We have already spoken about the immensity of the phenomenological material that testifies to the inestimable role of intuition in modern science. Strictly speaking, it was precisely this circumstance that served as the main reason for the appeal of Marxist philosophers to this problem.
Based on previous research, a path was found for the epistemological analysis of intuition as a specific form of interaction between sensory and logical cognition.
So, the place of intuition in scientific knowledge is determined by the sphere of interaction between sensory and logical knowledge. This is where the action comes in. intuition as a process. This interaction could also be called intuitive knowledge. The legitimacy of the allocation of this kind of knowledge, as well as sensory and logical, is due to the entire history of human knowledge.
Intuitive knowledge is an important area of human knowledge, belonging to the field of both scientific and non-scientific knowledge. scientific knowledge. In this section, we will be mainly interested in the operation of intuition as a process in scientific knowledge, so we will try to start by highlighting specific characteristics scientific intuition.
Among the most characteristic features scientific intuition, in our opinion, include:
1. The fundamental impossibility of obtaining the desired result through sensory knowledge the surrounding world.
2. The fundamental impossibility of obtaining the desired result through direct logical inference.
3. Unaccountable confidence in the absolute truth of the result (this in no way removes the need for further logical processing and experimental verification).
4. Suddenness and unexpectedness of the result.
5. Immediate evidence of the result.
6. Unconsciousness of the mechanisms of the creative act, ways and methods that led the scientist from the initial statement of the problem to the finished result.
7. Extraordinary lightness, incredible simplicity and speed of the path traveled from the initial premises to the discovery.
8. A pronounced feeling of self-satisfaction from the implementation of the process of intuition and deep satisfaction from the result.
So, everything that happens intuitively must be sudden, unexpected, directly obvious, unconsciously fast, unconsciously easy, outside of logic and contemplation, and at the same time in itself strictly logical and based on previous sensory experience.
It seems to us that from the perspective of philosophical research it is impossible to unambiguously determine the content of the concept of intuition, due to the extraordinary mobility of the process itself. This is not a frozen act, but a most complex cognitive process, the action of which is dialectically interconnected with the known forms of both sensory and logical cognition. At the same time, the intuitive process is much more relative than the oral stages of cognition. And the purpose of studying the epistemological mechanisms of intuition, in our opinion, is to reveal the complex dynamics of the processes included in it.
These are some of the characteristics of intuition. We by no means claim that the above list is considered exhaustive. This is just an attempt "to reveal some of the features inherent in those processes that are commonly called intuitive. The epistemological functions of these processes are to carry out the interaction of sensory and logical knowledge.
The purpose of any kind of knowledge is the acquisition and transformation of knowledge. As you know, there are four types of knowledge transformation * .
* (See: V. P. Branskii, The Philosophical Significance of the Visualization Problem in Modern Physics. L., 1962, p. 109.)
1. From some sensory images to other sensory images (sensory knowledge).
2. From some concepts to other concepts (logical knowledge).
3. From visual images to a new concept (interaction of the sensory and the logical).
4. From concepts to new sensory-visual images (interaction of the logical and the sensory).
3 and 4 types of transformation, thus, belong to the selected area of intuitive knowledge. The classification of intuition adopted above makes it possible to single out two levels of this type of cognition: conceptual and eidetic.
All these types of knowledge transformation are dialectically interconnected, providing the interconnection of the sensual, logical and their interaction - intuitive knowledge. In particular, at the level of sensory and logical knowledge, cryptognoses are accumulated. Its use lies in the transformation of accumulated knowledge through conceptual intuition (according to the 3rd type) and eidetic (according to the 4th type).
The transformations can be at least of two kinds; from existing sensory images to new concepts through conceptual intuition and from existing concepts to new sensory images through eidetic intuition.
Thus, the peculiarity of intuitive knowledge lies in the fact that, in its epistemological essence, it is transformative, combinatorial knowledge, the result of which is intuitive knowledge.
The process of obtaining this kind of knowledge consists of the most complex combinations with sensory-visual images. As A. Einstein noted, "this combinatorial game is an essential feature of productive thinking" * .
* (See: Hadamard I. An essay of the psychology of invention in the mathematical. Field, 1961, p. 142.)
We will not dwell on the question of what constitutes a sensory image in the process of cognition - it is covered in sufficient detail in Russian literature*. We only note that "in the general epistemological sense, an image is understood as any discrete (separate) element of knowledge that carries meaningful information about a certain class of objects" ** .
* (See: V. P. Branskii, The Philosophical Significance of the Visualization Problem in Modern Physics. L., 1962; Slavin A. V. Visual image in the structure of knowledge. M., 1971; Georgiev F.I., Dubovskoy V.I., Korshunov A.M., Mikhailova I.B. Sensory cognition. M., 1965.)
** (Slavin A. V. A visual image in the structure of cognition, p. 15.)
Therefore, it is most expedient to begin the analysis of intuitive cognition by considering the types of sensory images between which the combination takes place. The latter, in our opinion, include the following two groups of images: sensory-visual(direct perception, visual representation); conceptual(mental reproduction of previously obtained concepts, mental reproduction of the most common properties and essential aspects of the connections and relations of the objective world, inaccessible directly to the senses).
Scientific knowledge of any kind always has as its ultimate goal the acquisition of a new concept, i.e., new knowledge. Anything scientific concept is ultimately the synthesis of a set of sensory images, or, in other words, obtaining a fundamentally new concept in science can occur by combining the corresponding sensory images on the basis of some initial concept. However, a new concept in a number of cases is a "cast" from an intuitively obtained new sensory-visual image.
