Borodino, two armies - Russian and French - had a total of 1227 guns.
At the beginning of the First World War, the armies of all the warring countries had 25,000 guns, which were scattered along all fronts. The saturation of the front with artillery was insignificant; only in some areas of the breakthrough were collected up to 100-150 guns per kilometer of the front.
Things were different during the Great Patriotic War. When the enemy blockade of Leningrad was broken in January 1944, 5,000 guns and mortars took part in the battle from our side. When the powerful enemy defenses on the Vistula were broken through, 9,500 guns and mortars were concentrated on the 1st Belorussian Front alone. Finally, during the storming of Berlin, the fire of 41,000 Soviet guns and mortars was brought down on the enemy.
In some battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery fired more shells in one day of battle than the Russian army used during the entire war with Japan in 1904-1905.
How many defense factories were needed, how fast they had to work in order to produce such a huge amount of guns and ammunition. How skillfully and accurately the transport had to work in order to uninterruptedly transfer countless guns and shells to the battlefields!
And the Soviet people coped with all these difficult tasks, inspired by their love for the Motherland, for the Communist Party, for their government.
Soviet factories during the war produced huge quantities of guns and ammunition. Back in 1942, our industry in just one month produced much more guns of all calibers than the Russian army had at the beginning of the First World War.
Thanks to the heroic labor of the Soviet people, the Soviet Army received a continuous stream of first-class artillery weapons, which became skillful hands our artillerymen as a decisive force that ensured the defeat of Nazi Germany and the victorious end of the war. During the war, our domestic industry increased its output from month to month and supplied the Soviet Army with tanks and aircraft, ammunition and equipment in increasing quantities.
The artillery industry annually produced up to 120,000 guns of all calibers, up to 450,000 light and heavy machine guns, over 3 million rifles, and about 2 million machine guns. In 1944 alone, 7,400,000,000 cartridges were produced.
To supply the troops with food, to feed the population in the rear, to give industry raw materials and to help the state create stable reserves of grain and food in the country - these were the demands made by the war on agriculture. The Soviet countryside had to solve such complex economic problems under exceptionally difficult and unfavorable conditions. The war tore the most able-bodied and skilled part of the rural workers away from peaceful labor. For the needs of the front, a large number of tractors, motor vehicles, horses were needed, which significantly weakened the material and technical base of agriculture. The first military summer was especially difficult. It was necessary to put into action all the reserves of the village in order to harvest the harvest as soon as possible, to carry out state procurements and purchases of bread. In view of the situation that had created, the local land authorities were asked to use all collective farm horses and oxen in field work in order to ensure full implementation of harvesting, autumn sowing, and raising the fallow. In view of the shortage of machines, the collective-farm plans for harvesting provided for the widespread use of the simplest technical means and manual labor. Every day of work in the field in the summer and autumn of 1941 was marked by the selfless labor of the village workers. Collective farmers, rejecting the usual norms of peacetime, worked from dawn to dusk. In 1941, during the period of harvesting the first war harvest on the collective farms of the rear areas, 67% of the ears were harvested by horse-drawn vehicles and manually, and on state farms - 13%. Due to the lack of machinery, the use of draft animals has increased significantly. Machinery and horse-drawn implements played an important role in maintaining agricultural production during the war years. The increase in the share of manual labor and the simplest machines in field work was combined with the maximum use of the available fleet of tractors and combines. Emergency measures were taken to speed up harvesting in the frontline areas. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 2, 1941 determined that the collective farms and state farms of the front line should hand over to the state only half of the harvested crop. In this situation, the main burden of solving the food problem fell on the eastern regions. In order to, if possible, compensate for the losses of agriculture, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 20, 1941 approved a plan to increase the winter wedge of grain crops in the regions of the Volga region, Siberia, the Urals and Kazakhstan. It was decided to expand the sowing of grain crops in cotton-growing areas - in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Large-scale mechanized agriculture needed not only skilled labor, but also skillful organizers of production. In accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in many cases women were nominated as chairmen of collective farms from among the collective farm activists, who became the true leaders of the collective farm masses. Thousands of women activists, the best production workers, having headed the village councils and artels, successfully coped with the assigned work. Overcoming the enormous difficulties caused by the conditions of the war, the Soviet peasantry selflessly fulfilled its duty to the country.
