“What can we know?”, “What are the limits of knowledge?”. These are the main questions addressed in this article. Also here are different opinions about the boundaries of our cognitive activity, from antiquity to modern ideas.
“What can we know?”, “What are the limits of knowledge?”, “How limited are we in cognitive activity?” Philosophers, sociologists and a number of other scientists have been trying for many centuries to solve the problem of the existence of the boundaries of knowledge and the definition of these boundaries.
This problem was very relevant not only in our modern world. Even Plato raised the question: “What is knowledge?” and dedicated one of his works, Theaetetus, to this aspect.
In the modern world, in the age of technological advances, when, it would seem, the boundaries of knowledge have expanded significantly, this issue does not cease to be significant and discussed in scientific circles. It is important to understand that, despite all the technologies presented in the 21st century, a person remains very limited and unable to know all the elements of the material, and even more so the spiritual world. Boundaries bind us.
First you need to define what the boundaries of knowledge are. For example, such a philosopher as Rozin Vadim Markovich defined the concept of the boundary of knowledge as a conditional division, which is necessary as a result of the reflection of knowledge, discussion of its ultimate foundations, and also when comparing it with other forms that exist to comprehend reality. There are four types of human cognitive activity: scientific, everyday, game and artistic knowledge.
Despite the fact that many recognize the importance and power of science, yet in philosophy throughout its existence there has been a question about what are the limits of our knowledge. Can a person know absolutely everything he wants, or is there something in our world that we cannot understand, that will be inaccessible to human awareness and understanding. In philosophical science, in search of a solution to this issue, two diametrically opposed directions have developed. The first direction is called Gnosticism, or, in other words, epistemological optimism. The supporters of this position adhered to the point of view that our world is subject to knowledge, that it is open to human cognitive activity. Absolutely all things in the world are available for knowledge. If suddenly, in a given period of time, we do not know something, then this is only temporary, we simply do not have enough intelligence or experience. With the development of intellect and experience, a person will certainly know something more. This will continue indefinitely.
The most prominent representative of this approach is Hegel, a German thinker, philosopher and activist. In his works, he said that in the world there is nothing hidden from a person, there are no secrets. If something is unclear to the understanding of a person, something cannot be studied, then under the power of the mind, over time, everything secret is known. In addition to Hegel, representatives of Gnosticism were such scientists and philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Marx.
The second position is that it denies that our world can be fully understood. Scientists who adhere to this position are called agnostics, and sometimes also skeptics. Supporters of this concept say that there are such phenomena, things and processes that cannot be understood and known. They will never succumb to human understanding, not only that they will not be fully studied, but will not even be discovered. A prominent representative of this approach is Immanuel Kant, and in particular the ego theory and the so-called "things in themselves", that is, we cannot know the essence of these things. In addition to Kant, representatives of this position are Arcesilaus, J. Berkeley, D. Hume, E. Mach, R. Avenarius and others.
Aristotle, ancient Greek philosopher, in the IV century. BC e. set the boundaries of ancient knowledge from several positions. On the one hand, he set boundaries on the basis of categories, this is an ontological principle. On the other hand, with the help of the rules of reasoning and proof, these thoughts were presented in his work "Analytics". And the third side of the justification of the boundaries of knowledge is the formulation of the principles of truth, the excluded third, existence and other principles.
Any knowledge, psychological, ideological, theoretical, empirical, has its own limits. Even scientific knowledge has its drawbacks, it is not perfect, it has boundaries beyond which science cannot go. Some of these boundaries are scientific methods, which uses a particular field of science. Scientific methods are developed precisely in order to overcome the boundaries that science faces in its development.
But, one should not deny the fact that there are fundamental barriers, and it is possible that we will never be able to overcome them.
One of these boundaries is outlined by our experience. Whoever says anything about empiricism and criticizes it for the one-sidedness and incompleteness of the knowledge gained, nevertheless its main message is very true - the ultimate source of knowledge that a person receives is experience, absolutely in any of its forms. Although our lifetime experience is very great, it is still limited. And its boundaries are absolutely diverse, starting at least with the time of the existence of man as a species. Also, the scientist Ilyin I.A. dealt with the boundaries of cognition, namely in the cognition of the psyche. In his concepts, he put experience as the main element, saying that in order to know something, you need to experience it. But at the same time, the truth of the final conclusions remains only a probability, given that it remains outside the limits of experience.
Another obstacle, one boundary on the way to the omnipotence of scientific and cognitive activity has been erected by the nature of man. The problem is that man is a creature of the macrocosm. This means that a person is a creature of the world of objects that are similar in size to the person himself, with his size. Therefore, a person in his scientific activity uses means such as various instruments, language to describe other things, of the same size and scale as himself. And at that moment, when the teachings try to climb into and understand the essence of the micro or mega world with the instruments and ideas of the macro world, then problems and inconsistencies cannot be avoided.
The cognitive apparatus that we possess, when moving to other levels that are far from us and our everyday experience, simply stops working correctly, we can say that it loses its reliability. Scientists have tried to find a way out, to correct this situation, and to describe a reality that is inaccessible to our experience, they use the language of abstract concepts and notation, as well as the language of mathematics. But even here problems arise, since logic and mathematics are also the creation of the macrocosm.
A number of scientists have been involved in setting boundaries and analyzing different levels of reality. And so, for example, Shipov G.I., the founder of one of the theories of "torsion fields", identified 7 levels of reality. Absolute nothing - the first level, the second - torsion fields - non-material information carriers that determine the behavior of elementary particles. Then come the vacuum, elementary particles, gases, liquids and solids.
“In Shipov’s interpretation, “torsion fields”, unlike physical fields, do not have energy, for them there is no concept of wave or field propagation, but at the same time they “transfer information”, and this information is present “at once at all points of space-time” ".
Science itself has become another obstacle and limitation of knowledge. We can say that science has created a problem for itself. Of course, no one can refute the fact that science expands the boundaries, but it is indisputable that it significantly narrows the horizons, for example, the horizons of the human imagination. Very often it can be observed that in one theory, allowing one phenomenon to be present forbids another. For example, classical thermodynamics forbade perpetual motion, and in the theory of relativity there is a very strict ban on exceeding the speed of light. In a science such as genetics, the inheritance of acquired traits is refuted. And there are many more examples in which science limits various phenomena.
So the exact limits scientific knowledge still vague, uncertain. But what they are is undeniable. They are connected with personal boundaries, and with the possibilities of cognition itself, and with the level and type of cognition, and with psychology. So far, there are many white spots in the definition of boundaries. In my opinion, there will be a discussion about what these boundaries are and whether it is possible to overcome them for a very long time.
Bibliography
- http://eurasialand.ru/txt/hist_filo/23.htm
- http://www.filosofio.ru/filosofiya-poznaniya/granitsy-poznaniya.html
- Possibilities and limits of knowledge. Ed. Kirilenko G. G. Tutorial. – M.: Publishing House of Moscow State University, 1995.