So, the interaction of the sensory and the logical, carried out thanks to intuition, consists in a kind of combination of sensory images based on some initial concept. The result is a new concept about the object, new knowledge about its essence, and not just about the forms of manifestation.
The acquisition of new knowledge is not a simple combination of these sensory images. This is a combination at the level of intuitive knowledge. The epistemological mechanism of such a process involves the combination of sensory images based on some initial visual image - an image-model of a known object or an existing initial concept, concept-model.
The concept-model reflects such properties and aspects of the object, the content of which is already fixed in the conceptual apparatus of science. The concept-model arises as a result of a previous mental experiment. The latter is "a mental process in which sensual and rational elements are in a dialectical relationship and interpenetration. It is the unity of the sensual and logical, visual image and scientific abstraction that constitutes the necessary condition due to which, on the basis of a thought experiment, important scientific discoveries" * .
* (Slavin A. V. A visual image in the structure of cognition, p. 258.)
results thought experiments are deposited in the "depths of the unconscious psyche" of a person and constitute an important element in the structure of cryptognoses.
To consider this in more detail, we will analyze some possible types of combinations of sensory images, keeping in mind that sensory-visual and conceptual images can perform two functions in the structure of cognition: original if the image reflects information about an object whose essential features are unknown, and auxiliary, if the image reflects an object whose essence is well studied.
The process of intuitive cognition, as noted above, is carried out on the basis of cryptognoses data, which can be expressed in the form of a concept-model (or image-model) and constitute a certain background of the cognitive process.
The concept-model (or image-model) is a necessary component of the process of intuitive cognition. This is a special, specific constructive expression of previously acquired knowledge, with which newly acquired information about objects is unconsciously correlated. Regardless of the scientist, the processes of correlation, comparison, substitution, etc. of the acquired knowledge with the content of the concept-model (or image-model) are carried out. It is these constructs: the concept-model and the image-model that in a certain way color and direct the research process of the scientist, creating the background of his cognitive process.
Thus, we got the opportunity to somewhat concretize the introduced concept of cryptognoses. The latter consists of concepts-models and images-models and is not only the source of the action of intuition, but also creates a certain background of cognitive activity, on which the combination of sensory images is carried out.
It is possible, apparently, to establish four types of combinations (Table 1).
I and II types of combinations are carried out by acts of conceptual intuition (against the background of the original image-model), III and IV - by acts of eidetic (against the background of the original concept-model) intuition.
In accordance with this, we will consider two levels of intuitive knowledge, using some research from the field of physics. Let us turn to the history of the emergence of non-classical physics. This is a brilliant empirical material for studying the features of human cognition.
In the course of numerous experiments, V. Roentgen discovers an unusual phenomenon: a screen with barium platinum-cyanide, located near the cathode tubes, began to glow. The glow continued even if the tube was carefully covered with black cardboard, and stopped if metal objects were placed between the tube and the screen. Open radiation Roentgen calls "X-rays". “If we ask the question,” he writes, “what X-rays actually are (they cannot be cathodic), then, judging by their intense chemical action and fluorescence, they can be attributed to ultraviolet light. But in this case, we are now but we are faced with serious obstacles ... it was necessary to accept that these ultraviolet rays behave quite differently from the hitherto known infrared, visible and ultraviolet rays. Should not the new rays be attributed to longitudinal vibrations in the ether? I must confess that I am more and more inclined towards this opinion.
* (Roentgen VK On a new type of rays. M. - L., 1933, p. 40-42.)
The discovery of X-rays is the result of sensory knowledge of experience. This is how the "initial image" of this phenomenon was formed, in this case, sensually visual (direct perception).
It turned out that X-rays are not a stream of charged material particles, since they are not deflected by either electric or magnetic fields. At the same time, they could not be considered an electromagnetic phenomenon, since the interference and diffraction of X-rays had not yet been discovered. Nevertheless, Roentgen manages to reveal a number of features of the rays he received, in particular, their ability to penetrate objects that are opaque to ordinary light, as well as the increasing ability of a substance to absorb X-rays in accordance with the density of the absorbed substance (the absorption depends on the conditions for obtaining the rays). But these experimental data did not yet explain the nature of the phenomenon obtained.
It is no coincidence that we took this example with the discovery of X-rays. Let us try to show on it not only the action of intuitive processes, but also the necessity of their manifestation.
The wavelength of X-rays is much shorter than the wavelength of light rays. However, Roentgen still tried to obtain the phenomena of diffraction and interference of the rays discovered by him by the usual methods. He assumed that these X-rays were of a wave nature and made futile attempts to prove this in the manner applied to visible light. What are the epistemological reasons why the efforts of the scientist did not lead to the desired result? *
* (It seems important in the study of the epistemological mechanisms of intuition as empirical material to use studies that end in a negative result.)
In the epistemological plan, Roentgen's research consists in the interaction of the initial sensory-visual image (direct perception of the screen glow in the experiment with X-rays) and the auxiliary sensory-visual image (visual representation of the wave nature of light rays as a result of experiments) against the background of the concept-model (concept about the usual methods of obtaining diffraction and interference).
It is easy to see that this is an act of eidetic intuition, which led Roentgen to form a new visual image of the wave nature of the rays he discovered. The result, not confirmed by experiments, is essentially negative.
The formation of the "initial image" is only a stage on the path to discovery; a combination with an "auxiliary" one is necessary, that is, the successful fulfillment of an act of conceptual intuition. The fact that for Roentgen it did not bring the desired result, once again indicates that scientific activity requires the ability of a scientist to abandon the usual methods, from "templates" in conducting research. But back to physics.