The restructuring of the work of the railways began with the transfer of train traffic from June 24, 1941 to a special military schedule. Transportation that did not have defense significance, including passenger traffic, was significantly reduced. The new traffic schedule opened the "green light" for trains with troops and mobilization cargo. Most of the class cars were converted for the military sanitary service, and the freight cars were adapted to transport people, military equipment, as well as factory equipment evacuated to the rear. The procedure for planning cargo transportation, which had military-strategic importance, was changed; the nomenclature of the cargoes planned by the centralized order is expanded.
Under the conditions of the war, the life of the Soviet school was not suspended, but its workers had to work radically in a changed and extremely difficult environment. Particular difficulties fell on the teaching staff of the western regions of the Union. From the areas threatened by the enemy, the equipment of hundreds of schools, technical schools, thousands of students and teachers were evacuated to the east of the country, the number of which was sharply reduced. Already in the first days of the war, about 10 thousand people joined the active army in Belarus, over 7 thousand in Georgia, 6 thousand in Uzbekistan. In the occupied territory of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic republics, in the western regions of the RSFSR, many former teachers participated in partisan struggle. Many teachers have died. Even in cities besieged by the Nazis, as a rule, many schools continued their work. Even behind enemy lines - in partisan territories and zones - schools (primarily primary) functioned. The Nazis destroyed material values schools, educational buildings, turned schools into barracks, police stations, stables, garages. They transported a lot of school equipment to Germany. The invaders closed almost all the universities of the Baltic republics. The main part of the teaching staff, who did not have time to evacuate, was subjected to cruel persecution. A difficult time has come for the universities of the besieged cities. During air attacks, German aircraft damaged the building of the Leningrad University. During the long winter months, the university had no heating, no electricity, no water, plywood replaced window glass. But the student and scientific life of the university did not stop: lectures were still given here, practical classes were held and even dissertations were defended.
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Home > Abstract >History
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………... 2
Mobilization of Forces…..…………………………………………………………………………………........ 4
Evacuation of dangerous areas……………………………...……........................... ................................ 5
Soviet rear in 1942…………………………………………..…………………………………. 7
The growth of the military power of the Soviet Union……………………………………………………………… 9
Life of the USSR in 1944…………………………………………………………………………………… 10
The Soviet Rear in the Final Stage of the War………………………………………………………….. 11
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………. 13
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………… 15
Introduction
Great Patriotic War- one of the heroic pages in the history of our country. This period of time was a test of resilience, endurance and tolerance of our people, so the interest in this period is not accidental. At the same time, the war was one of the tragic pages in the history of our country: the death of people is an incomparable loss.
The history of modern wars did not know of another example when one of the belligerents, having suffered enormous losses, could solve the problems of restoring and developing agriculture and industry already during the war years. The selfless work of the Soviet people, devotion to the Motherland were demonstrated during these difficult years of the Great Patriotic War.
More than half a century has passed since the significant event when our country won the Great Victory over fascism. In recent years, we have seen more and more attention paid to the study of the contribution of the Soviet rear during the Great Patriotic War. After all, the war was not only on the fronts, but also within the country, its echo reached the very depths. There is not a single person who was not touched by the events of the Second World War - where shots were not heard, hunger and devastation reigned, mothers lost sons, and wives lost husbands. In the rear of the war, everyone worked for victory, the workshops did not stop for a second, people did not sleep for days, only to contribute to the future victory. And probably only thanks to this selfless zeal of the Soviet people, our troops nevertheless defeated the Germans, gave a worthy rebuff, and prevented the domination of the Third Reich in the world.