- Ilyin VV Theory of knowledge. Introduction. Common problems. - M .: MGU Publishing House 1994.
- Ilyin VV Theory of knowledge. Epistemology. - M .: MSU publishing house, 1994.
- Ilyin IA Axioms of religious experience. In 2 volumes. Paris, 1953. Vol. 1.
- Russell B. Human knowledge. Its scope and boundaries. - M., 1957
- Shipov G. I. Theory of physical vacuum. Moscow: Nauka, 1997.
Philosophy of Science Essay
How is scientific knowledge possible? (I. Kant)
In the theoretical understanding of science, scientific knowledge and its methods, a new step was taken in the philosophy of Kant. If Descartes and Bacon in the study of science, the scientific method focused on the development and substantiation of a new method of cognition, then Kant made a productive attempt to comprehend the nature of science as such, to substantiate the possibility of scientific judgment, to reveal the general conditions for the formation of scientific and theoretical knowledge. In his philosophy, an orientation towards a "new science" - mechanistic natural science - was clearly manifested.
In his philosophy and logic, Kant clearly distinguished scientific knowledge (science) from artistic, aesthetic, religious and philosophical knowledge. In his opinion, scientific knowledge is primarily creative, synthetic knowledge, which at the same time has a universal and necessary significance. It is also knowledge about the object, nature, which is the totality of experience. According to Kant, the object differs from objective reality, from "things in themselves". If objective reality exists on its own, regardless of the subject (consciousness), then the object, nature, does not exist on its own, but is conditioned by the subject, formed by the initial unity of self-consciousness.
According to Kant, in reality, science deals only with an object (nature, phenomena), the possibility of which is determined by the forms of contemplation and thinking. From this it is self-evident that concepts are not borrowed from experience, but the possibility of experience is conditioned by the categories of the understanding. The latter apply to items, i.e. have a right to objective meaning because they essentially create experience and objects of knowledge themselves. Kant interprets the “object” only as an object of knowledge, distinguishing it from the “thing in itself”.
The philosopher is convinced that if our knowledge were knowledge about objective reality, about "things in themselves", then it would be impossible to theoretically substantiate the existence of a scientific judgment, i.e. synthetic and creative knowledge, the general condition of which is the existence of a priori logical categories, under which! and sensory varieties are brought up.
Therefore, the question arises: categories in their origin are subjective forms(they are rooted in the understanding), but how do they have an objective meaning, i.e. how can they synthesize objects of objective reality, attribute laws to them? Kant gives a clear answer to this question: our scientific knowledge does not deal with things in themselves, but deals with phenomena, objects, nature, which from the very beginning are conditioned by the subject, the original unity of self-consciousness. In other words, reason ascribes its laws not to objective reality, but to an object that has been formed even earlier by this unity.
Thus, the difference between an object and objective reality lies in the fact that the object as an object of knowledge is a condition for the emergence of science. In other words, the history of science begins only when this task is clearly formulated, when this new element of spiritual activity is precisely defined. What is the nature of this new epistemological element? The philosopher believes that these elements existed earlier in mathematics and natural science, thanks to which they were able to formulate synthetic a priori judgments before philosophy, which are the condition for the existence of any real science. This new element, according to Kant, is the beginning of a new way of thinking, the beginning of a new methodological approach.
For the first time in the history of philosophy, Kant substantiated the idea that the subject of cognition, science is not an object that exists by itself ("thing in itself"), but experience, a set of sensory representations, which, in essence, are due to the activity of the subject. In other words, the real object of scientific and theoretical knowledge is such an object (a set of experience), the possibility and reality of which from the very beginning are conditioned by a priori forms of contemplation - space and time - and a priori forms of reason, i.e. logical categories.
This idea of Kant introduced something really new into the consideration of the problem of knowledge, i.e. now it has become clear that beyond the subject there is reality in itself, and everything that a person deals with, his knowledge, does not exist outside the subject and his activity. According to the thinker, the advantage of mathematics and natural science in comparison with philosophy is that they somehow understood this earlier.
In his Critique pure mind"Kant is deeply convinced that philosophy, unlike mathematics and natural science, has not yet experienced such a happy moment, by the will of fate somehow it has not yet developed a new way of thinking. Therefore, the philosopher believes, it has not become a true science - after all, there is still no universal synthetic principles, so the only possible way scientific philosophy is its orientation to the experience of mathematics and natural science, an attempt to develop a new style of thinking, a new way of research.
Philosophy, in its mode of investigation, has never even come close to these highly respected sciences. It proceeded in the study from that theoretical premise, which not only did not contribute to its formation as a science, but, on the contrary, interfered with it, making it possible to freely construct a multitude of unsubstantiated philosophical systems. Kant believed that objects should be consistent with our knowledge, and this is better consistent with the requirement of the possibility of a priori knowledge about them, which should establish something about objects before they are given to us.
Kant valued this method of research, this methodological approach, so highly that he compared it with the Copernican revolution. He believed, without any doubt, that just as the Copernican approach made it possible to truly understand the solar system, so the new epistemological approach makes it possible to approach the subject in a new way and explain the functioning of scientific and theoretical knowledge.
The Kantian approach did contain a new and valuable element, which, however, was internally connected with Kantian subjective idealism, apriorism and agnosticism. Only in the subsequent development of philosophy (especially in materialistic philosophy) were the rational elements of his productive ideas rethought, and then they revealed their rational elements. First of all, we are talking about the development by Kant of the initial ideas of the principle of the activity of human cognition, without which it is currently impossible to imagine the dialectic of the process of cognition.
The philosopher emphasized that synthetic judgments, which by their nature have a universal and necessary significance, are the true sphere of the scientific and theoretical field. Therefore, he associated the question of the possibility of science, scientific-theoretical knowledge with the possibility of such knowledge. Kant is convinced that the possibility and necessity of such scientific and theoretical knowledge as the provisions of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics cannot be substantiated on the basis of analytical provisions and experience. Any genuine scientific and theoretical knowledge, in his opinion, should be of universal significance and at the same time expand our knowledge of the subject.
According to Kant, to substantiate the nature of science and scientific knowledge, the principles of traditional logic are insufficient, which does not at all raise the question of the formation of scientific and theoretical knowledge. Such knowledge also cannot be substantiated on the basis of the theory of knowledge of rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism can only substantiate the possibility of analytic knowledge, while empiricism is unable to give its judgments a universal and necessary character. Kant proves the futility of both: they are equally one-sided. Each direction emphasizes one side and discards the other.
The great merit of Kant is that he first decided to unite opposites in unity. If all the old philosophy and logic, when considering objects and phenomena, threw out a good half of thinking, then the philosopher restored integral thinking.