Among the group of physicists stubbornly and persistently engaged in the study of x-rays, was at that time M. Laue. "I lived there," he wrote, "in an atmosphere saturated with questions about the nature of x-rays" * . When discussing with P. Ewald the question of the behavior of light waves in a spatial lattice of polarizable atoms, Laue (in whose mind an "image-model" of X-rays and the idea of the impossibility of obtaining their diffraction in the usual way) unexpectedly overshadows the idea that if atoms form spatial gratings, then there must be interference phenomena similar to light interference ** .
* (Laue M. History of Physics. M., 1956, p. 183.)
** (See: U.I. Frankfurt, A.M. Frankfort. At the origins of quantum theory. M., 1974, p. 8.)
Changing the "auxiliary image" and conceptually combining it with the "original" one has a positive effect. Laue makes a suggestion: we should try to conduct experiments on the diffraction of x-rays on a crystal lattice, and two students of Roentgen - Friedrich and Knipling - successfully carry out these experiments.
Let's see how this happens from the standpoint of epistemological analysis. The interaction of the original conceptual image (mental reproduction of the idea of the phenomenon of X-ray interference) with the auxiliary conceptual image (mental reproduction of the idea of the behavior of light waves in the spatial lattice of polarizing atoms) against the background of the model image (visual representation of the negative results of obtaining X-ray diffraction in the usual way). The result is a new concept of crystals as a natural diffraction grating.
We give two more examples, one of which has a negative result.
The problem of studying X-rays and their properties has attracted the attention of scientists from all over the world.
So, Henri Poincaré in his research proceeds from a visual representation of the phenomenon of phosphorescence and the causes that cause it (the initial image is sensually visual). Comparing this idea with the direct perception of the phenomena of phosphorescence caused by impacts of cathode rays on obstacles (auxiliary - sensually visual), and bearing in mind the existence of a specific source of phosphorescence of a glass tube phosphorescent under impacts of cathode rays (background - concept-model), the scientist comes to new visual representation of the phenomenon of fluorescence, as always accompanied by the emission of x-rays.
As a result, a clear idea is formed in Poincaré's mind that if the causes that cause phosphorescence are different from the impact of cathode rays on an obstacle, then phosphorescence is also capable of causing x-rays. In other words, Poincare formulated the assumption that fluorescence is always accompanied by the emission of x-rays. However, Poincare's conjecture, which is an example of the action of the eidetic process of intuition, was not confirmed.
On the basis of the considered discoveries in physics, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the action of intuitive processes in the act of scientific knowledge. First of all, it is obvious that the presence of intuitive moments in scientific research does not depend on the truth or falsity of the result.
Intuitive cognition (unlike sensory and logical cognition) is not an independent, autonomous area of cognition. Forms of intuition always act in cognition in a dialectical relationship with known forms of cognition, while carrying out the interaction of the data of sensory and logical cognition.
In the epistemological sense, apparently, this interaction consists in a special combination - "linking" of sensory images on the basis of a known concept-model (eidetic intuition) or on the basis of an image-model (conceptual intuition).
As already noted, the concepts-models and images-models are taken from the data of cryptognoses. They are the result of an unconscious selection of existing knowledge. We know that it is in the choice of concepts-models and images-models that the researcher's mistake most often lies. Thus, the act of choosing the components of the background of cognitive activity is also intuitive, although it is based, of course, on all the previous experience of the scientist. The choice of the path of further research depends on the choice of the concept-model and the image-model, on which success or failure may be directly dependent.
Obviously, intuition, as a specific form of cognition, is more closely (than any other form) connected with the individual psychological characteristics of the scientist*. It is logical to assume that the uniqueness of the creative process, the division of scientists into, say, theoreticians and experimenters, is connected with it.
* (See: Ponomarev A.L. Psyche and intuition. M., 1967.)
It is possible that the ability for conceptual intuition is more characteristic of theorists, and the ability for eidetic intuition * - for practitioners. It is not uncommon in science when an experimental discovery is made by a scientist who himself is unable to interpret it correctly. Such facts also suggest that the discovery process and its interpretation are carried out by various forms of intuition.
* (Apparently, the act of eidetic intuition underlies artistic intuition.)
In accordance with this, apparently, it will be possible to elucidate the question of the epistemological nature of talent in a somewhat different way. In addition to the well-known signs of this highest ability of our thinking apparatus, a synthesized presence of the ability for eidetic and conceptual intuition must play a certain role here.
Consider now an example where the scientist himself goes from discovery to its true interpretation.
“On the very day when it became known in Paris about the experiments of Roentgen and about the extraordinary properties of the rays emitted by the walls of Crookes tubes, I decided to investigate whether any other phosphorescent substance does not emit the same rays, experience did not confirm this assumption, but during In my research, I came across an unexpected phenomenon..." * . Becquerel's initial conceptual image was the mental reproduction of the idea of the causes that cause x-rays. Auxiliary sensory-visual image was generated by direct perception of the phenomenon of phosphorescent walls of Crookes tubes emitting x-rays. The interaction between these images was carried out by Becquerel against the background of the concept-model (meaning the concept of a multitude of phosphorescent substances and the effect of their incessant glow after the termination of excitation). As a result - the formation of a new visual representation of all phosphorescent substances, as emitting X-rays.
* (Proceedings of the Institute of History, Natural Science and Technology, 1957, v. 19, p. 139.)
The result is negative, experience does not confirm it. It is easy to see that Becquerel is essentially trying to repeat the path of Poincaré, but also failing.