Force mobilization
The sudden invasion of Germany into the territory of the USSR required quick and precise action from the Soviet government. First of all, it was necessary to ensure the mobilization of forces to repulse the enemy. On the day of the Nazi attack, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree on the mobilization of those liable for military service in 1905-1918. birth. In a matter of hours, detachments and subunits were formed. Soon the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution approving the mobilization national economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941, which provided for an increase in the production of military equipment and the creation of large tank-building enterprises in the Volga region and the Urals. Circumstances forced the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the beginning of the war to develop a detailed program for restructuring the activities and life of the Soviet country on a military footing, which was set out in the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Union and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 29, 1941 to the party, Soviet organizations of the front-line regions.
In areas occupied by the enemy, partisan detachments and sabotage groups were created to fight against parts of the enemy army, to kindle guerrilla warfare everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, and set fire to warehouses. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every turn, disrupt all their activities. Among other things, conversations were held with the population on the ground.
Evacuation of dangerous areas
In connection with the rapid advance of the German troops to the east, there was an urgent need to evacuate to the eastern regions of the population, factories and valuables from territories that were in danger and could fall into the hands of the enemy. The rapid pace of creation of the country's main arsenal in the East could only be ensured by the successful transfer of enterprises, ammunition, weapons and other industries to the rear. The forced evacuation of resources from the dangerous frontline zone is not a new phenomenon. It took place, in particular, in Russia in the first world war. But never before has any of the belligerent states been able to carry out a gigantic evacuation of productive forces so purposefully, according to plan and with such amazing results, as was done by the Soviet Union.
On June 24, 1941, an evacuation council was created, which was entrusted with the management of the movement to the east of the frontline areas of the population, institutions, military supplies, equipment, enterprises and other valuables. It was headed by L. Kaganovich, and then N. Shvernik. The Evacuation Council worked out the procedure and sequence for the movement of people and material assets, planned the timing of the formation and dispatch of echelons to unloading points in the eastern regions. His decrees, approved by the government, were binding on the economic leadership, party, Soviet bodies and military councils and fronts, whose troops covered the areas and regions subject to evacuation.
The evacuation required tremendous effort from the railroad: by the end of 1941, 1.5 million wagons with people, cars, raw materials, and fuel were sent to the east. Meanwhile, the railways were already working with heavy overloads, providing (often under enemy bombs) the transfer of reinforcements, weapons, ammunition and other equipment to the front.
Along with the planned evacuation, there was also a spontaneous one: people fled from the advancing Germans in passing cars, wagons, overcame many hundreds of kilometers on foot. Often the situation was aggravated by the fact that the evacuation of the population from the front line without a corresponding order from the State Defense Committee was prohibited. Then, when the Nazis approached, a disorderly mass flight began.
All evacuees and refugees in the new place had to be provided with food, housing, work, and medical care. To this end, by the end of August 1941, more than 120 evacuation points were created. Each of them served up to 2 thousand people a day.
The second half of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 turned out to be the hardest time for the Soviet economy, when a significant part of the evacuated enterprises had not yet managed to resume production. The volume of industrial production as a whole decreased by 52% compared to the pre-war level, the production of rolled ferrous metals fell 3.1 times, bearings - 21 times, rolled non-ferrous metals - 430 times. This led to a significant reduction in the production of military equipment.
The relocation of productive forces to the east is one of the brightest pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The heroic efforts of Soviet workers, engineers, production commanders, and railroad workers ensured the evacuation to the east of many hundreds of large enterprises and more than 11 million people. In fact, an entire industrial country was displaced thousands of kilometers. There, in uninhabited places, often in the open air, cars and machines literally from the railway platform were put into action.
Soviet rear in 1942
Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet people, by the middle of 1942, the restructuring of the economy on a war footing was completed. By the summer, 1,200 large evacuated enterprises were already operating in the east of the country. In addition, 850 new plants, mines, power plants, blast and open-hearth furnaces, rolling mills and other important facilities were put into operation.
In summer and autumn, new difficulties arose, connected primarily with the temporary loss of the southern regions of the country and the need to evacuate from the threatened zone. The difficult situation was aggravated by the fact that the reserves created in peacetime were exhausted. To overcome the disproportion, it was necessary to use internal resources to the maximum and rationally, increase the capacity of heavy industry, and increase the pace of industrial construction.