He was deeply aware that in order to prove the possibility of scientific and theoretical knowledge, the unity of opposites is necessary, i.e. the unity of the universal with the individual, the necessary with the accidental, the form with the content, the one with the many. If for all pre-Kantian logic the principle of knowledge was abstract identity and abstract difference, then Kant puts forward the unity of both as the basic principle of science, scientific knowledge.
In sensibility and reason, the philosopher saw two sides of scientific-theoretical, synthetic knowledge. The first of them is the ability to receive an idea (susceptibility to impression), and the second is the ability to cognize an object (self-activity of concepts). Real knowledge is given by reason and sensibility in their combination. The very formulation of the question was a step forward in comparison with the previous philosophy. Kant does not confine himself to stating the unity of the sensuous and the categories of reason, but also subjects to painstaking analysis each aspect of this unified theoretical knowledge.
Further Kantian philosophy explores the question of how objects and phenomena are brought under the category of reason, as a result of which scientific knowledge is formed. To classify objects is to make a judgment, and the faculty corresponding to this activity is called the faculty of judgment. According to Kant, general logic, abstracted from any content, cannot provide a justification for the ability to judge. Another thing is transcendental logic, which does not abstract from the content of concepts, but teaches the correct application of the pure concepts of the understanding to objects. It shows whether the object obeys the given rules of the understanding or not, and as a criticism it protects us from errors of the faculty of judgment in the application of pure concepts of the understanding.
The largest philosopher, founder of the German classical philosophy, Immanuel Kant had a huge impact on the subsequent development of the world philosophical thought. The relevance of his ideas has not been lost for our time. We can assume that Kant summed up the previous development of philosophy and largely determined its problems in the future. This is especially true for theory of knowledge.
Kant proceeds from the distinction between pure and empirical knowledge. All knowledge begins with experience. External objects only affect our sense organs, awakening to life the cognitive abilities of a person. The mind connects, compares, synthesizes or analyzes the received representations, processes the sensory impression into cognition. Kant calls this kind of knowledge experience; knowledge in terms of time cannot precede experience. It starts with experience.
It should be emphasized that knowledge, according to Kant, only begins with experience, but does not completely proceed from it. This position significantly distinguishes his theory of knowledge from the concept of empiricism. The material of the sense organs gives only the initial impetus. Our cognitive faculties add something of themselves. Consequently, knowledge tends to be isolated, to a certain extent it does not depend on sensory material, it can exist independently. This is how the idea of pure knowledge arises, which can also be called theoretical. The division of knowledge
on the theoretical and empirical had very great consequences. Many methodological programs up to the present have been based on this division.
Let us give a definition of the main terms that are used by Kant and were actually first introduced by him.
A posteriori knowledge is a set of judgments, each of which depends on experience. The content of a posteriori judgments is based on sensory material. The truth of such judgments depends on the degree of their correspondence to reality, which is reflected with the help of human senses with all the ensuing consequences.
A priori knowledge is a set of judgments that, unlike a posteriori, do not depend on experience. Only such knowledge has the signs of necessity, universality and evidence. A priori judgments are valid.
Here one involuntarily arises the desire to compare a priori and a posteriori knowledge with the truths of reason and the truths of Leibniz's fact. A priori knowledge, like the truths of reason, is necessary, and a posteriori knowledge, like the truths of fact, has an accidental character. Therefore, Kant further relies on a priori knowledge, it is this that should give scientific propositions a reliable character.
Of great importance in Kant's theory of knowledge is the distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments. Analytic judgments cannot add anything new to our knowledge, since the predicate in such judgments forms part of the content of the subject. Synthetic judgments, on the contrary, are able to give new knowledge, carry new information.
The fundamental basis of all theoretical sciences are a priori synthetic judgments, and the main task of philosophy in this regard is the question of substantiating their possibility. To answer such a question means to explain what are the sources of knowledge, types of knowledge, and what are the limits of applicability of cognitive abilities in each type of knowledge.
Kant distinguishes three types of knowledge: mathematics, natural science and theoretical philosophy(metaphysics) - and formulates accordingly the questions: "How is pure mathematics possible?", "How is pure natural science possible?" and "How is metaphysics as a science possible?". Of course, Kant does not question the real existence of these sections of knowledge. Even metaphysics, in his opinion, is a "kind of knowledge" and it "should be considered in a certain sense as given: metaphysics exists, if not as a science, then at least as a natural inclination [of man] (metaphysika naturalis). Indeed, , the human mind, by virtue of its own need, and not at all prompted by the mere vanity of omniscience, irresistibly comes to such questions that they cannot answer
no experimental application of reason and principles borrowed from here: therefore, all people, as soon as their reason expands to speculation, there really always was and will be some kind of metaphysics. Therefore, the question should be raised about it as well: how is metaphysics possible as a natural inclination, i.e. questions arise from the nature of the human mind, which the pure mind asks itself, and to which, prompted by its own need, it tries, as far as it can, to answer?
To approach the discussion of these questions, we must understand the Kantian distinction between phenomena and things in themselves. It should be noted that prior to Kant, no such distinction was made. Phenomena was usually understood as a set of objects and processes of our experience, outside of which there are objects that did not fall into the field of our attention. The latter constitute a reality that we have not mastered cognitively - a huge, alien, unknown world. Such ideas served as the basis, as we have already noted, for naive forms of skepticism, and in public life led to the emergence of religious and mystical views.
The specificity of Kant's approach lies in the fact that, according to his theory, the same object of our cognitive attitude can turn out to be both knowable and fundamentally unknowable. How is this possible? Any object (and this should be emphasized) exists irrespective of the person who cognizes it, independently of him, as a thing in itself. When a person directs his attention to him, he becomes an object of sensual contemplation, "and, therefore, we can cognize an object not as a thing that exists in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensual contemplation, i.e. as a phenomenon" .
In the object of knowledge, what Kant calls the object of sensory contemplation stands out, and the interaction between it and the sense organs leads to the emergence of special entities, which are the essence of the phenomenon itself, our representations. This is a special objective world, conceivable on the basis of the unity of categories, subjective reality, the world of the results of sensory perceptions. And what is the "object of sensual contemplation" itself? This is a kind of transcendental object that has a single property: the ability to come into contact with our senses; this is what constitutes objective reality, the intelligible world, it can only be thought, it includes objects of insensible contemplation. The transcendental object "denotes only something = x, about which we know nothing and cannot know anything at all", it can only be correlated with the unity of inner self-consciousness in the formation of concepts, can serve as a basis, ensure the unity of the diverse perceived properties of a thing, provide and consolidate stability of the concept of a thing. The transcendental object cannot even be represented without reference to sense data.
nym, because otherwise it would not be possible to think. This is "not an object of knowledge in itself, but only a representation of phenomena in the form of a concept of an object in general, determined by means of the manifold in a phenomenon" .