Conducting a series of experiments with uranium salts as a phosphorescent substance, Becquerel discovered new radiation. The action of the latter was similar to X-ray. These rays, as Becquerel discovered, are capable of discharging electrified bodies. This led to the emergence of an electrical method for studying open rays. Further investigation showed that the observed radiation was not due to fluorescence, but to the presence of the element uranium. It was a discovery. Becquerel was also convinced that the radiation of uranium salts does not depend on either light, or electrical, or thermal excitation. Thus, not only the phenomenon of radioactivity was discovered, but also its source - uranium - was indicated.
So, the epistemological description of the study under consideration, which is an act of conceptual intuition, looks like this.
The interaction is carried out between the initial sensually visual image (meaning the direct perception of "invisible rays", the action of which is similar to X-rays) and an auxiliary conceptual image (mental reproduction of the results of experiments for which uranium salts were taken as a phosphorescent substance) against the background of the model image ( in other words, a visual representation of the source of radiation in the form of some phosphorescent substance). As a result, a new concept of radioactive radiation and its source, uranium, is being formed.
Subsequently, Rutherford conducts research on the ionization of gases by x-rays. At the same time, he proceeds from a sensually visual representation of the nature of the ions formed from the radiation of uranium. He compares the results of the experiment with the mental reproduction of the process of ionization of gases by X-rays against the background of a visual representation of the nature of ions obtained from X-rays (image-model). As a result, the interaction of the original sensually visual image with the auxiliary - conceptual one against the background of the image-model leads to the formation of a new concept: about the similar nature of ions obtained from X-rays and from uranium radiation.
The result of the study is the confirmation of the correctness of the discovery, the establishment of the ionizing ability of α- and β-rays.
Another example of such a scheme concerns Faraday's discovery of the wave nature of the propagation of electric and magnetic forces. The starting point in this case is the conceptual image (mental reproduction of the nature of the movement of magnetic lines of force when the current is opened and closed in the conductor), the auxiliary is sensory-visual (a visual representation of the vibrations of the water surface or sound vibrations of the air). The interaction between these images occurs against the background of the concept-model (the concept of electromagnetic induction). The result is the formation in Faraday's mind of a new visual representation of the wave nature of the propagation of magnetic and electrical forces.
We specifically gave an example of the positive result of an act of eidetic intuition to show that it is also a necessary process in the formation of a visual representation of objects that are inaccessible to direct perception. Although in some cases, and possibly in most cases, eidetic intuition leads to a negative result.
However, before drawing any conclusions, it is important to clarify in more detail the types of possible combinations between sensory images*. Based on the considered material, the following can be distinguished (Table 2).
* (See table 1.)
The epistemological mechanisms of various types of these combinations turn out to be "symmetrical"*. In each of the four indicated types of combinations, a connection is traced between the nature of the auxiliary image and the result: if the auxiliary image is conceptual, then as a result - a new concept, if the auxiliary image is sensually visual, then the result is a new visual representation.
* (See: Karmin A. S., Khaikin E. P. Gnoseological analysis of scientific intuition. - In the book: Problems of Philosophy and Methodology of Modern Natural Science, M., 1973, p. 323-324.)
Types I and II are carried out at the level of conceptual intuitive cognition, III and IV - at the level of eidetic intuitive cognition.
Since we are now talking about scientific intuition, it should be noted that the interaction between the two types of sensory-visual images (according to type IV) does not give new knowledge. This combinatorics apparently refers to an eidetic act of this kind, which is not included in the field of scientific knowledge. The result of types I, II and III of interaction is intuitive knowledge, which is an important component in the structure of the process of obtaining scientific knowledge.
There is a general impression that whatever we believe can be proved, or at least shown to be very probable. Many understand that a belief that cannot be justified is an unreasonable belief. For the most part, this view is correct. Almost all of our ordinary beliefs are or can be derived from other beliefs that can be considered as their basis. As a rule, this basis is either forgotten or never realized. Few of us ask ourselves, for example, what reason is there to suppose that the food we are just about to eat will not be poison. But still we feel, when we doubt, that a perfectly sufficient reason can be found for this, even if we cannot do it now. And such belief is usually justified.
But let us imagine the persistent Socrates, who, not satisfied with any reason that we present him, continues to demand a reason for a foundation. We must sooner or later, and in all probability quite soon, reach a position which we can no longer justify, and for which it is almost certain that further justification is even theoretically impossible. Starting from ordinary everyday views, we may go back, passing from point to point, until we arrive at some general principle, or a particular application of it, which seems to be manifestly obvious and incapable of being deduced from anything more obvious. In most questions Everyday life as, for example, in the question of whether it is likely that our food is nutritious and not poisonous, we will arrive at the principle of induction, which we discussed in chapter 6. But going deeper than this principle does not mean going back to the origins. This principle we - sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously - constantly use in our reasoning; but there is no reasoning which, starting from a simpler self-evident principle, would lead to the principle of induction as a conclusion from it. The same applies to other logical principles. Their truth is obvious to us, and we use them in our proofs, but they themselves - or at least some of them - cannot be proven.
However, self-evidence is not limited to those general principles that cannot be proved. If we admit a certain number of logical principles, then the rest can be deduced from them, but the propositions deduced are often as obvious as those we have admitted without proof. Moreover, all arithmetic can be deduced from general principles logic*, and yet a simple arithmetic statement such as "two plus two equals four" is as self-evident as the principles of logic.
It also seems, although more controversially, that there are self-evident ethical principles, like the principle: "We must strive for the good."
It is easy to see that special cases of general principles, individual examples concerning ordinary things, are more obvious than the general principles themselves. The law of contradiction, for example, states that nothing can or cannot have a certain quality. This law becomes obvious to us as soon as it is understood by us, but it is not so obvious as that a given rose that we see cannot be both red and not red.