In the east of the country, the construction of blast furnaces, metallurgical plants, high-quality steel plants, pipe-rolling, aluminum and other enterprises, power plants, railways, and coal mines expanded.
The All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union marched spectacularly over the most important construction sites. With the active help of Komsomol members, for example, the expansion of the Chelyabinsk and Krasnodar thermal power plants, the Sredneuralskaya state district power plant, and the construction of the Farhad hydroelectric power station in Uzbekistan were carried out at a high pace.
As a result of the skillful use of the economic system, the Soviet people sharply increased the production of military equipment in a short time. In the second half of 1942, compared with the first, the Soviet industry produced military aircraft by more than 1.6 times, weapons - by 1.1, mortars from 82 mm. and above - 1.3 times, shells and mines - almost 2 times. The production of tanks also increased, especially the T-34. In the third quarter, tank factories of the country produced 3946 T-34 tanks, and in the fourth quarter - 4325, which made it possible not only to make up for losses, but also to create a certain reserve of tanks. The production of self-propelled artillery mounts SAU-76 and SAU-122 began.
Despite the success of industry, 1942 was a particularly difficult year for the country's agriculture. Due to the occupation by the enemy of important food regions of the USSR, the sown areas and the gross grain harvest were significantly reduced. The losses suffered by agriculture were significant, its material and technical supply deteriorated sharply, and there was an acute shortage of labor. By the end of the year, the number of able-bodied collective farmers was halved compared to pre-war times, the machine park of the MTS and state farms was reduced, there was not enough fuel, and the production of mineral fertilizers was reduced. All this affected agricultural production. The village workers were given the task of developing new lands in the east. In a short time, sown areas were increased by 2.8 million hectares.
The growth of the military power of the Soviet Union
At the beginning of 1943, the Red Army carried out a series of strikes against Germany, which finally determined the turn of events in favor of the USSR. The order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief dated February 23, 1943 stated: “The fascist German army is going through a crisis in view of the blows received from the Red Army, but this does not mean that it cannot recover. The struggle against the German invaders is not over yet, it is only unfolding and flaring up ... This struggle will require time, sacrifices, the exertion of our forces and the mobilization of all our capabilities.
The armored and mechanized troops received improved T-34 tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts SU-122 and SU-152. The new Soviet fighter La-5FN was better than the German fighters in combat qualities. The famous Il-2 attack aircraft was improved. The performance characteristics of the Pe-2 dive bomber were improved. All this was created by the hands of millions of Soviet workers, technicians, engineers who did not leave the workshops for several shifts, ate and slept at the machines, worked without days off and holidays.
Life in the USSR in 1944
The victories won by the Soviet Army in 1944 became possible thanks to the new achievements of the home front workers. The increase in the scope of offensive operations of the Armed Forces, the completion of the liberation of Soviet territory, the implementation of the liberation mission became possible thanks to the rallying of the efforts of soldiers and home front workers, the mobilization of all the reserves and capabilities of the country.
In 1944, new problems arose. It was necessary to restore the territories liberated from the enemy. This required enormous efforts from people and high costs. Transport workers worked selflessly, ensuring uninterrupted communication between the front and rear, fulfilling the increased tasks of transporting military and national economic goods. Freight turnover of all types of transport increased by 15.3 percent and basically met the needs of the country. In the State plan for the restoration and development of the non-native economy for 1944 and in special decisions on sectors of the national economy, economic regions, republics, industries, territories and cities, the main objects of restoration, the sequence of restoration work were determined. People showed particular concern for the revival of the industry of Leningrad, the coal mines of Donbass, the metallurgical and machine-building plants of the South.
Soviet rear in the final stage of the war
The basis of the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces was: the growth of the military and economic power of the Soviet Union, the purposeful work of the Communist Party. On March 25, 1945, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved the State Plan for the Restoration and Development of the National Economy for 1945. It provided for the full provision of the needs of the Red Army, although in general the share of military industry production declined. Military expenditures continued to occupy a significant place, however, compared with the previous year, they decreased from 52.2 to 42.9 percent of all state expenditures.