Thus, any object of knowledge splits into a phenomenon and a thing-in-itself. The totality of phenomena constitutes the sensually perceived world, and the totality of things in themselves constitutes the world that is not perceived by the senses. Each of these worlds is not only given to our consciousness in a different way, but also has a different cognitive meaning. The world of things in themselves is inaccessible to experiential knowledge, its "inhabitants" are objects of reason, and if so, then "the main question is what and to what extent can be known by reason and reason, regardless of any experience." Our empirical knowledge is constantly progressing, providing us with an ever deeper knowledge of the world, but whatever this progress, it does not in the least bring us closer to the knowledge of things in themselves, which remain inaccessible to sensory forms of perception and are known only as objects of sensory contemplation, as phenomena. At the same time, the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself cannot be imagined as independent of each other. The distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves was made by Kant in order to outline the circle of man's cognitive possibilities. This circle includes only objects of experience. But “we always have the opportunity, if not to know, then at least to think of these objects in the same way as things in themselves. Otherwise, we would come to the meaningless assertion that the phenomenon exists without what is” .
We emphasize that the concept of a thing-in-itself "is only a demarcation concept that serves to limit the claims of sensibility and therefore has only a negative application" . But it is impossible to do without it, since the sensual material will have nothing to connect with. The unknowable world of things in themselves and its real existence stimulate cognitive curiosity and stimulate the advancement of cognitive hypotheses. The thing-in-itself can be likened to some substantial beginning, invisible, inaccessible to the senses, but nevertheless being a necessary carrier of potential "irritants" of sensuality. This is the positive meaning of the thing-in-itself. In other words, objects appear to our mind as they exist (things in themselves), and to our sensibility as they appear (appearances), i.e. as objects of experience. The concepts of phenomena and things in themselves characterize the cognitive capabilities of man.
Kant bases the doctrine of cognitive abilities on the scheme of progressive acquisition of knowledge: feelings - reason - reason.
The novelty of Kant's doctrine of cognitive abilities was that he introduced reason - the third source of knowledge - along with sensibility and reason.
Sensuality is the ability to sense, the realization of which provides rich material for visual representations. But in themselves, these representations are not knowledge, since they are fragmented, not formalized and not universal. The mind brings unity into this diversity; according to certain rules, it synthesizes representations and, as it were, arranges them into appropriate compartments on the basis of existing categories. Such ordering and synthesis are connected, in particular, with the use of a priori forms of sensibility, which are space and time. Space is an a priori form of external contemplation, and time is an a priori form of internal contemplation. It is they who provide the rational synthesis with universality and the necessity of judgments. According to Kant, any knowledge is a set of judgments, and a priori synthetic judgments are its most essential part.
However, the mind, actively transforming and sorting empirical material, "not only knows nothing about the limits of its competence, but also does not want to know." Reason seeks to expand its competence, seeks to penetrate beyond the limits of possible experience (the only one allowed for it), to become a kind of "legislator" for nature, the source of its laws. “Consequently,” Kant wrote, “we ourselves introduce order and regularity into the phenomena we call nature, and they could not be found in phenomena if we or the nature of our soul had not put them in the first place.” This is how transcendental - beyond the limits of possible experience - illusions arise. But "the source of transcendental illusion is not reason, but reason. The illusion consists in an overexperienced expansion of reason, but reason is not prompted to this expansion by itself, but in obedience to the guidance and requirements of reason." To curb the arbitrariness of the mind, giving it the fundamental rules of its activity, is not the only duty of the mind. Reason contains absolute principles, which it does not borrow from anywhere, and from which all other concepts can flow. It turns on the deduction apparatus. By substituting knowledge based on absolute principles as the larger premise of the syllogism, we get all the rest of the knowledge. But since at the rational level knowledge is only formally ordered and universal, there is the possibility of error (illusion of knowledge). Note that this is not a logical error (the rules of logic are observed): reason can synthesize sensory perception errors, presenting them in formally correct structures.
Categories are of great importance in the activity of the mind. These are limiting concepts, concepts about objects in general. They make the contemplation of the subject concrete and create an opportunity to express judgments about it. The category actually makes possible the empirical contemplation of an object in experience, bringing under the manifold in contemplation a unifying basis, which serves as the principle
formation of a concrete concept about the contemplated object. In addition, the category does not allow any object of contemplation structural part judgments. From the point of view of traditional logic, a simple judgment (an elementary part of rational activity) consists of a subject and a predicate. The operation of reversing judgments allows you to swap the subject and the predicate, which, in turn, should lead to a change in the subject of thought, the transfer of a mental attitude to another entity. For example, according to the rules of logic, from the proposition "All people have a soft earlobe" follows the proposition "Some creatures that have a soft earlobe are people." In the first proposition, the concept of "beings with a soft earlobe" is a predicate; it conceives a sign of the object of thought (human). In the second judgment, the same concept becomes the subject and claims to be an independent object of thought. But the category of substance does not make it possible to think of signs as objects, because, on the contrary, objects are carriers of signs.
It does not, of course, follow from this that logical operations (in particular, reversal of judgments) are useless. They give us the opportunity to look at conceivable entities from different angles, reveal their content, clarify the thought. You just have to always keep in mind that the judgment of the second type is inferential, depending on the premises from which it is obtained according to the rules of logic. Let's take another example. Consider the proposition "A rose is red." A particular rose can be an object of contemplation, but redness cannot. "Being red" is a property of our representation, a subjective quality (it depends on the structure of the human body: dogs, for example, perceive the world in black and white, so a rose cannot be red for them). The connection between empirical contemplation (the content of knowledge) and categorical a priori forms is synthesized in the concept. "Being red" is a sign included in the content of the concept of a rose.
Cognitive activity is impossible without sensations and categories. Knowledge is the human way of representing the world. It cannot but depend on the nature of human cognitive abilities. It is essential that categories are entities independent of empirical material; they are pure forms. Knowledge becomes itself when sensations "flow" into certain forms and their synthesis leads to the formation of concepts, the basic "cells" of knowledge. Categories are the concepts of our mind, which subsumes experimental material, sensory data under categories, shapes sensibility. Categories are a priori forms of rational activity, conditions of possible experimental knowledge.
Categories cannot be derived empirically, empirically, from observations of nature, which is given to us as a set of phenomena. Even more than that, categories and reason establish, as we already
noted the laws of phenomena. And here the question arises, which Kant calls a riddle: "How can the categories determine a priori the connection of the manifold in nature without deriving this connection from nature?" Kant solves this riddle on the basis of the definition (i.e., from the understanding he adopted) of the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself. Laws exist only in relation to the subject, reason, acting on the basis of categories, is able to reveal patterns in phenomena. Things in themselves, with their inherent laws, exist independently of the subject. Phenomena only represent things in themselves in the consciousness of the subject. Reason and the ability of imagination process the diversity of sensory experience. But this processing happens through a grid of categories. Therefore, we know nothing about things in themselves. Our knowledge is the manifestation of things in themselves, obtained in a specific way with the help of higher cognitive faculties. It is an intellectual synthesis of reason and sensibility.