(Of course, it is possible that part of the rose is red and part is not red, or it may be of such a pinkish hue that we cannot decide whether it is red or not; but in the first case it is clear that the rose as a whole is not red, and in the second, the answer is theoretically certain, once we have established the exact definition of "red".) Usually, with the help of particular examples, we come to the point that we are able to see the general principle. And only those accustomed to dealing with abstractions can directly comprehend the general principle without resorting to particular examples.
Another kind of self-evident truths, apart from general principles, are truths directly deduced from sensations. We shall call them "truths of perception" and the judgments which express them "judgments of perception." But here a certain caution is necessary in ascertaining the exact nature of these self-evident truths. Actual sense-data are neither true nor false. A certain spot of any color that I see simply exists, it is not the kind of thing that can be true or false. The truth is that such a spot exists, the truth is that it has a certain shape and a certain brightness, the truth is that it is surrounded by certain other colors. But the spot itself - like everything else in the world of the senses - is fundamentally different from things that are true or false, and therefore, properly speaking, it cannot be called true. Thus, whatever the self-evident truths which we may obtain by the use of our senses, they must be different from the sense-data from which they are derived,
It may seem that there are two kinds of self-evident truths of perception, although they may ultimately merge into one. The first kind of truth simply asserts the existence of sense data without any analysis of it. We see a red spot and express the judgment: "there is such and such a spot of red color", or more strictly: "there is such and such a place"; this is one kind of intuitive judgment of perception. The second kind of truth arises when the sensible object is complex and we subject it, to a certain extent, to analysis. If, for example, we see a round spot of red color, then we can make a judgment: "that red spot is round." This is again a judgment of perception, but it is different from the judgment of the first kind. In this case, the only sense datum has both color and shape: the color is red, the shape is round. Our judgment analyzes the sense datum for color and shape and then recombines them, stating that the given red is round; another example of this kind of judgment is "this is to the left of that", where "this" and "that" are perceived by the eye at the same time. In this kind of judgment, sense data contain parts that are in a certain relation to each other, and the judgment asserts that these parts are in this relation.
Another class of intuitive judgments, similar to the judgments of the senses and yet sharply different from them, are the judgments of memory. Here confusion is possible as to the nature of memory, arising from the fact that the recollection of an object may be accompanied by its image, and yet the image cannot be that which constitutes the memory. This is easy to verify by noting that the image is in the present, while what is remembered is known to have been in the past. Moreover, we can certainly, within certain limits, compare our image with the remembered object, so that, within fairly wide limits, we often know how accurate our image is; but this would be impossible if the object itself, as opposed to the image, were not somehow before consciousness. Hence, the essence of memories is determined not by the image, but by the presence of an object immediately in front of the consciousness, recognized as the past. In this sense, if it were not for the fact of remembering, we could not know that there was any past at all, and also we could no more understand the word "past" than a born blind person can understand the word "light". Therefore, there must be intuitive judgments of memory on which all our knowledge of the past ultimately depends.
However, the example of recollection raises one difficulty, namely, that it is manifestly unreliable, and this raises doubts about the general validity of intuitive judgments. This difficulty is not easy to deal with. Let us first of all try to limit its limits as far as possible. Generally speaking, recollection is reliable depending on the intensity of the experience and its proximity in time. If the nearest house was struck by lightning half a minute ago, then the memory of what I saw and heard is so convincing that it seems superfluous to doubt whether there was a flash of lightning at all. The same applies to less vivid experiences if they were recent. I am quite convinced that half a minute ago I was sitting in the same chair in which I am sitting now. Going through the events of today, I find events of which I am absolutely sure, in others I am almost sure, in the third my confidence depends on reflection and recollection of incidental circumstances; Finally, there are some that I'm not at all sure about. I am quite sure that I ate my breakfast this morning, but whether I was as indifferent to it as a philosopher should be, I doubt it. As for the conversation at breakfast, I remember some of it easily, others with effort, a third with a great deal of doubt, and, finally, a fourth I can’t remember at all. Thus, a continuous gradation of degrees of self-evidence of what I remember, and a corresponding gradation of the certainty of memory, become clear.
And the first answer to the difficulty connected with the power of memory to err is that memory has different degrees of self-evidence, which correspond to its degrees of certainty; these degrees reach the limit of perfect self-evidence and perfect certainty in recalling vivid and recent events.
However, there appear to be cases of very strong belief in a memory that is entirely false. It is probable that in these cases what is actually remembered in the sense of being directly in front of consciousness is something else, in which we are falsely convinced, although something generally connected with the latter. George IV is said to have repeated so often that he had taken part in the Battle of Waterloo that he finally believed it. In this case, he directly recalled his repeated statements, and the belief in what he asserted (if it existed) arose in him by association with the recalled statement, and therefore it is not a genuine case of recall. It seems that all cases of erroneous memory can be considered in this way, i.e., it can be shown that they are not cases of memory in the strict sense of the word. One important point concerning self-evidence is clarified by an analysis of what is connected with memory, namely that there are degrees in self-evidence and it is not a property that is simply present or absent, but a property that can be present to a greater or lesser extent in a gradual gradation from absolute reliability to almost imperceptible obscurity. The truths of perception and some of the principles of logic are of the highest degree of self-evidence; the truths of immediate memory have almost the same degree of self-evidence. The principle of induction is less self-evident than some other logical principles, such as "what follows from true premises must be true." Memories become less self-evident as they fade in time and fade, and logical and mathematical truths (in the broadest sense) become less self-evident the more complex they are. Judgments of genuine ethical or aesthetic value tend to be somewhat self-evident, but not to a great extent.