From the beginning of 1945, All-Union socialist emulation developed even more widely, stimulating the development of technical progress and an increase in labor productivity. Of exceptional importance was the introduction of the experience of innovators. Only in the tank industry is the widespread use of the best practices of the front-line brigade E.P. Agarkov allowed to release 6087 people in four and a half months, and about 19 thousand skilled workers in 23 regions. Competition among collective farmers, workers of state farms and MTS has become widespread. In the spring, 22,450 tractor brigades joined it.
In the first half of the year significant results were achieved in the industry. The energy sector continued to develop at an accelerated pace. Successes in the field of construction and restoration of the energy industry of the USSR made it possible to increase the generation of electricity. Compared with the second half of 1944, the country's production of the main types of industrial products has increased significantly. Thus, coal production increased by 8.6%, iron ore - by 15.4%, iron production - by 5%, steel - by 1.7%, rolled products - by 5.1%.
The development of agriculture, as well as other industries, was affected by the severe consequences of the enemy invasion, and above all, the heavy damage inflicted by the Nazis on the agricultural regions of the European part of the country. In the devastated, burned, plundered villages, there was a shortage of workers everywhere, especially machine operators, as well as machines, equipment, livestock, seeds, and fertilizers. The restoration of agriculture in the territory liberated from the enemy took place with great difficulties. However, thanks to the leadership of the party, the labor of mostly women, the elderly and adolescents, and the active assistance of workers, agriculture gradually gained momentum. Successes in the restoration of the country's national economy allowed the Soviet state to increase the production of machinery, fuel and mineral fertilizers for agriculture as early as 1945. The workers of the village, despite the late spring, organized a sowing campaign. At the same time, for the first time during the war years, collective farmers managed to fulfill the state plan for sowing spring crops, and state farm workers even exceeded it. The selfless labor of the Soviet peasantry, the efforts of mechanization in agriculture made it possible to increase the sown area in the last war year to 113.8 million hectares, which accounted for 75 percent of the sown area in 1940.
Conclusion
The victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War was of world-historical significance. The socialist gains were defended. The Soviet people made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. The whole country fought - the front fought, the rear fought, who fully completed the task before them. The victory of the USSR in the war against fascism was a convincing demonstration of the possibilities of a planned socialist national economy. Its regulation ensured maximum mobilization and the most rational use of all types of resources in the interests of the front. These advantages were multiplied by the unity of political and economic interests that existed in society, the high consciousness and patriotism of the working class, the collective farm peasantry and the working intelligentsia, of all nations and nationalities rallied around the Communist Party.
The transfer of the national economy to the rails of the war economy radically changed the habitual way of life of the population in the rear. Instead of growing prosperity, constant companions of war came to Soviet soil - material deprivation, domestic hardships.
There was a change in people's minds. The news of the beginning of the offensive near Stalingrad was greeted with grandiose rejoicing throughout the country. The former feelings of anxiety and anxiety were replaced by confidence in the final victory, although the enemy was still deep within the USSR and the path to it seemed not close. The general mood for victory became an important psychological factor in the life of the front and rear.
To supply the troops with food, to feed the population in the rear, to give raw materials to industry and to help the state create stable reserves of grain and food in the country - these were the demands made by the war on agriculture.
The Soviet countryside had to solve such complex economic problems under exceptionally difficult and unfavorable conditions. The war tore the most able-bodied and skilled part of the rural workers away from peaceful labor. For the needs of the front, a large number of tractors, motor vehicles, horses were needed, which significantly weakened the material and technical base of agriculture. In the name of victory over German fascism, the working class, by their selfless labor, provided the active army with everything necessary and in sufficient quantity.
The events of the Great Patriotic War left such a trace in the soul of our people that has not been erased for many years. And the further the war years go down in history, the brighter we see the great feat of the Soviet people, who defended the honor, freedom and independence of their Motherland, who delivered mankind from fascist slavery.
The Great Patriotic War showed the essence of the soul of a Russian person, a deep sense of patriotism, colossal deliberate sacrifice. It was the Russian people who won the Second World War. We, contemporaries, must remember the lessons of the past, the price at which our happiness and freedom were won.
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