The above principles of understanding the process of cognition allowed Kant, based on general philosophical and epistemological premises, to put forward an original idea of the essence of science. He poses the following basic questions: "What is science in general?" "How is science possible?" "What is the role of a priori synthetic judgments in science?".
Kant believes that the beginning of true science as pure knowledge is a revolution in the way scientific thinking. In the pre-revolutionary period, there are only scattered methods that remotely resemble scientific research. One can hardly call a scientist a person who has learned to calculate the area of land plots, no matter how large and complex in configuration they may be, or who has opened an arithmetic account and even a decimal system of numbers. Discoveries of certain systems of measures, principles of measurement, etc. characterize a skilled person and do not in the least bring them closer to theoretical problems. Research becomes scientific when it special meaning gains intelligence. Awareness of the role of reason in the emergence of science is clearly seen from the formulation of the following dilemma. Should the mind only process randomly obtained experimental data (lag behind empirical facts), or should its purpose be to determine the direction of experimental research?
Research begins when the subject enters into a cognitive relationship with nature. A person relates to the world through his cognitive abilities, he cannot perceive the world as it exists. The laws and principles of rational and sensory-contemplative activity predetermine what a person can find in nature. This does not mean that he finds in nature such laws as exist before knowledge in the mind; but this is known
that the subjective factor actively organizes our cognition. The unity of the perceptions of the subject contemplating the object is ensured by the unity of inner self-consciousness. The objects of experimental cognition must conform to our consciousness, our concepts, which do not simply correspond to objects. The mind is not a mirror that dispassionately reflects the outside world, but a device that actively takes from the outside world what it can take.
If all the truths of science and reason were evaluated on the basis of their correspondence to reality, then the fact of the origin of new knowledge would be completely inexplicable. Where does it come from? If it arises from the generalization of experimental data (our ideas), then the principle of correspondence of knowledge to reality is not needed. The only thing that would be required in this case is the justification of the logical way of moving from particular facts to general provisions. This method has been known for a long time, and it is called induction. But induction does not give a reliable conclusion. Even before Kant, the famous English philosopher D. Hume showed that inductive conclusions are based on habit. Here you need to pay attention to the fact that the logical (rational-rational) way of obtaining new knowledge by its nature (as based on habit) turns out to be illogical, irrational. It is here that the famous problem of justifying induction arises, which has not yet been solved, and cannot be solved from the positions from which it was tried to be solved. Induction gives knowledge of an empirical nature; it is not for nothing that inferential inductive knowledge is called empirical laws. At the same time, an indisputable fact is the existence of a priori truths in our knowledge. If we rely on the principles of correspondence and induction, then the reliability of such judgments is very problematic.
So, if knowledge is not obtained as a result of the influence of the external world on a person (on his cognitive abilities), then it remains to accept the seemingly completely unbelievable assumption that knowledge is the result of the influence of a cognizing subject on the external world. Here it should be borne in mind that many things are determined by our habit, which at a certain moment becomes an unconscious regulator of human behavior, including a cognitive attitude to the world. A certain tradition is being created. Going beyond it is connected with what Kant calls a revolution in the way of scientific thinking. In the theory of knowledge, such a revolution was the acceptance of the point of view that knowledge is the result of man's influence on the external world. The laws of reason subjugate nature. The laws of reason, reason and sensibility determine what a person, following these laws, is able to take from nature. Beyond his cognitive abilities lies some X, about which we can know nothing. In this case, the origin of a priori judgments is quite clear: they are the products of the activity of the mind.
Rapid progress in the development of scientific knowledge came when it was realized that the objects of experience must conform to our concepts. Theoretical knowledge can develop independently of the objects of the experimental world, i.e. a priori. Science must go ahead of empirical practice. In practice, a person only uses, applies or tests the knowledge already received. Experience retains the right to correct the theory up to its refutation.
It is this understanding of scientific thinking - as a sphere in which evidence is based on a priori accepted axioms and concepts as constructs of the mind - that led to the emergence of pure mathematics.
It is useful to know the evolution of views on the understanding of an axiom as an a priori proposition. The change in ideas about the nature of an axiom is based on the gradual destruction of the connection between evidence as the principle of accepting an axiom with common sense. From the very beginning, axioms were understood as propositions that were obviously true and therefore did not require any proof and did not need experimental verification. Such, for example, were the initial positions of Euclid's geometry. However, the further development of science clearly showed that some of the provisions of non-Euclidean geometry, in particular, that "through one point lying outside a given line, an infinite number of lines parallel to a given line can be drawn" and "through one point lying outside a given line, it is impossible to draw any one straight line parallel to the given one" are far from obvious. Moreover, if we assume that the properties of real space and time are based on the principles of Euclid's geometry, then these provisions must necessarily turn out to be false. But it has been shown that replacing the usual postulate of parallel lines with postulates that offer a different understanding of space leads to theoretical systems that are internally consistent, and this is one of the main features of the theory. For such systems, interpretations have been found that rely on a modified concept of a plane and allow one to speak about the truth of such unusual statements in certain models. The emergence of non-Euclidean geometries stimulated a new formulation of questions about the nature of real space and time. In fact, is our world arranged in such a way that it has three dimensions, that time has only a linear direction from the past to the future, and that Euclid's geometry corresponds to the real properties of the world in which we live? Indeed, no everyday practical experience can give us evidence in favor of the existence of curved space, branching time, the beginning or infinity of time, etc., and tradition (habit and common sense based on it) has created a firm opinion that Euclid's geometry is the geometry of our reality.
Another illustrative example is the discovery of infinitesimal quantities. As is known, they led to the emergence of differential and integral calculus, and much later they suddenly discovered with surprise that these branches of mathematics can be successfully applied in practice; then applied mathematics actually arises.
A discussion of the question of how the revolutionary breakdown of the style of thinking in natural science was accomplished usually begins with an examination of the example of the Copernican upheaval. Here it must be emphasized that the Copernican hypothesis is an a priori assumption that was put forward before it was empirically confirmed. From this moment begins the transformation of the way of scientific thinking in natural science.
The discoveries of Galileo (1564-1642) also contributed to the revolutionary upheaval in the style of thinking in the field of natural science. He expressed hypotheses about the unity of terrestrial and celestial phenomena, about the relativity of motion, formulated the idea of inertia, the law of free fall of bodies and the principle of material substance, which is the single basis of nature. His idea that secondary qualities do not have substantial properties and belong to the subjective world led close to the concept of objective truth. The significance of secondary qualities in cognition should be taken into account along with any properties of the cognizing subject that are superimposed on objective truth and "obscure" it.