Degrees of self-evidence are important in the theory of knowledge, because if statements seem to be able to be self-evident to a certain extent without being true, then it is not necessary to cut all the threads between self-evidence and truth, but it should simply be said that in the event of a collision, a more self-evident statement should be retained, while the less self-evident is discarded.
However, it still seems very likely that, as we explained above, two different concepts are combined in the concept of "self-evidence"; one of them, corresponding to the highest degree of self-evidence, is really an unconditional guarantee of truth, while the other, corresponding to all other degrees, is not an unconditional guarantee, but only more or less an assumption. But this, of course, is only an indication that we cannot now develop. After we have clarified the nature of truth, we will return to the question of self-evidence to consider it again in connection with the difference between knowledge and error.
Sensory reflection appears in three main forms - in the form of sensations, perceptions and ideas. Feel - these are sensual images of individual properties of objects. We feel colors, sounds, smells, we have taste, tactile sensations, etc. This image is objective in content, it adequately reflects the properties of the object, but subjective in form, depends on the physiology of the human senses, the physiology of his higher nervous activity, and even from his life experience.
Perception - a holistic sensory image of an object, a set of sensations. Here already, as a rule, the thought denoting the perceived object comes into play.
The highest form of sensory reflection is performance - figurative knowledge about objects not directly perceived by us, reproduced from memory. In representation, the abstracting ability of our consciousness already comes into play; insignificant details are cut off in it. At the level of representations, imagination reveals itself - the ability to connect sensual material differently, not in the way it is connected in reality. Representation stands, as it were, on the boundary between sensory reflection and abstract thinking.
Supporters of the theory of hieroglyphs (Helmholtz) believed that a sensual image is just a sign, a symbol, a hieroglyph denoting some phenomenon of the external world in our minds. By declaring sensation to be mere symbols, they deprive them of their cognitive value, since they do not tell us anything about the properties of the objects that they only symbolize. In essence, this is Kant's position: sensations say nothing about things, and the latter remain for us things in themselves.
It should be recognized that sensations have the character of signs, but those that carry objective information about objects in their content, act as signs-images, or rather, have both figurative and sign sides.
But sensory reflection is limited - it gives information about the directly visible, audible, but does not give knowledge about what is hidden behind both, it stops at the external, at phenomena, but itself cannot give knowledge about the internal, about the essence. Practice thus requires a transition, a leap from feeling to thought, from sensory reflection to abstract thought or rational cognition.
rational cognition is based on the material that the sense organs give us, its main forms are the concept, judgment and conclusion.
concept- this is a form of thinking, which reflects the general and essential properties, connections and relationships of objects and phenomena (thought, representation).
Judgment- a form of thought in which, through the connection of concepts, something is affirmed or denied about the subject of thought (a thought that affirms or denies something on the basis of concepts).
inference- a form of movement of thought, in which from one or more judgments, called premises, a new judgment is derived, called a conclusion or consequence (inductive, deductive).
Sensory reflection and rational cognition dialectically interconnected . Sensory cognition provides only the starting material for the work of thinking, and without this work of thought there can be no question of obtaining complete knowledge of the subject. In turn, rational cognition, being a step forward in the cognition of the subject, in itself, without relying on sensibility, cannot exist, because. it turns out to be devoid of the ground, which are given sensory reflections.
Thus, only in the unity of sensory reflection and rational cognition, empirical and theoretical cognition - is there a real way to comprehend the truth.
The ability to comprehend the truth or the idea of invention, discovering or inventing something, without justification with the help of logic, is called intuition . Intuition has long been divided into 2 varieties: sensual and intellectual. Intuition is a kind of semi-instinctive consciousness and, at the same time, standing above ordinary consciousness, and in its cognitive power - superconsciousness. She, as if in an instant, running through the parts, through the smallest details of the whole, grasps the essence. There are times when a person very quickly, instantly grasps the thought of a difficult situation and finds the right solution (for example, during a military battle). Intuition is not a special way of knowing, but a qualitatively new kind of inference, where thinking, feeling and sensation are combined.
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The desire to distinguish between two types, or methods, of knowledge - intuitive and logical - appeared already in antiquity. The beginning of this can be found in Plato's doctrine of ideas, in which there is the concept of non-discursivity (without reasoning) of their comprehension. The Epicureans fixed this phenomenon of direct knowledge or comprehension in the word επιβολή. The terms for designating the two types of knowledge appeared in Philo of Alexandria, and then in Plotinus, who distinguished between επιβολή (direct, instant comprehension (vision, insight)) and διεξοδικός λόγος (consecutive, discursive knowledge, with the help of logical conclusions).
The translation of the concept of επιβολή into Latin by the term “intuitus” (from the verb intueri, meaning “to peer”, “penetrate with a look (vision), “instantly comprehend”) was made in the 5th century by Boethius.
In the 13th century, the German monk Wilhelm of Mörbecke (1215-1286) repeated the translation of Boethius, and the term "intuition" became part of Western European philosophical terminology.
The English, French, Italians, Spaniards translate Anschauung with the term "intuition" (French, English - intuition, Italian - intuizione, Spanish - intuicion). The Kantian Anschauung is also translated into Russian by the term “contemplation” to convey the meaning of direct comprehension, non-discursiveness, instantaneous “vision”.
Intuition in terms of philosophy
In some currents of philosophy, intuition is interpreted as a divine revelation, as a completely unconscious process, incompatible with logic and life practice (intuitionism). Various interpretations Intuitions have something in common - emphasizing the moment of immediacy in the process of cognition, in contrast (or in opposition) to the mediated, discursive nature of logical thinking.