The goal of science is to find the causes of phenomena, to search for and reveal their inner necessity, and not in the aimless (disorganized, random) collection and description of facts. Galileo believed that the understanding of causes is valued much higher than the acquisition of empirical facts, even repeatedly confirmed by experience. Experience is the starting point for the knowledge of nature, the beginning of science. But the world is so rich that we cannot know everything about it. The amount known by man is negligible compared to the immeasurable wealth of nature, which remains unknown. And if experience were the only source of knowledge, then a person could never know more than the abilities of the senses allow him. Therefore, Galileo asserted with complete certainty that "the human mind cognizes some truths as perfectly and with such absolute certainty as nature itself has." Reason in a certain sense takes precedence over empirical knowledge.
Support and consolidate a new understanding of the principles of knowledge of nature and discovered by J. Kepler (1571-1613) the laws of planetary motion. The following fact convinces us that these laws have an a priori synthetic character. The second law of planetary motion (each planet moves in a plane passing through the center of the Sun, and the radius vector of the planet at equal intervals of time
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(meni describes equal areas) was discovered by Kepler without knowing the physical causes of its action. He could only make a hypothesis about the force of attraction of the Sun. It is important that Kepler's laws were the result of theoretical efforts, although they were based on empirical facts, in particular, on the results of observations of the planet Jupiter, which could not be explained by the theoretical means that existed before Kepler's discovery. Sometimes Kepler's laws are called empirical laws, which is not entirely accurate, since they applied to any planet solar system and reduced to the problem of two bodies, i.e. did not take into account the perturbations introduced into their interaction by other celestial bodies.
The achievements in the natural sciences we have described were known to Kant. It was they who allowed him to draw the following conclusion: “Reason must approach nature, on the one hand, with its own principles, only in accordance with which phenomena that are consistent with each other can have the force of laws, and, on the other hand, with experiments invented in accordance with these principles. in order to draw knowledge from nature, but not like a schoolboy, to whom the teacher tells him everything he wants, but like a judge, forcing the witness to answer the questions posed by him.
Considering in this context the state of the philosophy that preceded him, Kant comes to the conclusion that it is not a science, at best it can be called "the natural inclination of man." Kant comes to this conclusion on the basis of the ideal of scientificity developed by him. This is the so-called apodictic science, which has the following main features: evidence, universality and necessity, i.e. is a "hard science". So far, such metaphysics does not exist, which, in fact, has given rise to distrust of it and skepticism. Kant rejects previous metaphysics, believing that uncriticality and dogmatism are the main reasons for its historical failures. Reforming metaphysics in the spirit of criticism is the main and only task of all philosophy. Only a critical examination of philosophy will lead to the identification of its specific nature and make it possible to approach the ideal of scientific knowledge. Metaphysical knowledge is a special type of a priori knowledge. Metaphysics cannot have empirical sources. It always considers the general through concepts (abstractly), in contrast to mathematics, which also studies the general, but in a single contemplation (concretely), though with the help of a pure a priori representation.
Kant first tried to connect the problems of epistemology (theory of knowledge) with the study historical forms activities of people: the object as such exists only in the forms of activity of the subject. He sought to substantiate the activity approach to understanding cognition. The starting point of the activity approach in cognition is the understanding of cognition as a constructive work to reproduce an object in thought, due to a certain position of the subject of cognition, the means, prerequisites and attitudes used by him.
Thus, Kant, having substantiated the thesis that the cognizing subject determines the method of cognition and constructs the object of knowledge, makes a revolution in philosophy, which is often called the "Copernican revolution".
The essence of scientific knowledge consists not in the contemplation of the intelligible essence of an object, but in the activity of constructing it, generating idealized objects.
The main merit of Kant is in a new approach to the nature of knowledge, its possibilities and limits. He was the first to propose understanding knowledge not as a reflection of reality, but as its construction through the prism of a priori schemes and principles inherent in reason and reason. Kant was convinced that the means of science alone are not enough to create a complete and adequate picture of the world. Having pointed out its limits to science, Kant proclaims the independence of aesthetic and moral thinking.
Kant showed that if a person with his mind begins to reason about the universal, which goes beyond the limits of his finite experience, then he inevitably falls into contradictions.
The essence of Kant's theory of knowledge.
Kant argued that our mind can cognize the objects of the surrounding world only because everything cognizable in these objects is created by the same mind according to its a priori principles and schemes. We do not cognize things in themselves, but their manifestations to consciousness.
Kant divides the surrounding reality into that which is accessible to knowledge, and that which cannot be known by man. Knowable reality is called the sphere of phenomena, "things-for-us", "phenomena". Unrecognizable objects are called "things-in-themselves", "noumena". The world is divided not according to the ontological (the doctrine of being), but according to the epistemological principle. This position is called "cognitive-theoretical dualism."
Kant's doctrine of a priori principles of knowledge
The object of knowledge is created by the operation of a priori synthesis of the material of sensory perception with the help of rules and principles rooted in the mind and reason. With the help of the categories of space and time, given a priori to the mind, a world of sensory phenomena is created. Then, this world of sensory phenomena, with the help of a priori rules of reason, is transformed into a world of experience, subject to scientific consideration.
Kant divides the principles of pure reason into four kinds: categories of quantity; quality categories; categories of relationship; categories of modality. In addition to the conditions and principles of the understanding, the action itself is also necessary, with the help of which these feelings could be transformed into true knowledge. Kant called this action "transcendental apperception".
The doctrine of a priori principles sensory knowledge called "transcendental aesthetics". The doctrine of the principles of pure reason is the domain of transcendental analytics. Transcendental dialectics explores the ideas and principles of reason and shows the impossibility of philosophy as a science.
Kant on the Antinomies of Pure Reason
Kant divides reason as a faculty into pure (speculative) reason and practical reason. Pure reason is limited by the limits of the world of phenomena, practical reason is aimed at "things-in-themselves." Kant demonstrates the limits of pure or speculative reason by proving the cosmological idea as an example. In an attempt to carry out such a proof, the mind becomes entangled in internal contradictions, which Kant called the antinomies of pure reason. "There are four such antinomies:
First antinomy. Thesis: The world has a beginning in time and space. Antithesis: The world has no beginning in time and is infinite in space.
Second antinomy. Thesis: Everything in the world consists of the simple and the indivisible. Antithesis: There is nothing simple in the world, but only complex bodies.
Third antinomy. Thesis: There is freedom in the world. Antithesis: There is no freedom in the world, but everything is necessary and causally determined.
Fourth antinomy. Thesis: God exists. Antithesis: There is no God.
Both the thesis and antithesis can be equally true, therefore, their objects cannot serve as the subject of scientific knowledge. But they can be a matter of practical reason
The Essence of Practical Reason
Kant's practical reason regulates the sphere human freedom. It means the right to freedom of choice. Often practical reason is identified with morality. Speaking of the relationship between pure and practical reason, Kant prefers the latter. This means that in difficult situations, a person must first of all listen to the voice of the heart, conscience, even if this goes against the requirements of logic.
The core of the theory of practical reason is Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of the human will.
Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, formulated his famous question, "What can I know?" and took upon himself the labor of substantiating by means of reason the very conditions and possibilities of human cognition.
In his theory of knowledge, he solves the problem: how, starting from subjectivity, from human consciousness, you can come to objective knowledge. Kant makes the assumption that there is some kind of proportionality between consciousness and the world. He connects the dimension of cosmic processes with human existence.
Before cognizing something, it is necessary to identify the conditions of cognition. Kant's conditions of cognition are a priori forms of cognition, i.e., not dependent on any experience, pre-experimental, or, more precisely, super-experimental forms that make it possible to understand the world. The comprehensibility of the world is ensured by the conformity of the mental structures that the subject has with the connections of the world.
Knowledge is a synthesis of sensibility and reason. Kant defines sensibility as the ability of the soul to contemplate objects, while the ability to think the object of sensuous contemplation is reason. “These two abilities,” writes Kant, “cannot perform the functions of each other. The understanding cannot contemplate anything, and the senses cannot think anything. Only from their combination can knowledge arise.”
Kant's doctrine of the limits of knowledge was directed not against science, but against blind faith in its limitless possibilities, in the ability to solve any problem by scientific methods. “Therefore,” writes Kant, “I had to limit my knowledge in order to make room for faith.” Critical philosophy required an awareness of the limitations of human knowledge, which is limited to scientifically reliable knowledge, in order to make room for a purely moral orientation in the world. Not science and not religious faith, and the “moral law within us” serve as the basis of morality for Kant.
The Critique of Practical Reason answered Kant's second fundamental question: "What should I do?" Kant introduces a distinction between theoretical and practical reason. This difference is as follows. If pure or theoretical reason “determines” the object of thought, then practical reason is called upon to “implement”, i.e., produce a moral object and its concept (it must be borne in mind that Kant’s term “practical” has a special meaning and - a productive activity, but simply an act). The sphere of activity of practical reason is the sphere of morality.
As a philosopher, Kant realized that morality cannot be derived from experience, empiricism. The history of mankind demonstrates a great variety of norms of behavior, often incompatible with each other: actions considered as a norm in one society are subject to sanctions in another. Therefore, Kant took a different path: he substantiates the absolute nature of morality by philosophical means.
Moral action, as Kant showed, does not apply to the world of appearances. Kant revealed the timeless, i.e., independent of knowledge, of the development of society, the nature of morality. Morality, according to Kant, is the most existential basis of human existence, that which makes a man a man. In the realm of morality, the thing-in-itself, or free causality, operates. Morality, according to Kant, is not derived from anywhere, is not substantiated by anything, but, on the contrary, is the only justification for the rational structure of the world. The world is arranged rationally, since there is moral evidence. Conscience, for example, possesses such moral evidence, which cannot be further decomposed. It acts in a person, prompting to certain actions, although it is impossible to answer the question why this or that action is performed, since the act is performed not for one reason or another, but according to conscience. The same can be said about debt. A person acts according to a sense of duty, not because something forces him, but because some kind of self-coercive force operates in him.
Unlike theoretical reason, which deals with what is, practical reason deals with what should be. Morality, according to Kant, has the character of imperativeness. The concept of imperativeness means the universality and obligatory nature of the requirements of morality: “the categorical imperative,” he writes, “is the idea of the will of every being, as the will that establishes universal laws.”
Kant wants to find the highest principle of morality, i.e., the principle of revealing the moral content itself, and gives a formulation of how a person should act, striving to join the truly moral. “Act only according to such a maxim, guided by which you can at the same time wish it to become a universal law.”
Kant distinguished between socially approved norms of behavior and norms of morality. Socially approved norms of behavior are historical in nature, but far from always being the realization of the requirements of morality. Kant's teaching was just aimed at revealing in it the historical and timeless characteristics of morality and was addressed to all mankind.
2. Trends in the physicalization of chemistry. Advantages and disadvantages of "chemistry in vitro".
The interaction of physics and chemistry is constantly deepening, which poses a number of questions for philosophy and natural science: 1) The question of the possibility of reducing higher forms of motion to lower ones and, in particular, of reducing chemical processes to physical ones. 2) The question of the status of chemistry as an independent science and its place in the system of natural science.
In the history of the interaction between physics and chemistry, researchers distinguish three stages: 1) the penetration of individual concepts of physics into chemistry; 2) penetration into chemistry of physical laws; 3) creation of integrative physical and chemical theories at the intersection of sciences.
From classical mechanics, the concept of force penetrates into chemistry, under the influence of which the doctrine of chemical affinity begins to develop, i.e. on the reactivity of substances. Such physical concepts as "mass", "energy" also played an important role in the design of the first truly scientific theories in chemistry. The penetration of the laws of thermodynamics into chemistry led to the emergence of chemical thermodynamics. The discovery of the electron and the complex structure of the atom led to the emergence of electronic theories in chemistry. But a qualitative breakthrough in the relationship between the two sciences occurred after the advent of quantum mechanics. The physical nature of chemical bonds was revealed. Phenomena that were studied exclusively by chemistry were explained by physics. This explanation turned out to be quite complete, accurate and meant more deep level penetration into the essence of chemical phenomena. At present, most chemical concepts, laws and theories have received a physical interpretation.
In philosophy, there is the following most general classification of forms of movement by level of complexity: mechanical movement, physical, chemical, biological and social. There are strict interconnections between the forms of motion of matter. 1) Each more complex form of the motion of matter has historically developed from less complex ones (except mechanical and physical). 2) More complex forms of movement include all previous, less complex ones. 3) More complex forms of the motion of matter are not qualitatively reducible to any of the less complex forms, nor to a combination of them. Violation of the third rule leads to reductionism. Reductionism- this is a methodological approach, which consists in reducing the complex to the simple, in reducing the properties of the whole to the sum of the properties of the parts. In some cases, reduction is not only justified, but also acts as a completely fruitful method of cognition. Combining analysis and synthesis, reduction makes it possible to cognize the whole through cognition of parts, the complex through cognition of simple components. But at the same time, one cannot identify the complex and the simple, or perceive the complex as a mechanical combination of simple components. In this form, reductionism is a simplification and leads to erroneous conclusions (for example, the identification of chemical and physical processes).
The opposite methodological approach is anti-reductionism also exists in various forms. While emphasizing the specifics of different forms of movement, many anti-reductionists misunderstand it. It is a mistake to believe that in chemical processes, along with physical ones, some other special, non-physical phenomena appear that cannot be explained from the standpoint of physics. Similarly, in a living organism there are no special biological processes that do not have a physical and chemical basis.