Materialistic dialectics sees the rational grain of the concept of Intuition in the characteristic of the moment of immediacy in cognition, which is the unity of the sensible and the rational.
The process of scientific knowledge, as well as various forms of artistic development of the world, are not always carried out in a detailed, logically and factually demonstrative form. Often the subject grasps a complex situation in his mind, for example, during a military battle, determining the diagnosis, guilt or innocence of the accused, etc. The role of Intuition is especially great where it is necessary to go beyond the existing methods of cognition in order to penetrate into the unknown. But Intuition is not something unreasonable or superreasonable. In the process of intuitive cognition, all the signs by which the conclusion is made, and the methods by which it is made, are not realized. Intuition does not constitute a special path of cognition that bypasses sensations, ideas and thinking. It is a peculiar type of thinking, when individual links of the process of thinking are carried in the mind more or less unconsciously, and it is the result of the thought - the truth - that is most clearly realized.
Intuition is enough to perceive the truth, but it is not enough to convince others and oneself of this truth. This requires proof.
Intuition in decision making from the point of view of psychology
The formation of an intuitive solution proceeds outside of direct conscious control.
In the psychological concept of C. Jung, intuition is considered as one of the possible leading functions of the personality, which determines the attitude of a person to himself and the world around him, the way he makes vital decisions.
Intuition - the ability of direct, immediate comprehension of the truth without preliminary logical reasoning and without evidence.
Another interpretation of intuition is direct comprehension the mind of truth, not derived by logical analysis from other truths and not perceived through the senses.
Computer simulation of intuition
Adaptive AI programs and algorithms, based on learning methods for automatic systems, exhibit behavior that mimics human intuition. They produce knowledge from data without a logical formulation of the ways and conditions for obtaining it, due to which this knowledge appears to the user as a result of “direct discretion”. Elements of such intuitive analysis are built into many modern automatic systems, such as, for example, computer service systems, chess programs, etc. Teaching such systems requires the teacher to choose the optimal learning strategy and tasks.
To simulate intuitive decision-making, neural-like devices called neural networks and neurocomputers, as well as their software simulators, are convenient. M. G. Dorrer with co-authors created a non-standard for computer techniques intuitive approach to psychodiagnostics , which consists in developing recommendations with the exception of the construction of the described reality . For classical computer psychodiagnostics importance It has formalizability psychodiagnostic methods, while the experience gained by researchers in the field of neuroinformatics shows that using the apparatus of neural networks it is possible to satisfy the needs of practicing psychologists and researchers in creating psychodiagnostic methods based on their experience, bypassing the stage of formalization and building a diagnostic model.
Development of intuition
Many authors offer various trainings for the development of intuition, however, it is worth remembering that some of them have not been experimentally proven, i.e. are the "reflections" of the authors on the topic. One of the hypostases of intuition is based on life experience, so the only way to develop it is to accumulate experience in a certain field of knowledge. " positive thoughts and the conviction that you deserve not just an answer, but the very best answer, move intuition to positive activity. - one of these trainings based on affirmation or self-hypnosis in order to remove barriers. The discovery by D. I. Mendeleev of the periodic law of chemical elements, as well as the definition of the formula of benzene, developed by Kekule, made by them in a dream, confirm the value of life experience and knowledge for the development of intuition, for obtaining intuitive knowledge.
Sometimes trainers offer, for example, such exercises for the development of intuition, which are rather exercises for the development of clairvoyance or clairaudience. Here is one of those exercises:
“Before the start of the working day, try to introduce each of your employees. Feel what is hidden behind the words, and what is hushed up. Before you read the letter, intuitively imagine what it is about and how it will affect you. Before picking up the phone, try to intuitively guess who is calling, what and how this person will talk. ... "
An ideal way to develop intuition is the well-known game of hide and seek. The game of "blind man's buff" is less preferable. during the game, the host uses the sense of smell and hearing, i.e. 2 and 5 senses "prompt". But in "hide and seek" all 5 senses are powerless and the sixth sense turns on.
Other meanings
The term "intuition" is widely used in various occult, mystical and parascientific teachings and practices.
See also
Literature
- Intuition // Great Soviet Encyclopedia
Links
- Articles on the development of intuition on the website of Mirzakarim Norbekov
Notes
Wikimedia Foundation. 2010 .
See what "Intuitive Knowledge" is in other dictionaries:
This term has other meanings, see Knowledge (meanings). This article or section needs revision. Please improve ... Wikipedia
Knowledge is a form of existence and systematization of the results of human cognitive activity. There are different types of knowledge: scientific, everyday (common sense), intuitive, religious, etc. Ordinary knowledge serves as the basis for a person's orientation in ... Wikipedia
Hidden, silent, implicit (from Latin implicite in a hidden form, implicitly; the opposite of explicite), peripheral in contrast to the central, or focal, i.e. in the focus of consciousness. Empirical the basis of the personal silent ... ... Encyclopedia of cultural studies
KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY. Due to the fusion of the procedural and substantial aspects in the category of masdar (verbal noun), Arabic linguistic thinking tends to consider the process and the result as something ... Philosophical Encyclopedia
KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY. Due to the fusion of the procedural and substantial aspects in the category of masdar (verbal noun), Arabic linguistic thinking tends to consider the process and result as something ... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia
This phenomenon of direct knowledge or comprehension was fixed in the word of other Greek. ἐπιβολή . The terms for designating the two types of knowledge appeared in Philo of Alexandria, and then in Plotinus, who distinguished between ἐπιβολή (direct, instant comprehension (vision, insight)) and διεξοδικός λόγος (consecutive, discursive knowledge, with the help of logical conclusions).
The translation of the concept of ἐπιβολή into Latin by the word "intuitus" (from the verb intueri, meaning "peer", "penetrate with a glance" (vision), "instantly comprehend") was made in the 5th century by Boethius.
The English, French, Italians, Spaniards translate Anschauung with the word "intuition" (French, English intuition, Italian intuizione, Spanish. intuition). The Kantian Anschauung is also translated into Russian as “contemplation” to convey the meaning of direct comprehension, non-discursiveness, instantaneous “vision”.
Philosophy
In some currents of philosophy, intuition is interpreted as a divine revelation, as a completely unconscious process, incompatible with logic and life practice (intuitionism). Various interpretations of Intuition have something in common - emphasizing the moment of immediacy in the process of cognition, in contrast (or in opposition) to the mediated, discursive nature of logical thinking.
Materialistic dialectics sees the rational grain of the concept of Intuition in the characteristic of the moment of immediacy in cognition, which is the unity of the sensible and the rational.
The process of scientific knowledge, as well as various forms of artistic development of the world, are not always carried out in a detailed, logically and factually demonstrative form. Often the subject grasps a complex situation in his mind, for example, during a military battle, determining the diagnosis, guilt or innocence of the accused, etc. The role of Intuition is especially great where it is necessary to go beyond the existing methods of cognition in order to penetrate into the unknown. But Intuition is not something unreasonable or superreasonable. In the process of intuitive cognition, all the signs by which the conclusion is made, and the methods by which it is made, are not realized. Intuition does not constitute a special path of cognition that bypasses sensations, ideas and thinking. It is a peculiar type of thinking, when individual links of the thinking process are carried through in the mind more or less unconsciously, and it is the result of the thought that is most clearly realized - perceived as “truth”, with a higher probability of determining the truth than chance, but less high than logical thinking.
Intuition is enough to perceive the truth, but it is not enough to convince others and oneself of this truth. This requires proof.
Psychology
The formation of an intuitive solution proceeds outside of direct conscious control. The famous American philosopher and cognitive psychologist Daniel Dennett explains:
Intuition is simply knowing about something without understanding how that knowledge was acquired.
Intuition is a premonition aspiring to the future, based on knowledge (without understanding how it is obtained) multiplied by experience.
According to the works of Daniel Kahneman, intuition is the ability to automatically generate solutions without lengthy logical reasoning or proof.
According to another interpretation, intuition is a direct comprehension of the truth by the mind, not derived by logical analysis from other truths and not perceived through the senses.
computer simulation
Adaptive AI programs and algorithms, based on learning methods for automatic systems, exhibit behavior that mimics human intuition. They produce knowledge from data without a logical formulation of the ways and conditions for obtaining it, due to which this knowledge appears to the user as a result of “direct discretion”.
Neural-like devices called neural networks and neurocomputers, as well as their software imitators, are convenient to simulate intuitive decision making. M. G. Dorrer with co-authors created a non-standard for computer techniques intuitive approach to psychodiagnostics , which consists in developing recommendations with the exception of the construction of the described reality . For classical computer psychodiagnostics, it is important formalizability psychodiagnostic methods, while the experience gained by researchers in the field of neuroinformatics shows that using the apparatus of neural networks it is possible to satisfy the needs of practicing psychologists and researchers in creating psychodiagnostic methods based on their experience, bypassing the stage of formalization and building a diagnostic model.
Development of intuition
Many authors offer various trainings for the development of intuition, however, it is worth remembering that some of them have not been experimentally proven, that is, they are the authors' "reflections" on the topic. One aspect of intuition is based on life experience, so the only way to develop it is to accumulate experience in a certain field of knowledge. “Positive thoughts and the conviction that you deserve not just an answer, but the very best answer, move your intuition to positive activity” - one of these trainings based on affirmation or self-hypnosis to remove barriers. The discovery by D. I. Mendeleev of the periodic law of chemical elements, as well as the definition of the formula of benzene, developed by Kekule, made by them in a dream, confirm the value of life experience and knowledge for the development of intuition, for obtaining intuitive knowledge.
Sometimes trainers offer, for example, such exercises for the development of intuition, which are rather exercises for the development of clairvoyance or clairaudience. Here is one such exercise:
Before the start of the working day, try to introduce each of your employees. Feel what is hidden behind the words, and what is hushed up. Before you read the letter, intuitively imagine what it is about and how it will affect you. Before you pick up the phone, try to intuitively guess who is calling, what and how this person will talk ...
Other meanings
The term "intuition" is widely used in various occult, mystical and pseudoscientific teachings and practices.
see also
Notes
- Intuition// Kazakhstan. National Encyclopedia. - Almaty: Kazakh encyclopedias, 2005. - T. II. - ISBN 9965-9746-3-2.
- Great Russian Encyclopedia: [in 35 volumes] / ch. ed. Yu. S. Osipov. - M.: Great Russian Encyclopedia, 2004-2017.
- Popov Yu. N., Konstantinov A. V. INTUITION // Great Russian Encyclopedia. Volume 11. Moscow, 2008, p. 472
- Jung K. G. Tavistock Lectures. Analytical psychology: its theory and practice / transl. from English. V. I. Menzhulin. - M: AST, 2009. - 252 p.
- Daniel Kahneman (Princeton) Psychic Research: Intuition , D. Kahneman Lectures , What is Intuition
- Daniel Kahneman. Lecture on intuition, 19:22 (indefinite) . youtube.be (2015).
- Schacter D. Implicit knowledge: new perspectives on the study of unconscious processes (indefinite) .