Dialectical-materialistic philosophy denies the extremes of primitive reductionism and anti-reductionism. The higher forms of movement arise on the basis of the lower ones and include them in themselves. Therefore, in nature there are no barriers separating physical, chemical and biological processes. Therefore, physics successfully explains chemical phenomena, and physicochemical methods are fruitfully used to understand the specifics of living things. If reductionism is understood only as a proof of the genetic interconnection of the forms of movement, then it does not contradict dialectics and acquires a positive scientific significance. Such reductionism proves the unity of material processes and promotes the integration of sciences.
At the same time, dialectics emphasizes the qualitative specifics of the forms of movement and the irreducibility of higher forms to lower ones. Quality is the certainty of an object, which characterizes its most important features, essential properties. The higher forms of movement are not qualitatively reduced to the lower ones, which means that they have new essential features that the lower forms do not have. So an essential feature that distinguishes the qualitative definiteness of chemical movement is the process of transformation of substances, changes in their composition and chemical structure. It is this feature that makes up the specificity of chemical processes, and, consequently, the subject of chemistry as a science of substances and their transformations.
Chemical motion is not only qualitatively different from physical motion, it is a more complex form of motion: 1) The simple can exist without the complex, but the complex cannot exist without the simple. There are many physical processes in which chemical transformations do not occur. But there is not a single chemical phenomenon that would not be accompanied by physical processes. 2) In the history of the development of the Universe, there was a time when only physical processes took place, and chemical ones were not possible. The high temperature made the formation of atoms impossible. The subsequent appearance of atoms, molecules and chemical processes meant the complication of matter. 3) Further complication of matter is already associated with chemical motion, on the basis of which an infinite variety of substances, properties, processes arises. More and more complex structures arise, including organic macromolecules, and biological processes begin.
That. it is a mistake to deny the qualitative specifics of chemical motion. For this reason, despite the increasing penetration of physics into chemistry, the latter will never be reduced to the former. The history of chemistry proves that, along with the process of physicalization, there is also a process of deepening traditional chemical concepts, theories, and methods. Just as in science in general, along with integration, differentiation occurs, the emergence of new sciences with their own specific subjects of research.
One of the central problems of epistemology is whether a person, humanity is able to develop knowledge adequate to the processes taking place in reality, to obtain reliable knowledge about things that exist? Most philosophers and scientists answer this question in the affirmative. And this position can be called
epistemological optimism.
Skeptics doubt the possibility of obtaining reliable and
objective knowledge about the essence of the world around them, declare that human "knowledge" is nothing but the expression of opinions, which may or may not be true.
In the history of philosophy, the most famous agnostics were the English philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) and German philosopher Immanuel Kant (17241804). According to Hume, it is impossible to rationally prove the reality of things behind our perception. Only sensations, their relations and complexes are available to a person. What is behind the sensations, in his opinion, cannot be the subject of our confident judgments, because they cannot be verified through direct comparison with the external world. Perhaps things are hidden behind sensory perceptions, as the materialists assure. And perhaps these perceptions are excited in a person by the World Mind or God, as the idealists assure. It is impossible to go beyond perceptions. Therefore, the process of cognition, according to Hume, is a combination, movement, increase and decrease in the material delivered to us by the senses.
Kant, unlike Hume, did not doubt the existence of material "things in themselves", entities, but he considered them in principle unknowable. Between the "thing-in-itself" and the phenomenon lies an impassable abyss, to jump over which human mind not given 19.
Kant proceeded from the fact that people have a certain knowledge - both in science and in Everyday life. But this knowledge is surrounded and intertwined with what only seems to be knowledge, but in fact can be either speculative metaphysics (Kant called it "the dream of the mind"), or a false claim to clairvoyance ("the dream of the senses"), or judgments about what what goes beyond the limits of human knowledge (for example, about the “world as a whole”)20. It is important to develop an approach that reveals the foundations of various phenomena of knowledge, analyzes the conditions for their possibility and confirms or, on the contrary, rejects their claims to the role of knowledge.
In the mind, according to Kant, there is an ineradicable desire for unconditional knowledge, arising from the highest ethical demands. Under the pressure of this, the human mind strives to solve questions about the boundaries or the infinity of the world in space and time, about the possibility of the existence of indivisible elements of the world, about the nature of the processes taking place in the world. He believed that the attempt of the mind to go beyond sensory experience and to know "things in themselves" leads it to contradictions, to antinomies of pure reason. It becomes possible for two contradictory, but equally justified judgments to appear in the course of reasoning, of which Kant has four pairs (for example, the world is finite - the world is infinite, divisible and indivisible, all processes are causally conditioned and completely free, necessary and random).
Reflecting on them, Kant assumes that the source of such antinomies is rooted in the mind, and not in the Universe, and undertakes a critical examination of the mind itself, its limits and possibilities. He argues that while the mind deals with the finite world (the world of phenomena), our thinking is carried out consistently, but as soon as the mind enters the sphere of thinking about the world as a whole (the sphere of “things in themselves”, entities), it becomes entangled in contradictions. Therefore, according to Kant, it is necessary to limit the claims of reason to the knowledge of "things in themselves." In the event that in the process of spiritual and practical development of the world, a person is forced to deal with the facets of the absolute, he can avoid contradictions only by volitional choice in favor of one or another thesis.
When characterizing skepticism and agnosticism, the following should be kept in mind. Skepticism is important point any serious analysis of knowledge: no type of human knowledge is so perfect that its reliability cannot be questioned. It should be noted that a critical position in epistemology is appropriate and fruitful, because it avoids both dogmatic assumptions21 and the excessive suspicion of skeptics who deny the very possibility for a person to have reliable knowledge.
Agnosticism cannot be presented as a concept that denies the very fact of the existence of knowledge. We are talking about clarifying its capabilities and what constitutes knowledge in relation to reality. The persistence of agnosticism is due to the fact that it was able to capture some of the real difficulties and complex problems of the process of cognition, which to this day have not received a final solution. This is, in particular, the inexhaustibility of the world, the impossibility of fully comprehending the ever-changing being, its subjective refraction in the senses and thinking of a person - limited in their capabilities, etc. The world is too complicated for human understanding; there are always mysteries and unsolved problems in it22.
Many philosophers have shown the internal inconsistency of the reasoning of skeptics and agnostics. It was said that an agnostic doubts how many fingers he has, it was argued that, adhering to the position of agnosticism, a person can die of hunger ... But in such criticism there is more wit than real arguments. More convincing is the position of those philosophers who believe that the refutation of agnosticism is contained in the sensory-objective activity of people. If they, cognizing certain phenomena, deliberately reproduce them, then there is no place left for the unknowable “thing-in-itself” (essence).
